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COMES NOW Plaintiffs, George Martin and Martin Custom Homes, LLC, by 
George Martin, through counsel, and file this Memorandum in Response to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and in support thereof states as follows: 
PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
1. The District Court for the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
Camas County, in Case No. CV-07-24, has made findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
orders regarding the litigation between the parties hereto, which are all attached hereto 
and made a part hereof, and which have binding and controlling precedent on issues 
pending before this Court. Plaintiffs hereby request this Court to take judicial notice of 
same, and offer each said order, marked as Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 into evidence. These 
rulings by the State Court have a binding and preclusive affect on the determinations 
before this Court as "law of the case". Defendants are collaterally estopped from re-
litigating the facts and issues determined therein. Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of 
Agriculture, 478 F.3d 985,1007 (9th Cir. 2007) 
INTRODUCTION 
2. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. I.R.c.P. 56(c). 
The district court, and this Court on appeal, must liberally construe the facts in the 
existing record in favor of the party opposing the motion, who is also to be given the 
benet It of all reasonable inferences drawn from those facts Student Loan Fund of Idaho, 
Inc. v. Pavette County, 125 Idaho 824, 827-28 (Ct. App. 1994) citing, Doe v. Durtschi. 
110 Idaho 466, 469, 716 P.2d 1238, 1241 (1986); Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed Credit 
Union, 103 Idaho 245, 646 P.2d 10 16 (Ct.App.1982). 
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RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
3. The matter pending before this Court has a convoluted procedural history, both 
administrative and judicial. (Procedural history provided by Exhibits 1-3, prior Court 
Orders.) The Camas County Board of Commissioners, (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Board") in late 2005 instructed the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission 
(hereinafter referred to as the "P&Z" or "Commission") to amend the zoning ordinance 
and rezone certain areas of Camas County. 
4. The P&Z held meetings and hearings and eventually submitted an Amended 
Comprehensive Plan with amended Land Use Map and an Amended Zoning Ordinance 
and amended Zoning Map to the Board. Notably P&Z did not submit any written 
findings. 
5. Thereafter the Board adopted, on May 25, 2006, as Resolution 96, an amended 
Comprehensive Plan, (amended again on March 29, 2007); on March 29, 2007, as 
Ordinance #150, an amended Zoning Designation Map; and on April 18, 2007, as 
Ordinance #153, an amended Zoning Ordinance. 
6. On or about May 4,2007 Plaintiffs filed in this Court, under Case No. CV-07-24, 
their Petition seeking a declaration that the Camas County Comprehensive Plan adopted 
as Resolution 96, and the Camas County Zoning Ordinance and Zoning Map adopted as 
Ordinance numbers 150 and 153 were all and each of them invalid, null and void as 
violative of the substantive and procedural requirements of Idaho's Local Land Use 
Planning Act. 
7. The basis of challenge against the 2006-2007 Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map, 
Zoning Ordinance and Zoning Designation Map included vruious procedural and 
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substantive failures to comply with LLUPA and due process of law, including, but not 
limited to; failure to maintain a reviewable record; inadequate legal notice of Public Hearing 
violations; conflicts of interest, and failure to comply with the substantive dictates of 
LLUPA. 
8. The Court agreed with Plaintiffs and issued Preliminary Injunctions against 
Defendants on December 28, 2007 and then again on April 2, 2008, finding that an 
inadequate record had been maintained, and that the chair of the Planning and Zoning 
Commission, Ed Smith, and the chair of the Board of County Commissioners, Ken 
Backstrom, had proceeded despite unlawful conflicts of interest. (Decisions attached 
hereto and made a part hereof) 
9. In reaction to the above referenced Court Orders, Defendant, Camas County on or 
about May 12, 2008, by Resolutions 114 and 115, illegally adopted a new Amended 
Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map. On that same date, by Ordinance Nos. 157 and 
159 the Camas County Board of Commissioners, adopted a new amended Zoning 
Ordinance and Zoning Designation Map. (See attached Exhibits for 2008 zomng 
amendment re-enactments) 
10. Plaintiffs in tum sought leave of Court to amend its Petition to include a request for 
Declaratory Judgment relating to these "2008 Amendments" which Motion languished 
while the parties attempted settlement negotiations, final evidentiary hearing of August 20, 
2008 and thereafter awaiting the Court's ruling, during the several month period when the 
declaratory judgment matter, and motion for leave were under advisement. 
11. Plaintiffs, in addition to the above referenced Motion to File Amended Petition, on 
May 20,2008, during an evidentiary hearing submitted in open court Plaintiffs Application 
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for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary InjlU1ction and Declaratory Relief, all 
addressed to seeking immediate judicial review of the 2008 amendments. (See Exhibit 25) 
12. While the declaratory judgment action was under advisement, on or about 
October 8, 2008, the Court issued its order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File 
Amended Petition by Adding Two Additional Causes of Action, namely actions for 
damages lU1der Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, which motion had been filed prior 
to the conclusion oftrial. 
13. On October 15, 2008, within one week of the Court's ruling refusing to allow 
amendment of the Petition in the original action to allow litigation regarding validity of 
the 2008 amendments, Plaintiffs filed the instant action by Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment. 
14. On or about November 5, 2008 Defendant Camas County, and the individual 
defendant's Backstrom, Davis, and Chapman filed Notice of Removal to Idaho Federal 
District Court. 
15. On December 3, 2008 this Fifth Judicial District Court for the State of Idaho, 
County of Camas, issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Following 
Trial granting all relief requested by Plaintiffs, adjudging" (1) The amendments to the 
Comp Plan adopted May 25, 2006 and March 29 2007, as Resolution 96 are null and 
void. (2) The amendments to the Camas County Zoning Ordinance, adopted April 18, 
2007, as Ordinance #153, and the Zoning Designation Map adopted March 29,2007 as 
Ordinance # 150 are all, and each of them, null and void." 
16. On or about February 11, 2009 Defendants filed the Motion for Summary 
Judgment now before the Court. 
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17. The Federal District Court, on March 17, 2009, issued its Order granting 
Plaintiffs Motion to Remand. (Order of the United States District Court for The District 
of Idaho attached hereto.) 
IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUES 
18. This Honorable Court, in its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Application 
for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction found Plaintiff was not 
likely to succeed on the merits of his cause of action. The Court concluded that the 
Defendants' conduct in adopting the 2008 amendments was legislative, rather the quasi-
judicial. Therefore, this Court concluded that "plaintiff would have to prove that the 
Board either (l) failed to comply with the notice and hearing requirements on I.e. 
sections 67-6509 & 67-6511 or (2) that the County acted arbitrarily or capriciously in its 
repeal of the prior plan and ordinance and its adoption of the 2008 plan and ordinance." 
Furthermore, this Court concluded that Plaintiff had yet to establish standing, by proof of 
a "distinct palpable injury .... fairly traceable causal connection bctween the claimed 
injury and the challenged conduct." 
Not surprisingly Counsel for Defendants in his Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment tracks these conclusions with his arguments, that Plaintiffs lack 
standing; that the Board's 2008 amendments were legislative and not quasi-judicial, and 
therefore subject to constitutional attack only for an arbitrary abuse of authority, which 
they argue is not the case here. It is understandable how an initial cursory review of the 
case law could easily lead to these conclusions. 
However, a complete understanding of the facts of this case and the entire 
development of the law makes clear that Mr. Martin has suffered particularized harm, 
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fairly traceable to the Boards actions; that the Board's 2008 amendments are quasl-
judicial, not legislative, in character giving rise to heightened due process; and the 
Board's actions in adopting the 2008 amendments violate both procedural and 
substantive requirements of the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) and 
constitutional guarantees. Alternatively, even if this Court cannot find the Board's 
actions in adopting an amended zoning ordinance, thereby rezoning Plaintiffs' 
neighboring properties, thereby reducing the economic value of plaintiffs' property, are 
entitled to quasi-judicial due process scrutiny, then the Board's actions were arbitrary and 
capricious and in violation of the notice and hearing provisions of I.C. sections 67-6509 
& 67-6511. 
The legal issues, and sub-issues, before this court, in order of analysis are as follows; 
(a) Whether Plaintiffs have standing to challenge Defendants' actions in adoption 
of the 2008 amendments? 
a. Whether one's own property must be the subject of one's O\vn 
application for rezone to obtain standing? 
(b) Whether Defendants' actions in adoption of the 2008 amendments were quasi-
judicial or legislative or stated alternatively, what level of due process scrutiny 
is due Plaintiff under the facts presented? 
a. Whether a rezone application must be that of a non-government 
employee property owner to confer quasi-judicial status? 
b. Whether a rezone application must be for a single parcel to confer 
quasi judicial status? 
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c. Whether a rezone application generated by members of the Board 
directed at many parcels of property, including parcels owned by 
members of Board and Commission require heightened due process? 
(c) Whether genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether LLUPA 
procedural and substantive requirements have been met by Defendants? 
CONTESTED FACTS 
19. In its statement of material facts, and by affidavits of Dwight Butlin and Ken 
Backstrom, in a general way, Defendants assert that the procedural and substantive 
requirements of LLUPA have been met. However the allegations made by verified 
Petition, restated herein, and reiterated in the attached affidavits and supported by the 
attached documentary evidence have not been directly challenged. It must also again be 
noted the above referenced Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance and 
Zoning Designation Map were adopted by Defendant, Camas County, in an abbreviated 
process whereby the entire "deliberative process" by the Planning and Zoning 
Commission and Board of Commissioners occurred in mere minutes without any actual 
analysis of the substantive dictates of LLUPA, nor was the taint of conflict of interest in 
anyway removed. 
(a) This Court has previously issued no less than four (4) orders concluding that 
Plaintiffs' have standing to challenge Defendants' rezoning of property he 
owns, has a contractual interest in, and neighboring properties. 
(b) George Martin is a real estate professional who acquired interest in Camas 
County real property with the specific intention of development, based upon 
the land use designation and zoning then present on the property in which he 
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acquired an interest AND the land use designation and zoning then present on 
neighboring properties and throughout the County. 
(c) Defendants' actions in adopting the 2008 amendments were amendments of a 
pre-existing zoning schematic in Camas County. 
(d) Discrete and individual parcels of real property, each holding property rights 
in said zoning, were either altered or affected by alteration of neighboring 
property by virtue of the rezone. 
(e) The permitted zoned use of Plaintiffs' property and that of surrounding 
properties were changed as a result of the 2008 amendments. 
(f) Plaintiffs challenge the validity of the 2008 amendments because they were 
illegally adopted. (See McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657 851 P.2d 
953) The basis of Plaintiffs' claim is not that Defendants made the wrong 
zoning decision, but that the enactment of the 2008 amendments did not 
comply with LLUPA. 
(g) Defendants failed to comply with notice and hearing requirements of I.C. 67-
6509 and 67-6511 in the following respects; 
I. No summary of the proposed amendments was published. (See 
legal notice of public hearing attached hereto - citation Jerome 
County v. Halloway, 118 Idaho 681) 
n. Notice of public hearing was not provided to all political 
subdivisions providing services within the planning 
jurisdiction, specifically the City of Fairfield and West Magic 
Fire District 
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111. Deficiencies under I.C. Section 67-6511 and Camas County No. 
142 in providing additional or alternative notice in the case of 
zoning district boundary change in that notice was not posted as 
required at the Camas County Courthouse or Fairfield City Hall 
iv. Deficiencies in the recommendations made by the Planning and 
Zoning Commission to the Board of County Commissioner 
regarding the new amended Comprehensive Plan, Zoning 
Ordinance and related Land Use Map and Zoning Designation 
Map in violation ofLC. Sections 67-6507,67-6509 (a) & (b), 67-
6511 (b), and in the findings issued by the Board of 
Commissioners, after public hearings concluded and containing 
matters never deliberated upon. 
(h) Defendants failed to publish the entire text, including legal description of the 
rezoned land, of the ordinances amending the comprehensive plan and 
rezoning individual property within the County, or alternatively a summary 
that actually describes the amendments made as required by I.C. Section 31-
715. 
(i) Members of the Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of County 
Commissioners had an economic interest in the outcome of this process 
under Idaho Code Section 67-6506 and despite recusing themselves, 
because the outcome was predetermined and the substance of the 
Comprehensive Plan, Zoning Ordinance and related maps were 
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substantially the same as those previously enjoined, are illegal as the 
result of a process tainted by fatal conflict of interest. 
G) The draft date of the new amended Camas County Comprehensive Plan and 
Zoning Ordinance is March 10, 2008 before any meeting had been held, 
indicating unnoticed and illegal meetings of the Board of Commissioners. 
(k) The draft date of the new amended Camas County Comprehensive Plan and 
Zoning Ordinance Land Use Map and Zoning Map is March 142008 before 
any meeting had been held, indicating unnoticed and illegal meetings of the 
Board of Commissioners. 
(l) In addition to the above statutory procedural errors the Defendants do not 
factually answer or point to documents and records indicating even an effort 
to comply with the substantive requirements of LLUP A found in Idaho 
Code 67-6502. 
(m) Similarly, I.C. Section 67-6528 states in relevant part, " ... In adoption and 
implementation of the plan and ordinances, the governing board or 
commission shall take into account the plans and needs of the state of 
Idaho and all agencies, boards, departments, institutions, and local special 
purpose districts ... " No such accounting of said plans or needs was had 
in this case or appears in the record of same, and Defendants have pointed 
to nothing in its Motion for Summary Judgment to cure this absence in the 
record. 
(n) Likewise, I.e. Section 67-6511 (a) provides in relevant part, " ... Requests 
for an amendment to the zoning ordinance shall be submitted to the 
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zoning or planning and zonmg commISSIOn which shall evaluate the 
request to determine the extent and nature of the amendment requested. 
Particular consideration shall be given to the effects of any proposed zone 
change upon the delivery of services by any political subdivision 
providing public services, including school districts, within the planning 
jurisdiction ... " No such evaluation of the extent and nature of the 
amendment has here occurred, or appears in the record of same. 
(0) Similarly, I.e. Section 67-6511 (b) allows a Planning and Zoning 
commission to make a recommendation to amend a Zoning Ordinance 
only "After considering the comprehensive plan and other evidence 
gathered through the public hearing process ... " No such consideration 
was made or appears anywhere in the record of this new process, and 
Defendants have pointed to nothing in its Motion for Summary Judgment 
to cure this absence in the record. 
(p) Idaho Code Section 67-6537 (4), states "When considering amending, 
repealing or adopting a comprehensive plan, the local governing board 
shall consider the effect the proposed amendment, repeal or adoption of 
the comprehensive plan would have on the source, quantity and quality of 
ground water in the area." Nothing in the record hereof indicates that any 
such consideration of ground water issues was had by the Camas County 
Board of Commissioners, and Defendants have pointed to nothing in its 
Motion for Summary Judgment to cure this absence in the record. 
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(q) Finally, the legislature, to be certain the purposes of LLUPA were 
adhered to, adopted 67-6535, requiring approvals of land use ordinances 
affecting a change in zoning district boundary, like that which has 
occurred here, to base the decision upon standards in writing. None of 
this occurred in the initial or new amendment process, and Defendants 
have pointed to nothing in its Motion for Summary Judgment to cure this 
absence in the record. 
None of the above facts are challenged and remain outstanding and ripe for trial. 
STANDING 
20. Plaintiff has standing. In Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 
(1989), the Court stated three basic propositions concerning standing that guide our 
decision here: 
]. The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the 
issues the party wishes to have adjudicated. 
2. To satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally 
must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the 
judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. 
3. A citizen and taxpayer may not challenge a governmental enactment where the 
injury is one suffered alike by all citizens and taxpayers of the jurisdiction. 
Miles at 641, 778 P.2d at 763. Standing may be predicated upon a threatened harm as 
well as a past injury. Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 133 P.3d 1232. (2006) 
In order to have standing a plaintiff must show that it has a personal stake in the 
outcome of the controversy. "This requirement of personal stake has come to be 
understood to require not only a distinct palpable injury but also a fairly traceable causal 
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connection between the claimed injury and challenged conduct." Rural Kootenai 
Organization Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, 133 Idaho 833, 993 P.2d 596 (1999), 
quoting Butters v Hauser, 131 Idaho 498, quoting Miles v. Idaho Power Co, 116 Idaho 
635. "To satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must 
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief 
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Miles. Miles, a mere ratepayer, was 
found to have standing to seek declaratory judgment. The Court emphasized, "This is 
more than a generalized grievance. It is a specialized and peculiar injury, although it 
may affect a large class of individuals. Miles at 642. (emphasis added) 
Rural Kootenai is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the instant matter. In 
Rural Kootenai the Plaintiff was an organization that challenged a subdivision 
preliminary plat approval for alleged violation of its due process rights as a result of not 
receiving proper notice. The organization claimed the harm or peril it was protecting 
against was water pollution. The Supreme Court held plaintiff lacked standing to 
challenge notice, but curiously addressed the merits of the organization's claims and 
remanded the matter due to violation of the local ordinance. Rural Kootenai at 841. The 
Court cited Student Loan Fund of Idaho. Inc. v. PaYette County, 125 Idaho 824, 827-28 
(Ct. App. 1994) for the proposition that" ... situs of owned property in relation to an area 
touched by the ordinance is relevant to a standing inquiry only insofar as the property's 
location exposes the owner to peculiarized harm." 
In Student Loan Fund of Idaho. Inc. v. Payette County, 125 Idaho 824, a 
corporation that owned land in Payette County that was designated as within a newly 
declared area of city impact by an Area of City Impact Agreement, pursuant to LLUPA, 
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I.e. § 67-6526, brought declaratory judgment action challenging validity of agreement. 
Neither the agreement, nor the implementing ordinances, actually rezoned the property, 
but did call for future rezoning ordinances. Student Loan Fund, at 825. The Court 
pointed out that Plaintiff did not allege the governments' actions will increase the Fund's 
taxes, decrease services available to the Fund, decrease the value of the Fund's property, 
prevent the Fund from developing its property, or interfere with the Fund's use and 
enjoyment of its property. The Court found no evidence that the zoning called for by the 
agreement would alter in any way the permitted uses of or restrictions upon the Fund's 
property or adjoining land, or that it has or will impair the land's marketability or value 
and therefore it lacked standing. Id at 826-27. 
Unlike in Rural Kootenai and Student Loan Fund here plaintiff is an individual, 
not an organization, who, as the basis for standing, complains of financial damage, not an 
environmental harm to be suffered by all citizens, or mere proximity. Mr. Martin does 
not complain that he is harmed solely because of the location of his land in a new 
comprehensive land use designation he may suffer some future harm, but that he has 
suffered an immediate negative fiscal impact because of tbe actual rezoning of his 
property and adjacent lands. More specifically, Mr. Martin does allege that the value 
of the property in which he has an interest is reduced in value by the 2008 amendments; 
will suffer decrease in available services; and increase in taxes and prevent him from 
developing the land as he would have been able under the pre-existing zoning schematic. 
This Court cited Ameritel Inns. Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium District, 141 
Idaho 849 (2005) for the proposition that Plaintiffs have, thus far, not sho'vVTI a distinct 
and palpable injury to himself with a fairly traceable causal connection between the 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ] 5 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
claimed injury and challenged conduct. In fact the Idaho Supreme Court found that 
Ameritel did have standing. Ameritel was a taxpayer within the Auditorium District that 
offered convention and meeting services who challenged a bond election seeking to raise 
funds for a convention center expansion. In finding Ameritel had standing the Court 
highlighted Plaintiff's claim that "substantial expansion of meeting facilities proposed in 
the Capital Station project . . . will increase the District meeting space that is in 
competition with meeting space of Ameritel." The Court found this to be an allegation of 
a particularized injury that is not one suffered alike by all citizens within the boundaries 
of the Auditorium District. Ameritel at 852-53. Like in the Ameritel case, Plaintiffs here 
complains that the government's illegal action will increase competition and therefore 
hurt him financially. 
In the LLUP A realm only an isolated few cases can be found where standing is 
discussed and not found. An overwhelming majority of the cases do not address the issue 
and simply move on with an analysis of the appropriate criteria to be applied. In the 
recent case, Cowan v. Board of Com'rs of Fremont County 148 P.3d 1247 (2006) the 
Court found plaintiff had standing to challenge approval of a subdivision on neighboring 
land. Cowan alleged that a new development, if built, would adversely impact his 
property rights and diminish his property value. The Cowan Court cited with approval 
Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71 (2003) stating "In Evans this Court determined that 
in land use decisions, a party's standing depends on whether his or her property will be 
adversely affected by the land use decision. See Evans, 139 Idaho at 75, 73 P.3d at 88. 
This Court held "[t]he existence of real or potential harm is sufficient to challenge a 
land use decision." Id. at 76, 73 P.3d at 89. (emphasis added) Mr. Martin, like the 
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plaintiffs in Cowan and Evans, is or will be adversely impacted, in a financial way, by 
development on neighboring properties. 
Without a specific discussion of standing, the Court proceeded to the merits of 
alleged LLUP A violations in Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey, 133 
Idaho 320, 986 P.2d 343, when the City had rezoned property owned by plaintiff. The 
Court found the city's rezoning process invalid because the comprehensive plan upon 
which the rezone relied was not in compliance with LLUP A. The Sprenger Grubb case 
demonstrates that standing does not depend upon who brings a rezone application, a land 
owner or the government. Jerome County v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681, 799 P .2d 969 
(1990) 
QUASI-JUDICIAL VERSUS LEGISLATIVE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS 
21. The Idaho Supreme Court in Cooper v. Board of County Commissioner of Ada 
County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980), fundamentally altered judicial review 
criteria in examining the validity of local land use decisions by local governing boards. 
Gay v. County Commissioners of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 628; 651 P.2d 560 
(1982). For the first time a distinction was drawn between adoption of comprehensive 
plans or the enactment of general zoning ordinances in contrast to decisions about 
whether to rezone particular parcels of property. Adoption of general zoning policies was 
deemed legislative, while rezoning of property was deemed quasi-judicial. Legislative 
conduct, the court held, could be attacked only on constitutional grounds for an arbitrary 
abuse of authority, whereas quasi-judicial actions afford the adversely affected citizen or 
aggrieved party full due process of law. Cooper at 411. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 17 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In discussing its rationale the Cooper Court stated, "The shield from meaningful 
judicial review which the legislative label provides is inappropriate in these highly 
particularized land use decisions." Id at 410. The Court favorably quoted Professor 
Arthur Smith, from Judicial Review of Rezoning Discretion: Some Suggestions for 
Idaho, 14 Idaho L.Rev. 591-99, " ... When such a process determines what a particular 
owner mayor may not do, whether an adjoining owner's expectation will be 
compromised, whether a community will accommodate housing needs, we may question 
its essential fairness." 
In the case before the Court the permit or application in question is that referenced 
specifically in I.C. Section 67-65 I 1 (b), an amendment of a previously established zoning 
ordinance. Like in Cooper, the ultimate outcome of the process determined what Mr. 
Martin could or could not do with his property, and altered his expectations, as a 
neighbor, of what could be done with surrounding properties, thus damaging him 
financially. The Court in Cowan, Evans and Price v. PaYette County Board of 
Commissioners, 131 Idaho 426 (1998) all have made clear that the particularized damage 
to a plaintiff need not necessarily stem from the adverse impacts, past or future, of a 
rezone on his property, but adverse impacts resulting from a rezoning his neighbors 
property. 
Likewise the Court in Gay, 103 Idaho 626 held that owners of property adjoining 
a parcel for which the governing board approved a change of use, previously not 
permitted, were entitled to procedural due process. The ovvners of neighboring property 
brought an action to vacate the board's permitting process citing numerous procedural 
errors and insufficient findings and record. Id at 627. Like in the present case, the 
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question before the Court in Gay was "whether procedural due process was afforded in 
proceedings before zoning authorities, on a request to change the authorized use of a 
particular parcel of land." As should the Court here, the Court in Gay answered in the 
affirmative. 
The Court reiterated that "the right to procedural due process is secured by 
Article 1 Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. The Court went on to determine what process is due 'affected 
persons' under I.C. Section 67-6521, and held that " ... notice, opportunity to be present 
and rebut evidence, preparation of specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, and 
the keeping of a transcribable record comprise a common core of procedural due process 
requirements, constitutionally mandated in all cases where zoning authorities are 
requested to change the land use authorized for a particular parcel of property." Id at 629. 
In McCusky v. Canvon County, 123 Idaho 657; 851 P.2d 953 (1993) a landowner 
who's property had been down-zoned from "heavy industrial" to "rural residential" filed 
a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the zoning amendment two 
years earlier. Plaintiff argued that the procedure by which the zoning amendment was 
adopted violated his due process rights because he was not personaI1y notified of any 
hearings to consider a zoning change to his property. The Court agreed. The first issue 
was whether the rezone could be challenged by action for Declaratory Judgment, to 
which the Court answered in the affirmative. 
The McCusky Court reasoned that the challenge was as to the validity of the 
enactment of a comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance, not that the authorities made 
the 'wrong zoning decision. ld at 660. The Court quoted the opinion in Jerome Countv v. 
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Holloway, 118 Idaho 681, 799 P .2d 969 (1990), " ... the district court has jurisdiction to 
issue its declaratory judgment regarding the validity of the 1985 amendment to the 
zoning ordinance. In Jerome County v. Holloway, the Court emphatically stated, "When 
the statute requires notice and hearing as to the possible effects of a zoning law upon 
property rights the action of the legislative body becomes quasi-judicial in character, and 
the statutory notice and hearing then become necessary in order to satisfy the 
requirements of due process of law, and may not be dispensed with .. .It is a well settled 
principle that notice and hearing requirements in zoning enabling acts are conditions 
precedent to the proper exercise of the zoning authority" id at 684. 
In Scott v. Gooding, 137 Idaho 206 46 P.3d 33 (2002), the Court found an 
Ordinance requiring one thousand feet of separation between a CAFO and a residence to 
be legislative. The Court, citing Cooper, detennined that a legislative action, while 
recognizing the right to proceed by claim for declaratory relief, cannot be attacked by 
petition for judicial review. The Court reasoned that nothing in the record indicated that 
plaintiff's intended their petition to include a claim for Declaratory Relief. The lesson 
from Halloway, McCusky and Scott, is that even if an action can be deemed legislative, 
when notice and hearing are required, the matter will be evaluated lmder a quasi-judicial 
standard. It must be noted that in the case before the Court was filed, and is, an action for 
declaratory relief. Under these standards Plaintiff is entitled to full due process of law. 
In 2008 the Idaho Supreme Court decided three cases that Defendant urges this 
Court to accept as controlling. The cases, Giltner v. Jerome COlmty, 145 Idaho 630, 
Highlands Development v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, and Euclid Avenue Trust v. 
City of Boise, 193 P .3d 853, are all easily distinguishable from the case at bar. In Giltner 
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a Dairy challenged a comprehensive plan amendment applicable to neighboring property 
that received an upgraded land use designation. No rezoning or other application as 
contemplated by LLUPA was at issue. Euclid stands only for the limited proposition that 
civil actions cannot be joined with a petition for judicial review. In Highlands, the Court 
held that LLUPA does not provide for a challenge by petition for judicial review to initial 
zoning of annexed property, and referred to LLUPA for the types of actions the provide a 
remedy, such as rezones. The Martin case, unlike the Giltner case involves a rezone, of 
his and adjoining properties and not merely a comprehensive plan land use designation 
change on his neighbors' property. Martin has not joined civil actions to a Petition for 
Judicial Review, as prohibited by Euclid, but pursued his right to proceed by independent 
action attacking the validity of the zoning ordinance. Finally, Highlands addressed the 
right to challenge by judicial review an initial zoning of annexed property, not an 
amendment to established zoning districts under I.C. Section 67-6511 (b), such as is the 
facts in this case. 
The only distinction that can fairly and reasonably be drawn between Cooper and 
its progeny is the number of particular parcels of property rezoned. As a matter of public 
policy the safeguards necessary and scrutiny to be given when many discrete parcels are 
rezoned must be more, not less. Because the Board of Commissioners directed the P&Z 
to rezone large areas and many parcels of real property, including property that they 
themselves owned, (unbekno\\-l1st to other members of the Commission or Board) does 
not provide a public policy rationale to offer them a shield from meaningful judicial 
review. The fact that many parcels were rezoned at one time does remove the need for a 
more controlling standard. The scale issue was addressed by the Court in Miles, and 
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found not to defeat a challenge to government action on procedural grounds. "To allow 
the discretion of local zoning bodies to remain virtually unlimited in the determination of 
individual rights is to condone government of men rather than government by law." 
Cooper at 411. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray this Court enter its Order denying Defendants 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
ATTORN OR PLAINTIFF 
Christopher P. Simms 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 1 st day of April, 2009, a copy of 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served upon counsel via facsimile and addressed to Paul 
Fitzer, Attorney for Camas County Defendants 950 W. Bannock St., Ste 520, Boise, 
Idaho 83702, facsimile number 208331 1202. 
Christopher P. Simms 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM) Case No.: CV-07-24 
HOMES, L.L.c. , ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) DECISION ON REQUIREMENTS OF A 
) "TRANSCRlBABLE VERBATIM RECORD" 
ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO,) AND OTHER RECORDS FOR PURPOSES 
by and through the duly elected Board of ) OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Commissioners in their official capacity, KEN) 
BACKSTROM, BILL DA VIS , and RON ) 
CHAPMAN, ) 
) 
Defendant ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Thi s matter came on for hearing at the Camas County Courthouse on the 25th of 
September, 2007. Chri stopher Simms, Ketchum , Idaho, appearing for and on behalf of 
pl ainti ff, and Carl Wit hroc, Boise, Idaho appearin g for and on behalf of Camas County. 
The onl y issues for hearing on this date, based on prior agreements between counse l and 
with the COUI1. were whether Camas County had maintained an adequate reviewable 
record of admini strative hearin gs as required by law. If not, the Court is to consider 
whether an order should issue restraining or preliminaril y enj oining defendant Camas 
County from acting upon or processing land-use applications and/or rezoning property, 
and/or approving subdivisions. 
The plaintiff, at the Court ' s direction, has reserved till later whether other 
challenges and issues raised by pl aintiff to the functioning and/or authority of the Camas 
County Planning and Zoning Commission (e.g.-other LLUPA violations, conflicts of 
interest, adequacy of notice, etc.) are valid. Evidence was submitted, and at the 
conclusion of hearing, add itional briefing was called for, to be completed by October 16, 
2007. The briefs have been timely received by the Court, and the matter \vas taken under 
advisement by the Court on October 16,2007 . 
The Court reiterates statements in its decision of August 2007 that factual 
determinations made in this decision and order are for purposes of a preliminary 
injunction on ly. Pursuant to Rule 65(a) IRCP, evidence rece ived upon this application for 
a preliminary injunction becomes part of the record on the tri al and need not be repeated 
upon the trial. However, there may still be evidence the defendants seek to introduce 
which alters or amends current findings or conclusions. Thus, no findings or conclusions 
made in th is order are !inaL and they may be modified, altered , or even reversed as the 
case progresses and further evidence develops. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
(1) Does the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act apply to Camas County 
planning and zoning activity? 
(2) Even if the APA applies, do the actions of Camas County in 
implementing a new Comprehensive Plan amI a new zoning ordinance constitute 
"legislative activity" which is not subject to judicial review? 
(3) If the APA applies, and/or Camas County's activities are subject to 
judicial review, has Camas County complied with legal requirements by 
~---.,..., .. =------------.. 
maintaining a "transcribable verbatim record" (and other required records) during 
the course of proceedings? 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Preliminarily, the Court must rule on the defendant's Motion to Strike the 
Affidavit of George Mm1in filed after hearing. There is no provision for the filing of this 
atTidavit. The Court did not grant leave to submit additional evidence. Mr. Martin's 
assertions in the affidavit "vere not and are not subject to cross-examination. The Motion 
to Strike will be granted. The profened evidence may certainly be the subject of later 
hearings, but it comes too late to consider it as a part of this hearing. 
Does the Idaho Administrative rroccdure Act (APA) apply to the Camas 
County proceedings? 
The APA, found at Title 67, Chapter 52 of the Idaho Code, has its own set of 
notice, hearing, and record-keeping requirements, over and above those required by the 
Local Land Use Planning Act, (I.e. 67-6501 et seq.) Camas County cites Gibson v. Ada 
Coumy Sheriff's Dep'/ 139 Idaho 5, 7, 72 pJrd 845 (2003) for the proposition that local 
governing boards are not --agencies" under the APA ,and hencc thc APi\ cloes not apply 
to them, unless a statute expressly makes provisions of the i\Pi\ applicable to them. 
Plaintiff Martin points to Urrutia v. Blaine County 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3 rd 738 (2000). 
Un'ilia is an appellate review of a zoning decision, and states flatly that the Idaho 
Administrative Procedures Act (lDAPA) governs review of local administrative 
decisions, and the Board (Blaine County's Board of Commissioners) is treated as an 
administrative agency for purposes of judicial review. Urrutia cites Comer v. City of 
Twin Falls, 130 Idaho 433, 942 P.2od 557 (1967) for authority, although there is a long 
line ofIdaho cases since then that support this position. See, e.g. Price v. Payette County 
Board o.fCommissioners 131 Idaho 426,958 P.2nd 583, (1998), Evans v. Teton County 
139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3rd 84 (2003), Payette River Property Owners Ass'n v. Board of 
Commissioners of Valley County 132 Idaho 55 1,976 P.2nd 477 (1999), and Cowan v. 
Board o{Commissioners oj Fremont County 143 Idaho 501, 143 P.3 rd 1247 (2006). 
Moreover, a statute does exist, in the LLUP A which expressly makes provisions of the 
APA applicable to LL UP A. See Idaho Code 67-6521 (1)( d). In fact, the proposition that 
the APA applies to county zoning decisions has been so well established it is difficult to 
believe Camas County located the Gibson v. Ada County case without running across the 
numerous other decisions in the land use area which support it. Counsel are reminded of 
their ethical obligation to disclose controlling authority to the Court. In short, the Court 
rejects the suggestion that the provisions ofIDAPA do not apply to Camas County's Jand 
use decisions. 
Do the actions of Camas County, in amending their Comprehensive Plan and 
adopting a new zoning ordinance, constitute "legislative activity" which is not 
subject to judicial review'? 
Camas County contends that they met the LLUPA requirements for record 
keeping. that LLUP A does not require local governing boards to maintain the sort of 
record plaintiffs claim should be kept under IDAPA, and that, in any event, "legislative 
activity" (as opposed to quasi-judicial activity) is immune from judicial review, citing 
Burt v. City of Idaho Falls ] 05 Idaho 65, 665 P.2nd 1075 (1983). They argue further that 
the challenged activity of Camas County is not subject to the requirements of 67-6536 
(maintain a transcribable verbatim record) because "no appeal is provided for". As noted 
above, 67-6521 (1 )(d) provides for an appeal pursuant to the provisions of the APA 
allowing judicial review. Thus, Camas County must provide a transcribable verbatim 
record as mandated by 67-6536 if the challenged actions of the County are "quasi-
judicial" as opposed to "legislative" in nature. Camas County correctly points to Cooper 
v. Board of County Com'rs of Ada County 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2nd 947 (1980) as the 
most definitive case on this point. Camas claims their activity (in amending the 
Comprehensive Plan and adopting a new zoning ordinance) is legislative, because the 
actions of Camas County, (even though Camas County may have changed the zoning in 
large areas of Camas County through this activity), were no! undertaken at the instance 
or request of any specific lando·wner. This particular distinction sought by Camas County 
does not appear to be supported by case authority. The origin of the zoning application 
does not appear to be legally significant. This is as it should be. It matters not to one 
whose property has been rezoned to their detriment whether the request came from a 
particular landowner or the governing body. The distinguishing characteristics, rather, 
between legislative and quasi-j udicial activity are whether the action "produces a general 
rule or policy which is applicable to an open class of individuals, interest, or situations, or 
whether it entails the application of a general rule or policy to specific individuals, 
interests. or situations. If the former determination is satisfied, there is legislative action; 
if the latter determination is satisfied, the action is judicial.·' Cooper v. Board o.[Corn 'rs 
o/Ada County 101 Idaho 407.614 P 947 (1980), quoting from Fasano v. Board of 
County Com 'rs, 264 Or. 574. 504 P.2d 23, 26 (1973) 
"Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific piece of 
property are usually an exercise of legislative authority .. On the other hand, a 
determination whether the permissible use afa specific piece 0.[ property should be 
changed is usually an exercise o/judicial authority ... " Jd (emphasis added). 
"Generally, when a municipal legislative body enacts a comprehensive plan and 
zoning code it acts in a policy making capacity. But in amending a zoning code, or 
reclassifying land thereunder, the same body, in effect, makes an adjudication 
between the rights sought by the proponents and those claimed by the opponents of 
the zoning change. The parties whose interests are affected are readily identifiable." 
Cooper, supra, quoting Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327,331 
(1972) . 
This Court concludes that the actions of Camas County in effecting a rezone of 
large portions of the County by the adoption of a new zoning ordinance is quasi-judicial, 
rather than legislative activity, and thus is not immune from judicial review. This 
conclusion mandates a second conclusion: because the action of the county is "quasi-
judicial, and thus reviewable, "an appeal is provided for" under I.e. 67-6536, and thus a 
'·transcribable verbatim record" of certain proceedings is required by I.e. 67-6536. 
Accordingly, the third issue referenced above (whether Camas County maintained such a 
record) presents itself for determination. 
Did Camas County maintain a transcribabJe verbatim record (or other 
required records) during the course of proceedings? 
There are several sub-issues that have been raised indirectly in the context of 
exploring whether Camas County maintained a transcribable verbatim record, most of 
them dealing with '.,vhat records have, or have noL been mainta1l1ed, and whether they 
meet the legal requirements of the APA or LLUP A. These sub-issues, which have not 
necessarily been put directly in issue by the procedural process that has been employed, 
include whether the Camas Planning and Zoning Commission kept records of their 
meetings, whether they made a recommendation to the Camas County Board of 
Commissioners, whether they held public hearings before they did so, and whether the 
Board of Commissioners issued findings of fact or conclusions oflaw after they amended 
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the Comprehensive Plan, or the zoning ordinance under attack. In the context of some of 
these sub-issues, it is entirely possible Camas County has maintained legally acceptable 
records, or held appropriate public hearings, or issued findings and conclusions, and they 
just have not been produced yet or are not before the Court. In this regard, the Court is 
sensitive to Defendant's stated position that they have not known exactly what records 
Plaintiff claims have not been maintained. As this is an application for a preliminary 
injunction, and has been proceeding as Plaintiff raises issues in successive hearings, it is 
entirely possible some of these records do exist in proper fonn, and will be produced in 
due course. The COUl1 does not intend to dwell extensively on these sub-issues, except to 
the extent to note what is required, what will eventually have to be produced, and to what 
extent these sub-issues impact the present issue (which has been squarely raised) as to 
vvhether a transcribable verbatim record was kept at the necessary times. 
First. it should be noted that whether activity of the Camas P&Z, or the Board of 
Commissioners, for that matter, is legislative or quasi-judicial does not exempt them 
from statutory requirements imposed by LLUPA. For example, prior to recommending a 
Comprehensive Plan, or (111 amendment or repeal o/a Comp Plan, (which all might be 
purely legislative activity) the P&Z Commission must conduct at least one publie hearing 
in which interested people shall have an opportunity to be heard. I.C 67-6509. Notice of 
that meeting must be published along with "a summary of the plan to be discussed". 
Notice of intent to repeal or amend the plan must be sent to "all political subdivisions 
providing services" at least 15 days prior to the public hearing. 67-6509. If the governing 
board (Bd. Of Commissioners) will be conducting a subsequent public hearing, notice of 
the planning and zoning commission recomrnendation shall be included in the notice of 
hearing provided the governing board. Ie 67-6509(0). It provides further: "A 
record of the hearings, findings made, and actions taken by the commission shall be 
maintained by the city or county." These statutory mandates/or recordkeeping at the 
P&Z level may not be dispensed with. If challenged, the County has to have an adequate 
record that at leasl details when and where and how each of these things occurred. 
Moreover, the Court presumes, without deciding, that pursuant to the provisions of the 
Administrative Procedures Act, section 67-5249, actions at the P&Z level might 
constitute virtually the entire record subject to appeal. This could occur, for example, 
even if the actions of the P&Z are deemed entirely "legislative" proceedings in 
considering a Comp Plan amendment, (e.g.-if challenged in a declaratory judgment), for 
it is possible no further "agency" action under the APA occurs at the Board of 
Commissioner level; that is, tbe Board might not conduct further hearings under 67-
6509(a), and simply adopt the P&Z recommendations, and thus virtually the entire 
"agency record" required by 67-5249 might consist of what occurred at the P&Z level. 
In other cases, where the Board of Commissioners hears evidence or testimony or 
makes a final decision that is subject to appeal (e.g.-approval or denial of a subdivision) it 
might not be necessary for the P&Z to maintain certain records or make cel1ain findings. 
See Cowan v. Ed olCom 'rs olFremonr County I Idaho 501,148 P 3 fd 1247 (2006) 
(I.e. 67-6535(b) does not apply to decisions of the P&Z because P&Z lacks the authority 
to fInally approve or deny an application under -(504). The long and short of it is that 
the P&Z runs the risk projects may be challenged successfully if adequate records are not 
kept and the determination that records are inadequate might not come until much later. 
Applying these factors to the case at bar suggests that, as it appears the Comp 
Plan was amended, and the Camas P&Z Commission undertook and commenced work in 
this area at the instigation of the Board of Commissioners, there should exist, at a 
minimum, records of at least one public hearing held at the P&Z level, the findings 
made by the P&Z, the actions taken by the P&Z, and the recommendation rnade to the 
Board oj Commissioners should be included in the notice 0.( public hearing sent oul by 
the Board ojCommissioners. Finally, once the Board acted upon the Comp Plan and 
amended the zoning ordinance, written findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
required. "I.e. 67-6535 governs the issuance of findings of fact or conclusions of law 
relevant to a local land use agency's approval or denial of a land use application. 
Approval or denial of a land use application must be in writing explaining the relevant 
criteria and standards, the relevant contested facts, and the rationale for the decision 
based on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan and relevant ordinances." 
Evans v. Telon County 1339 Idaho 7 I, 73 PJd 84 (2003). The record in this case. thus 
far, would not appear to contain all these items. 
Those are the sub-issues. Of more immedi3te significance, however, are dual 
requirements under 67-6509(b) and 67-6536. Pursuant to the former section, the 
"governing board shall not hold a public hearing, give notice ora proposed hearing, nor 
[({ke action upon the plan, amendments, or repeal until recommendations have been 
receivedjl-om the commission" Pursuant to 67-6536. a transcribable verbatim record 
must be kept of all public hearings "during which the commission or governing board 
delibe,-ates toward a decision after compilation of the record." In the present case, 
{here is no record of any kind identifying IIhe/1 P&:t. recommendation (0 amend the 
Comp Plan vl'clS sent to or received by {he Board o(Commissio17ers, or who! if contained 
Thus it becomes impossiblc to tell whether the g(Hcrning board took action bef9re the 
recommendations were received from the P&Z commission, or whether the Board 
deliberated toward a decision "after compilation of the record". As the evidence bears 
out, it appears they did one or the other, without a "transcribable verbatim record"; there 
are many meetings of the Board that simply were not recorded. I f they had been, at least 
the pm1ies (and the Court) could tell whether discussions took place that violated one 
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statute or the other. Without any record that is verbatim, and can be transcribed, no one, 
least of all the Court, can be assured of what conversations took place. The absence of a 
transcribable verbatim record of zoning or land use proceedings may result in a violation 
of a party's right to procedural due process. Rural Kootenai Organization v. Board of 
Commissioners 133 Idaho 833, 993 P. 2nd 596, (1999). Furthermore, it is not possible at 
this point for persons present to present, by affidavit or testimony, their recollections of 
what was. or was not discussed, for the purpose of attempting to have the Court conclude 
no statutes were violated. To allow such testimony to stand in place of a verbatim record 
vvould nullify the very reason a verbatim record is required. Finally, in this case, even 
\vithout such an offer of proof, the evidence presented thus far leads the Court to the 
conclusion that deliberations took place between the Commissioners, 'whether the 
recomrnendalions had heen received or not, which violated the statutory provisions. That 
is. i r the recommendation had been received from P&Z, the evidence from the available 
minute entries suggests the Board was deliberating after compilation of the record, 
violating 65-6536. If the recommendations hod not been received, the Board appears to 
have taken "action upon the plan" before it was received; Of, at the very least (because 
no tapes were made). it is not possible to tell the Board did not take action These 
observations are directed at some of the oroceedings before the Board that arouablv ~ L.. b ,.; 
imohed the Comp Plan. but it is impossible to telL without a verbatim record, whether 
the Board was considering matters in the record already compiled, that related to 
amendment of the zoning ordinance as well. A review of the evidence supports findings 
tbat these things occurred. 
The Court finds from the evidence thus far that members of the P&Z undertook. 
after request from the Board of Commissioners, to amend the Comp Plan. It is not clear 
from the testimony that the P&Z did contact other agencies as required by I.C. 67-6509, 
1°2Lo2 
or even that P&Z held the public hearing required. Perhaps they did. There is no record 
thus for of any written recammendationfrom the P&Z to amend the Camp Plan, nor is 
there any record oj/indil1gs made by the P&Z Commission. I.e. 67-6509(0). 
Exhibit 9 from the hearing is the minutes of the Board of Commissioners meeting 
of November 14,2005. This meeting was not recorded, or no verbatim record exists. It is 
clear from the minutes the Board heard a request of George Barber to rezone 198 acres 
in Camas County. This process violates the requirement of a verbatim transcribable 
record, as the Board is hearing from an applicant regarding a pending application. While 
this action has not been attacked, it demonstrates clearly the Board is operating without a 
verbatim record on a matter where one is required, in violation of1.C 67-6536. 
On February J 3,2006, (Exhibit 10), the Board was addressed by Earl Wilson 
regarding P&Z matters. "He also shmved the Board the latest version of P&Z new 
proposed zoning map." There is no tape of this meeting. Has the Board received a written 
recommendation from P&Z at this point regarding amending the Comp Plan? No one 
knows. Thus, in conversations with Earl Wilson, is the Board '·taking action on a plan" 
before it is received. or is it "deliberating alter compilation of the record"? No one knows 
or can say. No verbatim record was kept. 
The same problem is evident on Exhibit 11. No record \vas made of the March 13, 
2006 meeting, or at least no tapes exist Two people appeared at a "public hearing" 
before the Board to request a rezone. "The Board \vorked on Planning and Zoning 
matters. " 
By April 13, 2006, it appears the Board has received a proposal to amend the 
Zoning Ordinance. See Exhibit) 2 page 2. Thus proceedings after this date appear fo be 
"deliberations after compilations of the record" which would require a transcribable 
verbatim record. There are no tapes of this meeting. Exhibit 15, page 2, contain the 
minutes of the June 26, 2006 meeting of the Board of Commissioners. There is no tape of 
this meeting. The minutes recite: "Earl Wilson met with the Board and discussed 
possible changes to the Zoning Ordinance regarding CUP's and Variances. " The only 
conclusion the Court can draw from this evidence is that the Board has the proposed 
ordinance before it and is discussing proposed changes to it. These would appear to be 
"deliberations after compilation of the record"; a transcribable record was required and 
there is none. 
On July lO, 2006, (Ex 16, pg. 2) the Board discussed possiblc amendments to 
Ordinance # II and voted to send it to the P&Z for a public hearing. The same problems 
exist, but there is no tape of the meeting . At the meeting on Aug 14, 2006, (Ex 17. pg. 
2). it appears from the minutes the Board deliberated changes to the Comp Plan, and 
determined to pass those along to the P&Z Commission. Without a record, one cannot tell 
what type of deliberations these are, or what evidence, if any has been considered. 
Pursuant to 67 -5249(2)(f)and (g)of the APA, the agency record should consist of "staff 
memoranda or data submitted" and any "preliminary order". The only record the Court 
has is 3 lines from the minutes. 
No tape exists of the Sept 26. meding At least 2 matters are of concern at 
that meeting. Apparently the Board a final approval of a subdivision. and clearly 
"deliberated" in doing so (see page 2 of Exhibit 18) A commiSSIoner recused himself 
from this proceeding, as it was apparently it was his cluster subdivision under review. 
Again, although this pal1icular activity (passing upon this particular subdivision) is not 
being challenged on the merits, it did require a verbatim record. Conflicts of interest will 
be explored in further proceedings. Of further concern is the mention in the minutes that 
Suzi Bingham "met with the Board regarding Planning and Zoning matters." Regarding 
what? The minutes continue that "the Board needed to decide what the definition of an 
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existing parcel meant." Why? Is this in regard to a pa11icular pending application? 
Amending the Zoning Ordinance under attack, or some other? Review of a P&Z 
recommendation? Amendment to the Comp Plan? Maybe this required a verbatim 
record, maybe it did not, but without one to review, and in view of other meetings, 
including this one, where a record clearly should have been kept and \vas not, the County 
cel1ainly is not entitled to the benefit of any doubt that might exist. 
Exhibit 20, page 2 are the minutes of the Board's meeting on November 28, 2006. 
They reflect "The Board continued discussing the proposed new Zoning Ordinance." 
There is no tape of this meeting. This would appear to be after recommendation or 
referral of this ordinance from P&Z: otherwise, there is no explanation as to how or why 
the Board has this before them for any type of consideration at all. The Court cannot 
escape the conclusion that this is "deliberating toward a decision after compilation of the 
record". without a verbatim record, in violation ofI.C. 67-6536. Even if the decision 
made at a meeting is only to determine to go forward to public hearing, or to make 
changes in proposed language, or on a zoning map, that would likely constitute 
"deliberating (Q\,vard a decision". (see 67-2341(2) for a definition of "deliberation" as 
Llsed in the open meetings law). From the record before the Court, no one can tell \vhat 
\vas discussed, what evidence, if any was received from staff or others, whether the 
Board considered proposed zoning maps, whether amendments to zoning particular 
parcels or areas was discussed, or whether proposed amendments to the Comp Plan found 
their way into these discussions. 
The same defects are present from the meeting held December 11, 2006. Once 
again, there is no tape. The Board "reviewed the Subdivision Ordinance and proposed 
changes". The Board "Discussed the Camas County Zoning Ordinance." "The Board 
discussed the City Area of Impact." They also decided, apparently, to have Ken "meet 
with the attorney to make the recommended revisions and forward on to the Planning and 
Zoning Commission." What are these recommended revisions? Are they amendments to 
the actual zoning? Are they amendments to definitions? Do they favor particular 
individuals? One cannot tell. 
Although there is a tape of the December 26, 2007 meeting, it is clear by then the 
Board has received "the P&Z map". Was that map discussed at prior meetings? When 
was it received by the Board? The record yields no answer. 
On Jan 8. 2007, and again on Jan 16,2007, the Board again "reviewed the 
proposed Zoning and Land Use Map." and on Jan 16 they also discussed the proposed 
Zoning Ordinance and Subdivision Ordinance. There is no tape of either meeting. See Ex 
24,25, and 29. On Jan ,2007. the Board met with Dwight Butlin, the Planning and 
Zoning Commissioner from Camas County. There is no tape of this meeting. The Board 
reviewed the Subdivision Ordinance ... and apparently discussed with Butlin changes 
made to the ordinance and wording from a "Technical Review Committee". What was 
that? Were there recommendations or proposals that came from them? If so, there is no 
record of what was reviewed. According to the APA. staff data or memoranda should 
be maintained and preserved. The: met agall1 on February 20, 2007 and reviewed the 
proposed Zoning Ordinance. SubclIvision Ordinance, Comp Plan Map and Zoning Map 
that "will be used at the Public Hearing on March 14,2007." (sec Ex 27, pg. 2) 
The last meetings directed toward this issue were held on March 26, 27, and 29. 
Tapes do exist of these meetings. They were not admitted into evidence, however, and 
what they contain is unknown to the Court. They do, presumably constitute a record as 
required by I.e. 67-6536. Apparently, the Zoning Ordinance was passed at this time, and 
the Zoning Map was approved, along with amendments to the Comp Plan. Although 
invited by the Court to submit whatever evidence they felt might be relevant on these 
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points, Camas County has not submitted any. To the Court's knowledge, there are no 
written findings of fact, conclusions of law, or record setting forth the relevant criteria 
and standards, what evidence the Board relied on, and their rationale, if any, for decisions 
reached. To an outsider, all of this looks as if the Board of Commissioners has gathered 
the data, deliberated along the way, consulted with their P&Z Commissioner, and made 
changes and revisions to the proposed Comp Plan, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map, 
all without a record. Then, once everything had been decided, they held a public hearing, 
on the record. After that, they passed amendments to the Comp Plan and the Zoning 
Ordinance. It is not these March 26, 27, and 29 hearings that concern the Court; it is the 
failure to record and preserve what appear to be deliberations "after compilation of the 
record" or "taking action upon the plan" prior to receipt ofa recommendation from P&Z, 
that occurred at other times and meetings before the Board took final action in the March 
hearings. 
It is clear the Board considered the Comp Plan and the proposed amendment to 
the zoning ordinance together. These procedures can be done in tandem. See Price v. 
Payelle County Ed Of County COI11 ·rs. 131 Idaho 426. 958 P.2d 583, (1998). However, 
it is 110t clear that the Board entered written findings and conclusions as required by I.e. 
35; perhaps they did and they are not yet in evidence. If they did not, a t~ltal flaw 
likely exists which will require the Court. e\cntually, to vacate the actions of the Board 
and remand for further proceedings. See Price v. Poyeul:! County, supra. 
CONCLUSIONS 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes Camas County has not met the 
requirements of Idaho Code 67-6536 by keeping a transcribable verbatim record in 
matters during which the governing board was deliberating toward a decision after 
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compilation of the record, and for which an appeal is provided-amendment of the zoning 
urdinance. This has been the primary thrust of the hearing conducted thus far on this 
issue. This conclusion is not likely to change upon trial or further hearing, as this 
particular challenge (absence of a verbatim record) has been raised directly, and the 
evidence has come from the testimony and records of the county employees charged with 
maintaining these records. Proceedings thus far have been consolidated vvith the trial of 
the action on the merits pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2). 
There are other challenges (called "sub-issues" above) which, as noted, have been 
raised indirectly, but are before the Court; evidence must be produced directly upon these 
points at some stage of the proceedings. These sub-issues deal pnmarily with the 
existence of records aside from a transcribable verbatim record. As further noteel, these 
records might exist, but have Just not yet been produced. The Court is not determining 
which party has the burden of proving the existence or non-existence of these records: 
hc)\vever, their absence. or lack of production will undoubtedly work against Camas 
County. as the Court is attempting to delineate at least some of the records that must exist 
to survive Plaintiff s challenges. As noted. these include a record that P&Z conducted a 
duly noticed publIc hearing prior to recommending an amendment of the Comp Plan per 
67-6509. a record that a proper notice was given and published, along with a summary of 
the plan to be discussed per 67-6509, and a record that political subdivisions were duly 
notlced. As the governing board did apparently hold the subsequent public hearing, rather 
than the P&Z, the written recommendation from the Camas P&Z to amend the Comp 
Plan had to be included in the notice of hearing provided by the governing board under 
I.C 67-6509(a). /\ record of the hearings, findings made, and actions taken by the 
commission should also exist. These are records that should exist {ojusli/J; lhe COUl1ly'S 
amendmenl to the Comp Plan The Court has already concluded that these proceedings 
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to amend the Comp Plan are likely legislative, and, not being subject to direct appeal, do 
not carry with them the requirements that each proceeding have a transcribable verbatim 
record as otherwise required by 67-6536. 
When the Board acted upon the Comp Plan (which apparently occurred on March 
26,27, and 29), a verbatim record was apparently made. It remains to be seen whether this 
record is adequate or what it contains. The COUJ1 cannot find at this point whether the 
amendments to the Comp Plan were done properly or not. The record of these hearings 
on March 26,27, and 29 must eventually show, however, that the Board considered the 
Comp Plan and the amendment to the zoning ordinance in the proper sequence. See Price 
v Payelle COllnry Board ojCollnfy Com 'rs 131 Idaho 426 at 430. 
Finally_ there is no record demonstrating when, or if, the P&Z recommendations 
regarding the Comp Plan changes, or any amendments to the zoning ordinance, actually 
came into the bands of the Board. More importantly, there is no record thus far of any 
findings offact. or conclusions of law lI1dicating what action the Board took, or why, 
after the tvlarch 2007 hearings. 
Absence of any or all of the records referred to above could be fatal to the Comp 
Plan or the Zoning Ordinance or the Zoning Map amended during or after the March 
2007 hearings. The CouJ1 is not any determinations yet in that regard. The Court 
is able at this time to conclude that. as regards the zoning ordinance amendment the 
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failure to have and maintain a transcribable verbatim record is a violation of Idaho Code 
67-6536. Thus, pursuant to the provisions ofIdaho Code 67-5279, the agency action 
adopting and amending af leas! the Zoning Ordinance (and, if a result of the zoning 
ordinance amendments, the Zoning Map as well) has been made upon unlawful 
procedure and/or in violation of statutory provisions. The Court further concludes that on 
the basis of the record thus j~1L substantial rights of the Plaintiff have been prejudiced. 
Camas County argues strenuously that Plaintiff has not suffered irreparable hann, 
and thus should not be entitled to an injunction. If the evidence was closed, Plaintiff 
would be entitled to an order vacating the zoning ordinance amendment, and likely the 
zoning map as wel1, and remanding proceedings back to the Board of Commissioners of 
Camas County. See Price v. Payette County Board o/County Com 'rs 131 Idaho at 430. 
As noted above, the evidence as to what "verbatim" records exist has come from Camas 
County's own employees, and is not likely to change. 
Previously, the Court declined to enter either a temporary restraining order or a 
preliminary injunction. (See Decision on Status of Camas County Planning and Zoning 
Commission For Purposes of a Preliminary Injunction, dated Aug 9, 2007). At least part 
the reason was that the reliefPJaintilTwL\s requesting at that point was an injunction 
stopping Camas County from processing appl ications under the new zoning ordinance 
# 147, although Plaintiff had no objection to the County processing applications under an 
older existing ordinance. The Court could not conclude that irreparable harm existed in 
one case but not the other, as Plaintiffs prImary complaint was a generalized assertion he 
would suffer from increased competition. A review of that decision indicates another 
other important observation: the Court':; notation that ifit could conclude Camas County 
\vas not operating in a legal fashion in any respect in making land use decisions, the 
Court might well issue a preliminary in) not necessarily because there was 
particular harm being caused to Plainti tl. but because there would be great and 
irreparable injury being caused to all the citizens of Camas County. 
Since this last decision, the Court has also determined what the appropriate 
remedy is if particular actions of the County are legally defective. It is not appropriate for 
the Court to determine, even in the long run, and particularly for purposes of a 
preliminary injunction, that Camas County may not process applications under one 
ordinance, but may under another, or that an agency may not proceed to review 
applications or grant permits if their process has been defective. Rather, if there have 
been defects in the proceedings, the only appropriate remedy under the Price case is to 
vacate the specific activity in question and remand proceedings to the appropriate agency. 
Thus, in determining whether injunctive relief should issue, the major question becomes 
whether the Court will ultimatelv arrive there. The Court is keenly aware of the standards 
"' -
involved. While legislative actions by counties are subject to collateral actions such as 
declaratory judgments, they cannot be attacked by a petition for judicial review. Cowan v. 
BoardofCom'rs o/Fremont County 143 Idaho 501,148 P.3d 1247 (2006) A 
preliminary mandatory injunction is granted only in extreme cases where the right is very 
clear and it appears that irreparable injury will flow from its refusal. Emns v. District 
C 'our! of/he Fifth Judicial District 47 Idaho 267, 270, 275 P. 99, 100 (1929). The 
substantial I ikelihood of success necessary to demonstrate that a party is entitled to 
mjunctive relief cannot exist where complex issues of law or fact exist 'vvhich are not free 
from doubt. Harris v. Cassia County 106 Idaho 513, 518, 68} P.2d 988. 994 (1984). 
The Court has now conducted a lengthy examination of the record keeping 
leading to the enactment of the Zoning Ordinance, which is subject to judicial review. It 
remains an open question whether a party is entitled to injunctive relief under a 
judgment action. The Court is further satisfied that Plalllti 1'1' bas nov\ 
demonstrated its entitlement to a preliminary injunction with regards, at least to the 
loning Ordinance, (and presumably the Zoning Map) amended on or after the March 
hearings. The Court further finds, at this point the right is clear, and that once 
Camas County proceeds under the Zoning Ordinance the harm will be ilTeparable. and 
cannot be undone. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS, AND THIS 
DOES ORDER, Camas County is hereby enjoined, restrained, and prohibited, tmtil 
fllrther order of the COUll, from proceeding under the zoning ordinance amended in 
March of2007 and the related zoning map if the zoning map purportedly effected any 
sort of change in existing zoning. 
Pursuant to the provisions ofRu1e 65(c), no bond shall be required. This order is 
not a final order pursuant to Rule 54 (b) and is subject to modification or revision at any 
time. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this ~ day of December, 2007. 
Robert 1. Elgee, District Judge 
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ISSUE FOR PURPOSES OF A 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
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.' I 
1 
Defendant I 
PROCEDURAL I-lISTOJ y AND REVmW OF PRIOR ORDERS AND 
I 
I PROCEEDINGS 
, 
On December 28, 2007) this Court entered a "Decision on Requirements of a 
'T ranscribable Verbatim Record' td Other Records for Purposes of a Preliminary 
Injunction." That Decision enjOinr d Camas COm1ty from proceeding u.nder the March 
2007 amendments to the Camas crunty zoning ordinance until further order of the Court. 
That injunction has been further amended by a subsequel1t order entered approximately 
I 
March 1 O~ 2008, following a crimihal contempt hearing: which also prohibits the County 
I 
fi'om proceeding under the pre-exitting zoning ordinance as well (Ordinance 12, enacted 
I 
DECISION ON CONFLICT OF INTERESTS ISSUE FOR PURPOSES OF A PRELIMlNARY 
INJUNCTION I I 
I 
i 
in 1976), pending further order of the Court. Trial has been scheduled in Camas County 
to commence May 20, 2008, at which time, or shortly after, all pending matters should 
become the subject of a fmal order. 
Camas County has also sought leave from both tms Court and the Idaho Supreme 
Court to appeal the granting of the preliminary injunction. TItis Court denied that 
request, and a decision from the Idaho Supreme Court has not yet been received as to 
whether they will al?cept review of the interlocutory order granting an injunction. This 
Court has reviewed Camas Countis Memorandum in Support of Motion for Acceptance 
of Appeal by Permission. As the naMe of the preliminary injunction order and the 
decision supporting it is interlocutory, and subject to revision until such time as it 
becomes final, there are some points raised by Camas County's appeal brief that should 
be acknowledged by this Court, and perhaps some points in the Court's Decision that 
should be solidified. 
Several arguments are raised by the C01.miy in their brief before the Supreme 
Court. One of the hinge points of the County's argument throughout all of the 
proceedings thus far. is that the actions taken by the Camas County Board of 
Commissioners in considering large scale zonjng changes throughout the County were 
done in a legislative, not quasi-judicial capacity. Their argument seems to be that if the 
County undertakes to rezone portions of the County on a large enough scale, the County 
can dispense with the procedural formalities required of quasi-judicial matters. Indeed, 
the County makes the same argument in current briefing: that Camas County 
Commissioners or P& Z Commissioners can enga.ge in contlicts of interest in public 
matters and public proceedings and public decisions affecting their ovm property so long 
as these "proceedings" are legislative. This Court takes a different view. 
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In support of their position, Camas County cites Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 
Idaho 65~ 665 P.2d 1075. The Court does not read Burt as Camas County does. Even 
Burt says: "The ~exation ordinance was silent as to the zoning of the annexed land; 
therefore if came into the city as unzoned land. ., (Emphasis added) Burt, supra at 67. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Burt went on to cite Cooper v. Board o/County 
Commissioners of Ada County. 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980) stating that" ... the 
action aftIte Bo~dof Comntissioners in acting lipan a rezoning request was quasi-
judicial in nature." (Emphasis added). This Court has focused on the fact the property 
was rezoned, which appears to be the focus of the Burt court. Camas County has focLtsed 
on the word "request," in arguing that there is no particular applicant here making a 
request; that this action in rezoning huge portions of Camas County was done at the 
instigation and request of the Board of Commissioners or P&Z. However, none ofthe 
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court seem to rest on the distinction as to who requested 
the rezone; in this Court's view, the distinction rests on the/act that the propeny is 
rezoned 
Assuming for the moment that Camas County might be correct in its argument 
that the overall proceedings in March of2007 were "legislative" does not, however, get 
them "out of the woods." At least part of the thmst of this Court's December 28, 2007 
decision is that the proceedings effecting the rezone in March 0[2007 were subject to 
appeal, pursuant to Idaho Code 67-652 1 (l)(d), and thUB proceedings leading up to the 
March hearing were subject to the requirements that Camas COlmty mrul1tain a 
"transcribable verbatim record" pursuant to Idaho Code 67-6536. But whether the 
proceedings before the Board of Commissioners are in fact appealable does not appear at 
all to be the ultimate factor in detemlining whether a transcribabie verbatim record must 
be kept. Rather, with or without an appeal, Idaho Code 67-6536 provides that: "The 
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proceedings envisioned by this statute for which a transcribable verbatim record must be 
kept shall include all public hearings at which evidence or testimony is received .. or 
I 
during which the commissum or governing board deliberates toward a decision after 
compilation oj the record." It was this Court's finding from the evidence that th.e Board 
had deliberated toward a decision, at public hearings, apparently after the P&Z 
recommendation had been received, with no record of those deliberations or discllssions. 
1\ i • 
These findings further served as the basis for the Court's conclusion that a required 
record had not been maintained. Moreover, if an appeal is a required element of 67-
6S21(1)(d), Idaho Code 31-1506 seems to make any order or proceeding of the Board 
sUbject to judicial review. 
Camas County also contends (both before thiSCOUlt and before the Idaho 
Supreme Court on their appeal motion) that because their overall activity was legislative, 
and thus not subject to judicial review, 110 transcribable record need have beel1 
maintained under § 67-6536. This does not necessarily answer the question as to whether 
any particular proceeding was quasi-judicial. If this particular proceeding in March of 
2007 (when the County amended the comp plan and rezoned large pOltiol1s of the county) 
was quasi-judicial, then it could not be "legislative" for purposes of keeping lit record, nor 
can the proceedings leading up 10 it be exempt as legislative activity. In shOtt, the 
County cannot go through a proceeding that is unquestionably "quasi-judicial" in 
character, for which all parties agree a verbatim record is required, but meet and discuss 
the pending matters prior to [he hearing and call that activity "legislative." Idaho Code § 
67-6536 is clearly intended to apply to meetings thaI might take pla.ce before or after the 
scheduled and noticed public hearing. 
In reviewing this issue) it appears the March 2007 hearings during which the 
County actually passed the amended comp plan and rezoned large portions of the County 
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were ul1questionably qua.si-judicial. In addition to the Burt decision, the County has also 
cited Jerome County v. HDlloway 118 Idaho 681> 799 P .2d 969 (1990) for the proposition 
that the County ~ acted in a legislative capacity) and states in their brief that "no 
discussion of the te~ 'quasi-judicial' ... was had" in that case. Au contraire. 111ere is a 
passage in that case that bears directly on this issue. In discussing the notice and hearing 
req'llirements of Idaho Code § 67-6509 (the same notice and hearing requirements of 
LLUPA applicable to the March 2007 hearings) the Idaho Supreme Court stated: "This 
Court confronted this issue in the case of Citizens for a Better Government v. County of 
Valley, 95 Idaho 320, 508 P.2d 550 (1973) and quoted with approval the Supreme Court 
of the State of California as follows: "When the statute requires notice and hearing as to 
the possible effect of a zoning law upon property rights the action of the legislative 
body becomes quasi-judicial in character, ... " citing Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 
Cal. 134,277 P. 308 (1929) (Emphasis added in both parts.) 
Granted, although this discussion is centered on the requirements of notice and 
hearing, the case makes clear that the County carmot exempt themselves from the 
requirements of a transcribable record by calling all activity of the County "legislative" 
in nature. As the Jerome County case would seem to make abundantly clear, even if a 
particular decision of the County might be construed overall by a Court as legislative 
activity, and thus not reViewable, particular hearings are ul1questionably "quasi-judicial" 
because they require notice and hearing. As such, there is no way the County can deem 
themselves engaged in "legislative activity" in conducting these hearings such that they 
are immune from the requirements of keeping a record, both during these hearings and 
leading up to them. In sum, whether a matter is ultimately reviewable by a Court, and 
whether it is "quasi-judicial" are different questions, The matters under review were 
unquestionably quasi-judicial insofar as the record keeping requirements are concerned. 
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ISSUES l)RESENTED 
In addressing the current conflict of interest issue it is important to note that the 
facts are not in dispu~e, at least through the headngs held so far. Camas County never 
attempts to dispute the fact that both Smith and Backstrom own property that was directly 
affected by the zoning changes that took place. Further, Camas County has not disputed 
the fact that neither Smith as chair of the planning and zoning commission, or Bac](strom 
as head of the Board'of Commissioners ever disclosed their property holdings. 1 
Additionally, Camas County never argues or disputes the fact that neither Smith nor 
Backstrom ever recused themselves from participating in the proceedings at issue. There 
is no suggestion in the evidence that Smith or Backstrom did not participate in every 
hearing at issue. Instead, Camas County has raised 3 arguments in its defense: 
1.) Whether Idaho Code § 67-6506 applies to Camas County when it adopted 
amendments to its Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance? Camas County 
takes the position that proceedings at issue were "legislative" as opposed to 
"quasi-judicial" and therefore Smith and Backstrom are exempt from conflicts of 
interest. 
2.) Whether Martin must prove the level of economic interest that is present on the 
part of any planning and zoning commission member or county commissioner 
with an alleged conflict of interest, and whether Martin must prove that any 
1 At hearing, Backstrom admitted that he never disclosed any ofllis property holdings, he never recused 
himself from any of the proceedings, and he never sought advice of counsel as to whether or not he should 
have done either. Smith testified that the only disclosure he mane as to any of his land holdings. was to 
simply point to the general areas where he owned land on a map during a wol'l< session held by the 
Planning and Zoning commission. Further, Smith testified that this was the only disclosure he made, at any 
level of proceedings. Additionally, Smith testified that he solicited a legal opinion from rhe County's legal 
counsel as to whether there was a conflict of interest which was not shared with the public and which he 
relied upon in deciding to continue participating in the deliberations. 
DECISTON ON CO'J'..'FLICT OF INTE:RES1'S iSSUE FOR PURPOSES OF A PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTlON 6 
t"'. U ( 
lN~ ~UUNII JUU1~IHL r HA l~U. LUO / '10;);)L ( 
chaD.ges in zoning designations were motivated by, or actually affected, a 
conflicted. member's economic interest. 
3.) If a violation ofIdaho Code § 67-6506 occurs, is the appropriate remedy to 
simply disregard the conflicted members vote? 
ANALYSIS & CONCLUSIONS 
Initially, it is important to note that the activities challenged by Martin encompass 
more than one hearing or proceeding. From the Comt's reading, Camas Cotl1lty argues 
that all of its actions are in essence "legislative" and thus the alleged violations of the 
LLUPA do not aJ?ply. As noted elsewhere in this and earlier decisions, while the Court 
agrees that the creation of a Comprehensive Platl is probably a "legislative" activity, the 
Court disagrees with the assertion that the passing of a zonini ordinance, simply because 
it is deemed to cover the whole c01.mty or is done in cOl1junction with the Comprehensive 
Plan is in any way "legislative." 
1.) Does Idaho Code § 67-6506 al2plv in the instant ca:;e? 
Camas County contends that Idaho Code § 67-6506 (which prohibits conflicts of 
interest) does not apply to the proceedings which are the subject oftrus instant lawsuit. 
Specifically, Camas County relies wholly on the contention that the County, in adopting 
its Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map, exercised its legislative power 
and that § 67-6506 only applies to quasH1.ldicial proceedings, 
Idaho Code § 67-6506 states the following: 
A governing board creating a planning, zoning, or planning and zoning 
conmlission, or joint commission shaH provide that the area and interests 
within its jurisdiction are broadly represented on the commission. A 
member or employee of a governing board, commission, or joint 
commission shall not participate in any proceeding or action when the 
member or employee or his employer, business partner, business 
associate, or any person related to him by affinity or consangui,."1ity within 
the second degree has an economic interest in the procedure or action. 
Any actual or potential interest in any pI'oceeding shall be disclosed at 
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or before any meeting at which the action is being heard or 
considered. For purposes of this section the tel'm "participation" means· 
engaging in activities which constitute deliberations pnrsnant to the 
open meeting act. No member of 1\ governing board or a planning and 
zoning commission with a conflict ot'interest shall participate in any 
aspect of the decision-maldng process concerning a matter involving 
the conflict of interest. A knowing violation ofthls section shall be a 
misdemeanor. (Emphasis added) 
See IDAHO CODE ANN § 67-6506. In applying Idaho Code § 67-6506, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has stated that the legislature intended to prohibit economic 
conflicts ofinterest and that in adopting Idaho Code § 67-6506 the legislature 
acted "to assure that, consistent with Ollr democratic principles, only impartial and 
objective persons make decisions affecting other person's liberty and property." 
Manookian v. Blaine County. 112 Idaho 697, 701 (Idaho 1987). 
As noted in the Court's discussion regarding the current posture of the 
case and previous rulings and detenninations by this Court, though Camas County 
may have engaged in some activities which could be "legislative," they 
undeniably engaged in activities which are "quasi judicial" in natrU"e and are 
therefore subject to the conflict of interest provisions of Idaho Code § 67-6506. 
Thus even if Camas County is light in its assertion that Idaho Code § 67-6506 
does not apply to "legislative" activities, it is clear to this Court that some of the 
proceedings, (particularly those which were the s4bjects of prior notice and which 
constituted "public hearings"), which Smith and Backstrom participated in. are 
properly characterized as "quasi-judicial" and thel'efore their participation was in 
violation of the conflict of interest provisions ofIdaho Code § 67~6506. 
Camas County also contends that Idaho Code § 67-6506 does not apply 
(apparently to any proceedings involving rezoning or the Comp Plan) because 
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requiring the zonipg process to occur piecemeal would violate the requirements of 
Idaho Code § 67-6511 and § 67-6508. Camas COl.U11y posits that those code 
sections require that comprehensive planning take into account the whole of the 
jurisdiction. The Court rejects this argument. First; Camas County attempts to 
group all of the challenged activities into one group, "legislative activity," when 
in reality, as set forth above, at least some of the challenged activities are "quasi-
judicial." (Le .... rezoning portions of the county). Second, while "planning" 
might have to take into account "the whole of the juri sdiction" as Camas County 
suggests, there is no requirement in either of the statutes reforred to that mandate 
the County do zoning "all in one piece)) or "all at one time." 
Beyond a mere assertion that doing zoning in piecemeal violates Idaho 
Code § 67-6511, Camas County gives no other support for their contention. In no 
way does the application of § 67-6506 prevent zoning from being done in 
accordance Vlith the comprehensive plan.2 Further, zoning is commonly done on 
a piecemeal basis, and as long as it is in accordance Vlith the comprehensive plan. 
it does not violate § 67-6511. The application of ~ 67-6506 in this case would not 
and does not change this. The Court is in no way declaring or even implying that 
zoning should not be done in accordance with the comprehensive plan. Applying 
the conflict of interest requirements of § 67-6506 supports, rather than prohibits, 
the concept that zoning should occur for various parcels at various times. I.e. § 
l In £:'lct, had the zoning in this case been done in a piecemeal fashion so that conflicted members could 
have recused themselves during proceedings which involves land in which they have an economic Interest, 
while still participated in proceedings which involves land in which they did not have an economic interest, 
there would be no issue for this Court to decide. 
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zoning affecting their particular property. 
2.) Economic Int~rest and its affect on the proceedings at issue 
Camas Cq~ty next 31'gues that Martin has failed to meet his burden of 
proof by pointing to the fact that "no evidence exists suggesting that either 
gentleman lobbied Or advocated for particular zones, Or that either discussed his 
ownership of properties with other members of the Planning and Zoning 
Commission or the Board of Commissioners.',3 Camas County contends that it is 
incumbent on Martin to prove that any change in zoning designations were 
motivated by an economic interest, which resulted in a direct pecuniary benefit, 
and which adversely affected him. 
It is undisputed that both. Smith's and Backstrom's property were directly 
affected by the zoQing changes and that they were both in a position to possibly 
influence or perhaps direct changes to zoning: at a minimum both participated in 
the decision to malce such changes. 
The language ofIdaho Code § 67-6506 is clear and unambiguous; it 
certainly contains no requirement that a party who has an economic interest must 
reap a direct pecuniary benefit or that there must be some direct adverse harm 
directly to the plaintiff The statl.lte states that any "actual or potential interest' 
in any proceeding must be disclosed. See IDAHO CODE A ...... 'N § 67-6506 (emphasis 
:' Through their assertion, Defendants have squarely identified the major complaint dlat has led to the 
current lawsuit: the fact that there is little in [he way of any record to figure out what was discussed, 
considered, disclosed, and/or voted on. In order for this COLHi or any interested citizen to review in order ~o 
make an informed decision about disputes or to detel111ine if conflicts were ever disclosed, it record is 
mandatory. 
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added). Moreover, it prohibits "participating in any aspect of the decision making 
process . . , 
The Court needs look no further than Manookian v. Blaine County to 
analyze this issue. InManookian v. Blaine County, the Chair of the Planning and 
Zoning Commission, and a member of the Board of County Commissioners 
owned land on whlch one of several proposed alternative routes for a power line 
might cross. 112 Idaho 697, 703 (1987). After the P & Z recommended, and the 
Board approved an alternate route which did not cross the property of either of the 
members, the affected property owners challenged the actions alleging a conflict 
of interest under § 67-6506. Jd. Though the conflicted members did not even vote 
in the ultimate decision~ their participation alone was sufficient to taint the 
proceedings and thereby invalidate them. ld (Emphasis added). The Court did 
not require a showing on the part of plaintiffs that either conflicted member 
lobbied or received any direct pecuniary benefit from the proceedings. 
Following A1anookian and the clear language of Idaho Code § 67-6506, 
this Court does not believe that the Martin need make a showing any greater than 
what was required of the plaintiffs in Manookian. That lS, Martin need not show 
that the cont1icted members reaped any sort of pecuniary benefit or show that 
Martin was in any way adversely affected. Martin need only show that the 
conflicted members had an economic interest in the proceedings in which they 
participated. Jd 
Camas County goes to some length to point out that land holdings of 
Smith and Backstrom which were rezoned were not the only areas that were 
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rezoned, and that any changes in zoning were consistent with the comprehensive 
plan and were not singled out for favorable or unfavorable treatment. In essence, 
the argument is made that if enough other property is rezoned at the same time) 
actualconflic!s of interest can be ignored. There is no support in the Jaw for this 
proposition. TIus same argument was made in Manookian, where the appellants 
argued that the construction of high voltage lines across a person's property does 
not have the type of "economic effect" contemplated by § 67·6506. See 112 
Idaho at 701. Further, the dissent in that case even noted that the parties who 
were fOtUld to have "conflicts of interest" denied that their property either 
increased or decreased in value:1 112 Idaho at 703. In Manookian, plaintiffs 
were not required to prove the amount of economic interest that was present on 
the part of the conflicted members, nor were they required to prove an increase or 
decrease in the value of the conflicted members property or of their own propertyj 
they were simply required to prove that an economic interest existed, and despite 
arguments to the COl1iTary, the majority in that case noted that transmission lines 
impact the land they occupy, and that depending on the present and future use of 
the property, there are multiple ways the property could be economically 
impacted.ld. at 701 (emphasis added). 
Analogous to the economic impact fOfmd to exist in Manookian so as to 
malce I.e. § 67-6506 applicable, Martin, in this case, need not prove the amount 
of economic interest present on the part of Smith and Backstrom, but instead need 
4 Similar assertions were made during the court hearing, where Defendant Ed Smith was questioned as to 
his lack of intent to develop. sell, or build on any of the land that he owned which was up-zoned during the 
process in question. 
DECISION ON CONFLlCT OF INTERESTS ISSUE FOR PURPOSES OF A PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 12 
r. L) 
285 
tNt GUU~I'y JUUIGIAL tAX NU •. 
only prove that one existed and that the conflicted parties stilJ participated. 
Distinguishable and even more egregious than the parties in Manookian, the 
parties here not only participated in the proceedings, but took part in voting as 
well. Whether up-zoned or dOWTl~zoned, the ability to subdivide the land into 
, I 
smaller parcels or put it to a use that it would not have otherwise had absent the 
zoning changes, impacts the land in an economic way which can be measured and 
q·uantified. See Id. at 701. 
The Court rejects Camas County's arglunents that, first, these proceedings, 
even if they were legislative~ would necessarily be eXel1ipt from a conflict of 
interest analysis. Second. the Court rejects the suggestion these proceedings were 
legislative; only some might have been. Smith and Backstrom participated in 
proceedings that required notice and hearing and were unquestionably "quasi-
judicial". Third, Martin need not show that a public official actually benefitted 
from the conflict of interest. Fourth, whether Smith or Backstrom actually voted 
is of 110 legal significance; participation in a quasi-judicial proceeding is enough. 
Fifth, the magnitude or contemplated size of the rezone is no shield against the 
requirements ofLe. 67-6506. 
3.) Appropriate Remedy. 
Camas County has argued that even if the Court finds there to be a 
violation of I.e. § 67-6506 either becallse the participatio11 of Smith, (who o"WIled 
property whlch was positively affected by zoning recommendations which he 
participated in making to the Board of Commissioners), or because of the 
participation of Backstrom, (who also owned property which was favorably 
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affected by actions which were taken and approved with his participation on the 
Board of Commissioners), the proper remedy is to simply disregard the conflicted 
member's vote. Camas County urges such an outcome because this was a county~ 
wide process, and there has been no showing of undue influence by Smith or 
Backstrom. However, the Court is .tm-persuaded, and finds that simply 
disregarding a conflicted member's vote is not sufficient to purge the taint that a 
conflict of interest may have had on the proceedings leading up to the vote. 
First, Camas County cites to no Idaho authority to support the proposition 
that the appropriate remedy, where a conflict of interest exists, is to simply 
disregard the conflicted members vote. The Court finds the language of Idaho 
Code § 67-6506 to be clear and unambiguous. Manooki(.ln v. Blaine Counly. 112 
Idaho 697, 701 (Idaho 1987). "Where a conflict of interest exists a commission 
member 'shall not participate in any proceeding or action ... ,., See Id; see also 
lDAIjO CODE ANN § 67-6506. Further, such a member is prohibited from 
participating even ifhe or she will not vote.s Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc" 
v, City oj Hailey, 127 Idaho 576,584 (Idaho 1995). 
In Manookian v, Blaine County, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision of the District Court which concluded that the participation oft\vo 
planning and zoning members who had an econon:lic interest in the matters 
presented to them for decision, and who participated in the hearings before the 
Planning and Zoning commission consti1uted a violation ofI.C. § 67-6506. The 
5 See 2006 Idaho Session Laws, H.B. No. 724, ell. 2 [3 which amended Idaho Code 67·6506 to furthel' 
prohibit conflicted members from even testifYing at, or presenting evidence to, a public hearing Or simi1l1r 
public process. 
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effect of such participation rendered the decisions of the county planning and 
7..oning commission and the Board of County Commissioners illegal and without 
force and effici. Id The Idaho Supreme Court fiuther noted that even though the 
coirllicted members disqualified themselves before the voting took place) the 
language ofl.C. § 67·6506 bars them from participating in the proceedings at all. 
Under the Court's reading of Manookian, disregarding the vote of a 
conflicted member is not appropriate. 
ORDER 
The Court concludes,fiw purposes of a preliminary injunction only, that conflicts 
of interest existed at both the planning and zoning and county commissioner level which 
will likely, upon trial, render Camas County's passage of the March 2007 zoning 
amendments illegal and without further force and effect. If the Court were entering final 
judgment today, this would be the result mandated by law without regard to whether 
Martin himselfhas suffered or is suffering il1'eparable harm, or any harm whatsoever. As 
it is, it would appear to be irreparable harm to all the citizens of Camas County if the 
Court were to allow Camas County to proceed with zoning changes based on a void or 
illegal ordinance. As with the prior order granting a preliminary injunction, the evidence 
supporting it comes from the County's 0\\11 agents or employees, and is unlikely to 
change at trial. 
The Court finds, again, relying on the cases cited in its earlier decision, that the 
right here is very clear. Accordingly, the injunction previously entered is hereby 
continued in full force and effect. TI1is order constitutes a wholly independent and 
separate order, and a separate basis for an injunction; dissolving one or the other of these 
injunctions would not affect the other. 
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A Court Trial is scheduled in Camas County for Tuesday, May 20,2008. It will 
not be continued under any circumstances, as these matters need to be finalized and 
have tbe utmost priority. 
No bond is required of plaintiff pursuant to Rule 65(c). TI1is order is not a final 
order pursuant to Rule 54(b) and is subject to modification or revision at any time. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated thisd.tJ day of April, 2008 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN, 
Plaintiff, 
and 
MARTIN CUSTOM HOMES, LLC, 
vs . 
ED SMITH, 
Defendant 
and 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, 
By and through the duly elected 
Board of Commissioners in 
the ir official capacities, 
KEN BACKSTROM, 
BILL DA VIS, and 
RON CHAPMAN 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) Case No.: CV-2007-24 
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) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
) LAW, and ORDER FOLLOWING TRIAL 
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) 
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On May 4,2007, the plaintiff filed a petition alleging Breach of Contract, a claim 
for Tortious Interference with Contract, and, in Count III , a Petiti on for Declaratory 
Judgment or in the Alternative Petition for Judicial Review. This last claim has proceeded 
primarily as a petition for declaratory judgment rather than as a claim for judicial review. 
An amended petition was filed on or about December 13,2007. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Following Trial -- I 
- Z90 
Plaintiff George Martin applied for and was denied a temporary restraining order 
and later a preliminary injunction on the issue of whether Camas County had a duly 
constituted planning and zoning commission. The decision denying that relief was filed 
on or about August 9, 2007. 
Thereafter, Martin applied for and was granted a preliminary injunction on the 
issue of whether Camas County was required to or did maintain a "transcribable verbatim 
record" of certain proceedings as required by Idaho Code § 67-6536. That decision was 
entered and filed on December 28, 2007. 
Martin again applied for a preliminary injunction on the issue of whether certain 
Camas County Commissioners, or others, had prohibited conflicts of interest. This court 
entered a written decision on that issue along with a second injunction on April 2, 2008. 
In that decision, the court also re-examined the question of whether at least some of the 
proceedings before the Camas Board of Commissioners were quasi-judicial in nature, and 
thus required that a verbatim record be maintained. 
Pursuant to IRCP Rule 65(a)(2), and by virtue of stipulations between the parties, 
the court ordered the hearings on the applications for preliminary injunctions 
consolidated with the trial. The evidence from them has become part of the trial record 
and thus did not need to be repeated at trial. 
Trial was held before the court sitting in Camas County without a jury on August 
20,2008. The plaintiff has been represented throughout by Christopher Simms, Ketchum, 
Idaho. Camas County has been represented throughout by the firm of Moore, Smith, 
Buxton, & Turcke, Chartered, of Boise, Idaho. Phillip Collaer, of Anderson, Julian, & 
Hull, of Boise, was excused from attending the trial. Following trial, the parties submitted 
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briefs, the last coming on September 26, 2008. At that time, the court took this matter 
under advisement. 
INTERIM DECISIONS FROM THE IDAHO APPELLATE COURTS 
While this case has been pending, the Idaho Supreme Court has entered a few 
decisions in the area of land use planning; their affect on this case is unclear. Among 
them are GiltnerDairy, LLCv. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630,181 P.3d 1238 (2008); 
Highlands Developmenl Corporation v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 188 PJd 900 
(2008); and Euclid Avenue Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 193 P.3d 853 (2008). 
The Giltner Dairy and Highlands Development cases raise issues such as whether judicial 
review of certain zoning decisions is available to aggrieved parties, while Euclid Avenue 
clarifies that a petition for judicial review, being an appellate proceeding, may not be 
combined with other claims for relief. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Overview 
I.) The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Venue is 
proper. 
2.) This court reiterates and re-adopts its decision filed December 28,2007 
regarding Camas County's failure to keep and maintain an adequate transcribable 
verbatim record, and its decision filed April 2, 2008 on the issue of whether certain 
conflicts of interest existed. 
3.) This court will be the first to recognize that, while the distinction between 
"legislative" and "quasi-judicial" activity has not always been clear, some of the Idaho 
Supreme Court's recent decisions-notably Highlands Development Corporation v. City 
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of Boise-cast doubt on whether and under what conditions a court may review quasi-
judicial zoning decisions under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("IDAPA"). See 
Highlands Development Corporation v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 962-70, 188 P.3d 
900, 904-12 (2008) (Jones, 1. dissenting). This court also recognizes the distinction the 
Idaho Supreme Court clearly made in Euclid AvenueTrust that judicial review of 
administrative activity should proceed as an appeal while, as different procedural rules 
apply, the appellate and civil processes should not be allowed to proceed together. This 
case was well underway before Euclid Avenue Trust was decided. 
Although the court has paid significant attention to the issue of whether Camas 
County's process of holding public hearings and maintaining a proper record was 
legislative activity as opposed to quasi-judicial, most of that examination has focused on 
determining what record the county was required to maintain, and not in determining 
whether this case involves an appeal of arguably legislative activity. Admittedly, in its 
decision on the "transcribable verbatim record" issue, the court paid a good deal of 
attention to whether there could be an appeal from those administrative decisions. In its 
next opinion, which concerned the conflicts of interest issue, this court clarified its earlier 
decision by pointing out that at some time during the 2007 rezoning process, Camas 
County clearly engaged in "quasi-judicial" activity when it held noticed public hearings 
for the purpose of passing amendments to its Comprehensive Plan, and also when it 
rezoned large portions of the county, if not all of it, during the March 2007 meetings. 
The court's determination that a transcribable verbatim record was required turns 
on its findings that the County engaged in deliberations leading up to the quasijudicial 
public hearings at which the Comprehensive Plan and new zoning were adopted, and that 
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the County did so without making any record of those deliberations. J Moreover, at the 
time the court was reviewing the verbatim record issue, all of the evidence had not yet 
been presented, and there were at least two open questions. One question involved 
determining when the Board of Commissioners actually received a written 
recommendation from the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission ("P&Z"), so 
that deliberations by the Board of Commissioners might have thereafter ensued in 
violation of § 67-6536. The second question concerned what the written recommendation 
from P&Z might have contained. 
The answer to those questions is that no one from Camas County can provide that 
information. In other words, no one knows exactly what the Board of Commissioners 
received from the P&Z, and no one can tell when it was received. Thus, no one can tell 
precisely when the Board commenced "deliberating toward a decision after compilation 
of the record." It is evident from the court's prior findings that the Board of 
Commissioners was certainly having discussions "off the record" after it received P&Z's 
recommendations, but before the public hearings commenced. 
In this regard, the court wishes to clarify its view that Idaho Code § 67-6536 
mandates a record of any deliberations once P&Z's recommendations have been 
received, and that such deliberations are not confined or limited to discussions among the 
Board of Commissioners once they have heard all the public testimony. Otherwise, the 
Board gets to deliberate all they want after P&Z's recommendations have arrived, but 
prior to the public hearings, and with no record maintained as to what was discussed. 
The Board then gets to come to whatever conclusions they desire. If that happens, the 
I "When a statute requires notice and hearing as to the possible effect of a zoning law upon property rights 
the action of the legislative body becomes quasi-judicial in character." Jerome County v. Holloway, 118 
Idaho 681, 799 P.2d 969 (1990). 
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public hearings become a sham. Without a record, the public has no assurance this is not 
exactly what has happened. The "record" here-P&Z's recommendations-was 
obviously received and discussed by the Board in some fashion for quite some time 
before any public hearings commenced. 
The court also views Idaho Code § 67-6356 as requiring a verbatim record if a 
board engages in a quasi-judicial proceeding, and deliberates with an objective of 
reaching a decision, regardless of whether an appeal is ullimately available to some 
party. 
4.) Camas County has argued long and hard in this case that its actions were 
legislative, not quasi-judicial, and thus are exempt from judicial review. While counties' 
legislative actions are subject to collateral actions such as declaratory judgments, they 
cannot be attacked by judicial review. Burt v. City of Idaho Falls 105 Idaho 65, 665 P.2d 
1075 (1983): Cooper v. Ada County Commissioners, 10] Idaho 407,614 P.2d 947 (1980). 
A trial and several evidentiary hearings were held on three preliminary injunction issues. 
Here, the plaintiff clearly indicated at the commencement of trial he was proceeding on 
the declaratory judgment aspects of this case, and did so by going forward with trial and 
by presenting evidence and testimony. For these reasons, and for the reasons set forth 
above, the court will review the facts and law and enter a decision as a declaratory 
judgment, and not as a judicial review proceeding. Thus, while the court agrees that large 
portions of the County's challenged activities may be legislative, certainly not all of the 
County's activities are. More importantly, however, is that simply because the County's 
actions may have been legislative in nature, and thus perhaps exempt from ajudiciaJ 
review proceeding, this fact does not mean those actions are exempt from law. 
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In order to accept Camas County's position, one must accept the proposition that 
if a county acts on a broad enough scale and rezones enough property, it acts in a purely 
legislative capacity. Thus, if it acts in a legislative capacity, it is essentially immune from 
the legaJ requirements of LLUP A or any number of other statutory requirements, and 
need not keep verbatim records of meetings or avoid conflicts of interest. Additionally, 
under the county's position, its actions are not reviewable. 
Camas County also suggests in its briefing that, in view of the recent decisions of 
the Idaho Supreme Court, comprehensive plans, land use maps, zoning ordinances and 
zoning maps rezoning property are no longer subject to the statutory review procedures 
of LLUPA. Time will tell. 
B. New Findings and conclusions. 
5.) The plaintiff still has civil causes of action pending against Camas County 
based on whether the County acted appropriately in effecting the questioned rezones. The 
issues in this case are not moot, and the plaintiff may or may not be entitled to attorney's 
fees. Actions are not mooted by an amendment or replacement if the controversy is not 
removed or the amendment or replacement does not otherwise resolve the parties' claims. 
Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v Idaho State Board of Education ]28 
Idaho 276,912 P.2d 644 (1995). 
Two related principles bear on the mootness issue. The first is the public interest 
doctrine. Even if a case is determined to be moot, if the issue presented is one of 
substantial public interest, the issue may need to be addressed for future direction and 
guidance. Johnson v. Bonner County School Dis/riel No. 82, 126 Idaho 490, 492,887 
P.2d 35,37 (1994); Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Idaho State 
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Board of Education 128 Idaho 276, 912 P.2d 644 (1995). The second principle is that, 
even if a case could technically be deemed moot, it can fall within the exception of 
"capable of repetition yet evading review." As the Court noted in Idaho Schools for 
Equal Educational Opportunity, the county could pass new ordinances every year, 
making any prior determinations arguably moot. 128 Idaho 26, 912 P.2d 644. As the 
Court there stated, "Then, as in this case, each time a declaratory judgment action is filed 
claiming the method of school funding is not 'thorough' under that year's standards, the 
district court could dismiss the case as moot claiming those standards had been 
sunsetted." ld. at 284, 912 P.2d at 651. Thus, "a situation arises wherein the case is 
repetitive or continuing, but is incapable of being resolved." Id 
The court notes that this situation has already presented itself here. On the heels 
of this presently pending case, the plaintiff has already sought and been denied leave to 
file an amended complaint alleging that the new ordinance passed in 2008-the one 
Camas County claims renders this case moot-suffers from the same defects as the ones 
being presently ruled upon. (See Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Petition by 
Adding Two Additional Causes of Action, filed on or after August 7, 2008 herein, and 
Plaintiff's Applicationfor Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary injunction, and 
Declaratory Relieffiled herein on or after August 7, 2008.). In these new pleadings that 
the plaintiff sought to be made a continuing part of this case, the plainti ff has attacked the 
very 2008 ordinances that the defendant claims have mooted the present case, and for 
many of the very same reasons. The plaintiff should be entitled to a detel111ination of the 
issues in this first case, as they directly impact the allegations in the second. 
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6.) Camas County claims that the plaintifflacks standing. It is undisputed that the 
plaintiff holds record interest in several parcels of real estate situated throughout various 
portions of Camas County. (See attached Stipulation.). Pursuant to that stipulation, at 
least some of the plaintiff s property was rezoned, apparently down zoned from AT to 
AS. (See Paragraph 15 of Stipulation.). In addition, the plaintiff may be affected ifhis 
neighbors are allowed to develop adjoining property in a rural area. See Evans v Teton 
County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 PJd 84 (2003); Cowan v. Fremont County, 143 Idaho 50 1, 148 
PJd 1247 (2006). The plaintiff has also claimed that the county will allow development 
on several parcels near his, and that by allowing nearby properties to be upzoned 
(including parcels belonging to commissioners that have been upzoned in violation of 
conflicts of interest statutes), the county has acted with an evil motive and in a manner 
that deprives the plaintiff of both of due process and equal protection. Those civil 
damages claims, though filed in this action, have yet to be resolved. For the above 
reasons, the court concludes that the plaintiff has standing. 
7.) In making amendments to the Comprehensive Plan in March, 2007, Camas 
County used very little new information. The general consensus of the Board of 
Commissioners was that old information was still valid. The Board felt the zoning 
ordinances needed to be amended because of gro\Nth in Camas County. At least one 
Board member admits that the Board permitted new density in new areas of the county 
without knowing the impact of new zoning and without obtaining any new studies. In the 
same breath, that same board member also admits that the Board did not anaJyze how 
new development would affect roads or transportation. 
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8.) A large-scale rezone of the county was effected in March, 2007. The county 
claims that the original recommendation from the P&Z Board was for a large rezone and 
that the County Board then gave public notice and re-zoned the entire county on or after 
March 14, 2007. This has not been the subject of testimony or argument, though it may 
be ascertainable by lengthy and protracted review of the evidence. However, the court is 
not resolving this issue. The March 2007 rezone involved a contemporaneous amendment 
to the Comprehensive Plan and did effect a rezone, at least by estimates, of 10,000 to 
20,000 acres, ifnot the whole county. 
9.) There is an area of Camas County known as the "recharge" area, which is the 
area within the southern half-mile or so of the base of the Smoky Dome peaks. Prior to 
the March 2007 rezone this was zoned "Agricultural"; after the rezone it has some 
residential zoning. In some of this area, the county had a land use map that designated 
this area as "Agricultural TransitionaL" or "Ag Tran." The parties seem to agree that 
obtaining an actual rezone to Ag Tran required an application to P&Z, and approval by 
the Board. The Board, however, felt that because of the map, they had no way to deny 
any applications for a rezone from "Ag" to Ag Tran. The Board apparently rezoned this 
area in March, 2007 without any recommendation from P&Z. Large portions of the 
recharge area have also been rezoned from Ag to "Residential," and to zoning allowing 
one house per five acres. No studies were apparently done to detennine the effects of the 
rezone on water in the recharge area. 
10.) In approximately 2006, the Board of Commissioners, or some of its 
members, approached the Camas P&Z Commission and asked them to come up with a 
new zoning map for Camas County. This may have been the Board's response to its own 
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opinion that they could not prohibit rezone applications from Ag to Ag Tran in those 
areas of the county designated Ag Tran by the existing map. The inference the court 
draws is that this request by the Board or some of its members was oral and is not in the 
record. If it is, the court has not been directed to it. 
11.) There is no written record of any recommendations in this regard that 
the Camas P&Z Commission ever completed and sent to the Board. That is, there is 
no record that P&Z ever prepared and sent to the Camas County Board of Commissioners 
any written recommendation for a rezone or an amendment to the Comprehensive Plan 
that the Board could either accept or reject. 
12.) At least initially, P&Z was not attempting to rewrite the Comprehensive Plan, 
but only attempting to comply with the Board's request for a zoning map. Partway 
through the process, P&Z determined it had to change the Comprehensive Plan and map 
in order to get to the zoning map. P&Z chose not to gather new data because its members 
felt not much had changed. P&Z did not consider the whole of the county in making 
whatever recommendations it did make, and in fact, did not make any recommendations 
as to changes in the Comprehensive Plan. According to the testimony, this failure to 
consider the whole of the county was "rectified in 2007," apparently by the Board. The 
court has not been directed to the record to confirm that any of that action was attributed 
to the P&Z Commission. 
13.) According to the testimony from P&Z members there is no written 
recommendation from the P&Z to the Board, as noted above. What was sent to the Board 
was a compromise consisting of a single big "proposed land use map," together with 
additional maps submitted by each P&Z commissioner that contained what each would 
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like to see. What is important is that whatever map(s) was sent to the Board, if such 
a map by ilselfcould constitute a written recommendation pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-
6509, is not now before the court. Trial Exhibit 0 is not it. There is not, therefore, any 
record maintained by Camas County as required by Idaho Code § 67-6509(a) of the 
"hearings, findings made, and actions taken by the commission." These maps went 
to the Board sometime in 2006, although it is impossible to say when. At least one P&Z 
commissioner testified that at the time he raised the issue that the law required the P&Z 
commission to send a written recommendation to the Board to accompany the 
documents, but that it never happened. 
14.) This failure to identify a written recommendation from P&Z to the 
Board precedes and precipitates a number of other legal difficulties. Because there is 
no \vritten recommendation that can be identified from the P&Z to the Board, it is 
impossible to tell when the Board received whatever it is they did receive, and therefore 
impossible to tell when the Board commenced its "deliberations." It is obvious from the 
court's prior findings made after the second injunction hearings-the transcribabJe 
verbatim record issue-that the Board discussed these recommendations before [hey ever 
gal to public hearing or were even noticedfor public hearings. The minutes are clear that 
on November 28, 2006, in a meeting at which no record was kept, the "Board continued 
discussing the proposed new Zoning Ordinance." (Defendants Exhibits, Pg. 318.). The 
same thing occurred on December 11,2006, when the Board reviewed the Subdivision 
Ordinance and proposed changes, and the Board "discussed the Camas County Zoning 
Ordinance" and "The Board discussed the City Area ofImpact." Other unrecorded 
meetings at which "the P&Z map" and the "proposed Zoning and Land Use Map" and the 
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proposed ordinances were discussed by the Board occurred on December 26, 2007, 
January 8, 2007, and February 20, 2007. (See Pgs 13 and 14 of the Decision on 
Requirements of a Transcribable Verbatim Record and Other Records for Purposes of a 
Preliminary Injunction filed herein December 28,2007.). Because there is no record of 
what was discussed, it is impossible for the county to deny that these are "deliberations 
toward a decision after compilation of the record." 
In addition, because it is not possible to identify precisely what recommendations 
the Board received, it is virtually impossible for the county to give proper legal notice as 
to what would transpire at upcoming public meetings. I.e. § 67-6509 states, "If the 
governing board will conduct a subsequent public hearing, notice of the planning and 
zoning commission recommendation shall be included in the notice of public hearing 
provided by the governing board." Without a written recommendation from P&Z, this 
requirement became almost impossible for the county to comply with. The County 
attempts to get around these requirements by suggesting the proposed maps were on 
display somewhere so that the public could go look at them in order to comment at public 
hearings. However, unless the public has other maps available to illustrate what changes 
are proposed, such a map would mean little. It is the \Nritten recommendation that the 
public needs, and that the law requires, in order to know what is proposed. 
Finally, without a written recommendation from P&Z that can now be identified, 
it is difficult for the county to argue that they complied with I.e § 67-6509 by giving 
notice of, and adopting, a proposed plan. If there was not a written proposed plan, what 
did the Board adopt'? Presumably, the Board adopted a map that cannot now be located 
Moreover, it is impossible to tell whether any changes or how many changes were made 
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to the proposed "map" after its receipt, which would require additional hearings pursuant 
to the same statute. There were at least some changes because the county claims it made 
amendments on approximately March] 4, 2007 to include the whole county. It is also 
evident from the minutes of the December 11, 2006 meeting that Commissioner Ken 
Baxtrom was directed to "meet with the attorney to make the recommended revisions and 
forward on to the Planning and Zoning Commission." Were those changes the subject of 
additional hearings as required? Without knowing what recommendations originally went 
up to the Board, it is impossible to know whether the final result was the subject of 
proper hearings or not. 
15.) The plaintiff and Camas County entered into a written stipulation filed herein 
on May 21,2008 entitled "Stipulation as to Facts and Admission of Documentary 
Evidence." A true and correct copy of that stipulation consisting of 6 pages is attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference, and the court adopts all of that 
stipulation into these findings of fact. Alleged deficiencies in publication oflegal notices 
are set forth in the stipulation at paragraphs 8, 9, 10, II, 12, and 13. When these 
deficiencies are combined with the failure of the county to identify a written 
recommendation from the P&Z Commission, the effect IS exponential. 
16.) The Camas County Comprehensive Plan was amended during the same 
March 2007 hearings that the county was rezoned. There is no formal written 
recommendation from the Camas P&Z to the Board to amend or adopt amendments to 
the Comprehensive Plan. (See Stipulation, Paragraphs 5 and 6.). This would appear to 
violate Idaho Code § 67-6509. When asked at trial by the plaintiff s counsel where in the 
record it appeared that the county considered the Comprehensive Plan and other evidence 
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before adopting the amendments to the zoning code, Commissioner Backstrom gave an 
answer sugge.sting that process occurred in his head, and if there had been discussions 
about that issue with his fellow commissioners it had occurred over the years from time 
to time. 
However, as the court advised counsel, the court would not listen to the tapes in 
order to ascertain events. The tapes are in evidence. This answer, however, suggests that 
the county may not have properly considered the Comprehensive Plan in making 
amendments to the zoning ordinance, or may not have considered the Comprehensive 
Plan and the zoning amendments in the proper order. Idaho Code § 67 -6511 (c) provides 
that "[a]fier the plan has been amended, the zoning ordinance may then be considered 
for amendment pursuant to section 67-6511 (b), Idaho Code." I.e. § 76-6511 (Emphasis 
added). See also Price v. Payette County Bd O/Com'rs, 131 Idaho 426,958 P.2d 583 
(1998). The court makes no factual finding in this regard one way or the other, except to 
the extent stipulated by the parties. 
17.) This issue is magnified, however, by the failure of the county to "generate 
any independent formal written record of decision of adoption of Ordinance 150 or 
153 other than the Ordinance itself." (See Stipulation, Paragraph 7.). An amendment to 
a zoning ordinance must be in accordance with the adopted plan. Love v. Board a/County 
Commissioners, 105 Idaho 558,671 P.2d471 (1983). Although the court recognizes the 
county's assertion that the very new decisions by the Idaho Supreme Court have modified 
50 years of case law, this court is not so sure. As matters now stand, it appears that cases 
like Price v Payette County Board a/Commissioners, 131 Idaho 426,958 P.2d 583 
(1998); Love v. Board a/County CommisSioners, 105 Idaho 558, 67J P.2d471 (1983); 
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and Cowan v. Fremont County, 143 Idaho 50] l 148 PJd 1247 (2006), are still good law. 
This court recognizes that some of those decisions involve judicial review of zoning 
decisions. The court also recognizes that the action of the county in rezoning large 
portions of the county may be entirely legislative activity. See Burt v. Idaho Falls, 105 
Idaho 65, 665 P.2d 1075 (1983). However, neither of those issues is the focus here. 
Rather, the focus here is to determine,for purposes of declaratory judgment, 
whether Camas County complied with applicable law in enacting new zoning ordinances 
in March of 2007. To this court, it appears that zoning decisions such as the one before 
the court are quasi-judicial agency functions, in which the public is given notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, and where evidence and testimony are taken. As such, it still 
appears that "The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (I.A.P.A.) governs the review of 
local zoning decisions." Price v. Payette County Board of Commissioners, 130 Idaho, 
426,958 P.3d 583 (1998) Therefore, this court believes that: 1.) because this is an action 
for declaratory relief, and 2.) because the county is engaged in a quasi-judicial function 
when exercising its authority here, it matters not whether the county was acting on a 
request from a particular landowner for a change in zoning or whether the Board was 
considering a request or recommendation from its own P&Z Commission to amend 
zoning. The fact is the county has taken evidence and testimony in the exercise of a quasi-
judicia/function and therefore due process considerations apply. Thus, the county must 
make written findings oJJact and conclusions of 1mI'. The Price case and numerous Idaho 
decisions say as much. Whether the county is acting on a particular application or on its 
own recommendation from its P&Z affects whether a party might be able to seek 
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judicial review, but it does not affect the requirements imposed by statutes and case law 
as to whether the county must make written findings and conclusions. 
The county suggests that the recent decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Highlands Development Corp. v. Boise and Giltner Dairy v. Jerome County change this 
result. In addressing whether findings of fact or conclusions of law are required, the 
county states that "[a Js the Supreme Court has made patently clear in Giltner and 
Highlands, there must be an application or permit to invoke the quasi-judicial review 
provisions ofLLUPA." (Defendant's Trial Brief, pg. 12.). In other words, the county's 
position is that as long as no one is able to seek judicial review of a county zoning 
decision, even though the county Board has taken evidence and testimony in the exercise 
of a quasi-judicial function, the Board does not need to identify the evidence or testimony 
on which it relies in rezoning 10,000 to 20,000 acres, or an entire county. 
This court does not believe Giltner and Highlands Development stand for so 
broad a proposition. If it was the Idaho Supreme Court's intent to overrule significant 
case law on point they would have more explicitly done so. Instead, it appears to this 
court that both Giltner and Highlands turn on much narrower grounds-i.e., the right to 
judicial review. Each case says as much. In Giltner Dairy the issue is directly stated as: 
"Did Giltner Dairy have a right to file a petition/or judicial review of an amendment to 
the comprehensive plan map"? GiltnerDairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 632, 
181 P.3d 1238, 1240 (2008) (Emphasis added). In Highlands Development, the Supreme 
Court again phrased the issue as, "Did the District Court Err in Dismissing the Petition 
for Judicial Review?" Highlands Development Corp v. Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 960, 188 
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PJd 900, 902 (2008) (Emphasis added). In each case the Supreme Court determined that 
the allegedly aggrieved party had no right 10 judicial review. 
There is, unfortunately, language in Giltner Dairy that could be interpreted to 
mean that IDAP A does not apply at all to zoning decisions. If that were so, then the 
Supreme Court, without saying so, has overruled a number of Idaho cases and done away 
with any requirements that zoning bodies keep records or identify the basis of their 
decisions. Such a decision would eliminate even declaratory relief actions such as this 
one. The Supreme Court stated in Highlands that they did not intend to eliminate other 
causes of action. It is this court's belief that the language quoted in Giltner Dairy about 
the applicability of IDAP A to the issue before the Supreme Court was not intended to 
eliminate a county's responsibility to make findings of fact in quasi-judicial zoning 
matters. It was instead intended to clarify that the APA conferred no separate right to 
an appeal of county zoning activity by way o/judicial review. That is what Giltner Dairy 
was about. No more and no less. The case starts with that discussion and never varies 
from it. There, the Court stated: 
In its briefing, Giltner Dairy contends it is entitled to judicial 
review under (he Idaho Administrative Procedures Act .... The 
language of the lAPA indicates that it is intended to govern the 
judicial review of decisions made by state administrative agencies, 
and not local governing bodies. During oral argument, Giltner 
Dairy admitted that the right [0 obtain judicial review in this case 
must come from a statute other than the lAPA. During oral 
argument, Giltner Dairy relied upon Idaho Code 67-6521 for a 
right (0 appeal. " 
GiltnerDairy, 145 Idaho 630, 632, J 81 P.3d 1238,1240 (emphasis added). 
In Giltner Dairy, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified only that Giltner Dairy was 
not an aggrieved party for purposes of appeal by way of judicial review. Highlands did 
not change this result, but in fact reinforced it. 
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On the other hand, there is a wealth of Idaho case law on the question of whether 
zoning bodies must enter written findings and conclusions of law on zoning decisions. 
See e.g. Evans v. Telon County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 PJd 84 (2003). Whether Giltner Dairy 
and Highlands are intended to overturn all aspects of cases such as Evans v. Teton 
County, Price v. Payette County, and Comer v. County of Twin Falls is anyone's guess. 
Until the Supreme Court has explicitly said that this has happened, this court believes its 
obligation is to follow existing law. 
The following language is taken from Cowan v. Board of Com 'rs of Fremont 
County decided less than 2 years ago: 
For effective judicial review of the quasi-judicial actions of zoning 
boards, there must be ... adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Conclusory statements are not sufficient; instead, what is needed for 
adequate judicial review is a clear statement of what, specifically, the 
decisionmaking body believes, after hearing and considering all the 
evidence, to be the relevant and important facts upon which its decision is 
based. (Citation omitted). However, a board of commissioners may adopt 
a planning and zoning commissions' findings and conclusions because 
I.e. § 67-6535 requires only that findings and conclusions be made. 
143 Idaho 501,148 P.3d 1247 (2006) (emphasis added) (internal citations 
omitted). 
Because I.e. §§ 67-6535(a) and (b) refer to "applications," the county suggests it 
is exempt from requirements to enter findings and conclusions imposed by existing case 
law. I-listoricaIIy, land use and zoning decisions have been appealable pursuant to 
LLUPA and the APA, and findings of fact and conclusions oflaw have been required in 
order to facilitate these appeals. Whether the Supreme Court has intended to do away 
with requirements that counties enter findings of fact and conclusions oflaw following 
quasi-judicial zoning hearings in cases that do not involve specific "applicants" remains 
to be seen. Until that happens, this court believes they are still, and should be, required. 
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If they are only required in cases where there is a narrowly qualified right to 
judicial review, a county would be free to engage in "legislative activity" and rezone an 
entire county without stating any standards and without indicating in any fashion what 
evidence, if any, has been accepted and/or relied upon from public hearings. This would 
also empower counties to rezone without reciting whether the zoning amendments in any 
way conform to or have even been compared with a comprehensive plan. In that event, 
the right to bring an action for declaratory relief in order to determine whether the county 
has functioned according to law is worth little. Working back further into the whole 
hearing process-without a requirement that there be a record and findings of fact and 
conclusions of law-there would seem to be little benefit to having hearings or giving 
notice. 
This court believes these issues have already been addressed, though the same 
sticky question sometime arises as to whether the zoning board is addressing a particular 
rezone application. This court does not believe that should be the determinative factor. 
From the case law, it appears that a county that engaged in purely legislative activity has 
always been exempt from judicial review. However, in Jerome COUnfy v Holloway, the 
Idaho Supreme Court states flatly that "[w]hen the statute requires notice and hearing as 
to the possible effect of a zoning law upon property rights the action of the legislative 
body becomes quasi-judiCial in character . ... " 118 Idaho 681, 799 P.2d 969 (1990) 
(emphasis added). The Cowan court likewise addressed this issue in the passage quoted 
above. In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Chambers v. Kootenai County 
Board of Commissioners that once there is a quasi-judicial decision, procedural 
safeguards must be followed: 
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This Court, in setting a standard o(due process (Or quasi-judicial 
proceedings, held that: (a) a board of commissioners' failure to provide 
notice of its second meeting regarding an application (after the public 
hearing) where staff views were expressed; (b) the absence ofa 
transcribable verbatim record of the proceedings; and (c) the failure fO 
make specific findings of jact and conclusions upon which a decision was 
based, did not comport with notions o[procedural due process. In 
addition, the opportunity to present and rebut evidence, which.is inferred 
from the right to notice and specific findings of fact, is an element of due 
process. 
125 Idaho 115,867 P.2d 989 (1994) (emphasis added). 
Thus, it is this court's conclusion that the question of whether a county 
board must produce vvritten findings and conclusions when changing county 
zoning laws is not connected to whether there is an identified "applicant," or 
whether most of the activity to a given point is legislative activity, or even 
whether an appeal pursuant to a judicial review proceeding is possible. Instead, 
once proceedings reach the quasi-judicial stage-which, it did here because the 
county engaged In hearings and took evidence and testimony pursuant to statutory 
notice and hearing requirements-due process, if nothing else, requires the county 
to make specific findings of fact and conclusions upon which a decision is based. 
18.) There is no written record of what the Board did in amending the 
Comprehensive Plan in March, 2007. There is nothing in v,Titing to confirm that 
the Board did or did not consider amendments to the Comprehensive Plan before 
amending zoning throughout the county. There is nothing in writing to confirm 
what evidence or findings or data or criteria or rationale, if any, the county relied 
upon in amending the Comprehensive Plan. There does not appear to be any 
record of when or if or how any P&Z commission's recommendations regarding 
changes to the Comprehensive Plan actually came into the hands of the Board. 
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19.) The legaJ notice of public hearings published on April 19: 2006, before the 
Camas County Board of Commissioners public hearing heJd initially on May 17,2006 
and continued until May 22, 2006, at which time an Amended Comprehensive Plan and 
Land Use Map were adopted as Resolution #96, failed to contain the Planning and 
Zoning Commission recommendation. I.e. § section 67-6509(a) requires inclusion of the 
P&Z commission's recommendation in the notice provided by the governing board if the 
board will conduct another public hearing. (See Plaintiff s Exhibit C6.). 
20.) The governing board made material changes to the Comprehensive Plan 
Land Use Map under consideration at meetings held May 3,2006, May 10,2006, May 
12, 2006, May 17, 2006, and May 22, 2006. Yet further notice and hearing were not 
provided. This would violate I.C. § 67-6509(b). (See Plaintiffs Exhibits B2, B4, B5, B6, 
and B7.). 
21.) Legal notices of public hearing before the P&Z Commission and before the 
Board to consider recommendation or adoption of Resolution 96, and Ordinances 150 
and 153, did not contain a summary of proposed amendments. I.e. § 67-6509(a) requires 
publication of a "summary of the plan to be discussed". (See Plaintiff s Exhibits C, C 1, 
C4, C6, C7, and C8.). 
22.) The legal notice of public hearing published February 21,2007, before the 
Board's public hearing held March 14,2007, at which the Board adopted Ordinance ]50, 
Amended Zoning Designation Map, failed to include the P&Z recommendation. I.e. § 
67-6509(a) requires inclusion of the P&[ commission's recommendation in the notice 
provided by the governing board. (See Exhibit C8.). 
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23.) Resolution #96, the Amended Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map 
adopted on May 22, 2006 included only the southern half of Camas County. I.e. § 67-
6508 requires that "[t]he plan shall include all land within the jurisdiction of the 
governing board." (See Plaintiffs Exhibit G, and Finding # 13 above.). It would appear the 
Board adopted Resolution # 1 03, to include all of the land within the county. Pursuant to 
I.e. §§ 67-6507, 6508, and 6509, it is the duty of the P&Z commission to conduct the 
process to prepare and update the Comprehensive Plan, to hold public hearings on it prior 
to amending the plan, to send out public notice of the hearings, and to make 
recommendations to the Board. The court cannot see where that process was ever 
undertaken by the P&Z Commission and recommended to the Board with regard to the 
northern half of the county. 
The Board can, under § 67-6509(b), make material changes to the P&Z 
recommendations and give notice and amend the plan. Purportedly the public hearing to 
amend the plan occurred on March 14,2007. However, all of the agenda notices, the 
legal notices, and the minutes, refer to amendments to the Comprehensive Plan 111al!.. (See 
Plaintiff s Exhibit B31 (minutes of meeting); Exhibit C8 (legal notice for the March 14 
meeting); and Exhibit F, pg. 25, (agenda for the meeting).). 
24.) At least pal1 of the importance of adequate legal notices to the public is so 
members of the public can make an informed determination of what will be discussed and 
decide whether they wish to attend a particular public meeting. If legal notice is 
inadequate, there are members of the public that would not attend, simply because they 
had no knowledge that particular topics would be discussed. In that event, it is not 
possible to measure or know what evidence or testimony from the public is missed; all 
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that can be measured or known is the evidence or testimony from those who attended. 
With that in mind it is no answer to those who allege that JegaJ notices of public hearings 
were inadequate, to counter that "you attended that meeting" and therefore "you were 
heard," and therefore "never mind that notice to the rest of the world was improper, or 
never given." While that mayor may not be the rule in evaluating due process 
considerations for judicial review purposes ("You were not aggrieved by a lack of notice 
because you [often as aparty] were abJe to attend and present your evidentiary case."), 
that is not the rule that should be followed if public legal notice is inadequate in the 
context of enacting ordinances such as these. Statutory notice requirements are conditions 
precedent to the enactment of valid ordinances and may not be dispensed with. 
25.) This case was tried on August 20, 2008 . On August 8,2008, plaintiff filed a 
Motianfor Leave to Amend Petition by Adding Two New Causes of Action. The court by 
wTinen order denied this motion as to new allegations seeking declaratory judgment 
relief. The court allowed plaintiff to amend his complaint in this action to add claims 
against the individual members of the Board, and to add claims for alleged due process 
and equal protection violations. In that same order the court addressed, but did not rul e 
upon, the advisability o f attaching a Rule 54(b) certificate to this deci sion. Following 
entry of that order, and the filing ofpJain tiffs amended complaint, defendants removed 
the remainder of this action to federal court (presumably all the civil damage claims that 
had remainded pending), by virtue of a Notice of Removal filed November 10, 2008. 
Therefore, after the entry of this decision, there is and will be nothing further pending in 
this action. Even if the entire pending case has not been removed to federal court, or in 
the event federa l jurisdiction is lost and some or all civil damage claims are once again 
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pending in district court in Camas County, a Rule S4(b) Certificate is proper in this case. 
Any and all other pending claims are bifurcated for separate trial, and involve separate 
issues. See Snake River Equipment Co. v. Christensen 107 Idaho 54 J, 691 P .2d 787 
(App. 1984) For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons set forth in its order allowing the 
filing of the amended complaint, this court will attach a Rule S4(b) certificate to this 
decision, and it will become a final order subject to appeal. 
FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER 
In summary, in addition to any conclusions that appear above, with regard to the 
ordinances in question, the court concludes: 
1.) The Board of Commissioners of Camas County failed to keep a transcribabJe 
verbatim record of deliberations they engaged in, leading up to quasi-judicial public 
hearings, after they received recommendations from P&Z and had compiled at least part 
of the record. 
2.) In recommending and passing Ordinances #153 and #150 at least one P&Z 
commissioner and one county commissioner acted with a conflict of interest as set forth 
in this court's Decision on ConfliCfS of interests Issue filed April 2, 2008. The court can 
find no exception in the law for members of these bodies if they are acting in a 
legislative, as opposed to a quasi-judicial capacity. 
3.) The P&Z Commission failed to keep and maintain adequate records of the 
hearings, findings made, and actions taken by the commission, and failed to send a 
written recommendation to the Board as required by law. The map or maps that were sent 
as recommendations cannot not be identified, and no one can identify when any 
recommendations with regard to changing the Comp Plan or zoning were received. 
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Because of these failures, and the failure to keep verbatim records of meetings, it 
is impossible to tell when the Board commenced deliberations toward a decision, or what 
changes or how many changes were made to the zoning or comp plan amendments by the 
Board. Consequently, it is not possible to tell ifrequirements for additional public 
hearings were met. 
4.) The Board failed to make any written record of its decision. No findings of 
fact or conclusions of law were entered on a decision that purportedly effected a rezone 
of at least portions of the entire county. These are required after the Board has made a 
quasi-judicial decision. 
5.) The Comprehensive Plan includes far more than a Comp Plan Map. In 
amending the Comprehensive Plan, the county has failed to follow proper legal 
procedures and to provide proper legal notice. In amending zoning in Camas County, the 
county has failed to follow proper legal procedures and provide proper legal notice. 
6.) This is a civil judicial proceeding between a county and a person as defined in 
Idaho Code 12-117. That same section provides the court shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees if the court finds the party against whom judgment is entered 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or Jaw. For the reasons set forth herein, the court 
concludes Camas County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, and plaintiff 
may make application for an award of attorney's fees. 
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ORDER 
THE COURT HEREBY DECLARES, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES: 
1.) The amendments to the Comp Plan adopted May 25, 2006 and March 29, 
2007 as Resolution 96 are null and void. 
2.) The amendments to the Camas County Zoning Ordinance, adopted April 18, 
2007, as Ordinance #153, and the Zoning Designation Map adopted March 29, 2007 as 
Ordinance # 150 are all, and each of them, null and void. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 2nd day of December, 2008. 
Robert J~l ifr 
District Judge 
RULE S4(B) CERTIFICA TE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order is it hereby 
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b) LR.C.P., that the court has determined that 
there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and 
does hereby direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which 
execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
DATED this~ day of December, 2008. 
ROberttffr£fF 
District Judge 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~...-c:Lday of DECEMBER, 2008, I served a true 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 
GEORGE MARTIN, 
Plaintiff, 
and 
MARTIN CUSTOM 
HOMES, L.L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, 
By and through the duly elected 
Board of Commissioners in 
their official capacities, 
KEN BAXTROM, 
BILL DAVIS, and 
RON CHAPMAN, 
Defendants, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
') 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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Case No. CV-2008-40 
AFFIDA VIT OF ROBERT "BOB" 
RODMAN IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. My name is Bob Rodman. I am an adult human being over the age of 18 years, 
and I am of sound mind. The statements made in this affidavit are made upon my own 
personal knowledge and are true to the best of my knowledge. 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
2. I was an appointed volunteer member of the Camas County Planning and Zoning 
Commission from July 2004 until October 2006. I was the vice chairman from January 
2005 until October 2006. I served for much of the relevant periods pertaining to this 
cause of action, and thereafter continue to closely monitor the progress of the proposed 
rezone as an interested citizen. 
3. By virtue of serving on the P&Z Commission, and thereafter as an observing 
interested citizen, I am familiar with the facts and issues pertaining to the current legal 
action against the County, the process used to adopt the 2006-2007 Comprehensive Plan, 
Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map, (2006-2007 P&Z Documents) and 
to a lesser extent the 2008 re-enactment of the above rezoning amended ordinances. 
4. Beginning in 2004 and continuing until Oct. 2006, I was continually involved in 
the process of creating the 2006-2007 P&Z Documents. 
5. Beginning in 2006 and continuing until today, as a private citizen, r have 
continued to monitor the activities of the P&Z and the Commissioners regarding the 
issues at question in these legal proceedings. 
6. I have been a witness of record regarding the actions of the defendants in the 
current trial. I have attended all court trial proceedings for this action. 
7. I have personally observed, and the limited court records made available from 
Camas County supports, the following situations I was personally involved in or 
observed: 
a. During my tenure on the P&Z, comment letters and oral testimony from 
public hearings was routinely not discussed or deliberated on by the P&Z. No 
questions presented by the public were ever answered in vvTiting. For example, in 
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April of 2005, the Chairman of the County Board of Commissioners, Ron 
Chapman, ordered the sheriff to investigate a meeting where several P&Z 
members met and tried to discuss testimony and evidence presented by the public 
and not available to the P&Z members at the meeting prior to the scheduled 
deliberations. 
b. During my tenure, there was repeated questioning from myself and the 
public regarding conflict of interest issues with the P&Z chairman. This was 
never answered with any written or oral legal opinion. 
c. During my tenure, the election results from the vote for the 
recommendation of two new P&Z members in the spring of 2006 was held on a 
secret ballot. The results were withheld from the public. The results of the 
"secret ballot" were only known by the County Commissioners. The two new 
"secret" appointees announced by the Board were both contractors with potential 
personal conflicts of interest. 
d. The P&Z, during my tenure, did not routinely seek or consider the input 
from appropriate political subdivisions, including but limited to the City of 
Fairfield, School District, Road and Bridge or Fire Districts. Only once did the 
County Road Boss testify to the P&Z. After that, a motion was passed that 
prevented any expert testimony from anyone to appear before the P&Z. 
e. During my tenure, in spite of repeated requests by myself and others, the 
County was never able to produce a "current zoning map". No record of the 
current County zoning was ever available during the entire preparation and 
adoption of the 2006-2007 P&Z Documents. 
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f. During my tenure, and at no time during the 2006-2007 P&Z Documents 
adoption process, were the P&Z members ever able to find out how many existing 
building lots were already approved and owned within the County. We were only 
told that there were more than 2,500 land owners in Camas County. 
g. During my tenure, at no time at any P&Z meeting was there ever any 
discussion of the aquifer recharge area and the protection of the County's drinking 
water. 
h. During my tenure, when the P&Z was completing its work on the 2006 
Comprehensive Plan, there was no consensus on a Land Use Map. As a solution, 
the chairman requested that each member of the P&Z submit a map and all the 
maps were presented to the Board to choose from. There was also never any 
record of the decision or a finding of facts and conclusion of law submitted with 
the documents. 
1. During my tenure, while the Board of Commissioners had the 2006 
Comprehensive Plan Documents, they amended and rewrote the recommended 
documents extensively, making many substantial changes (including such items 
as a new land use designation, multi-use) without ever returning the documents to 
the P&Z 
J. During my tenure, as the preparation of the 2007 Zoning Documents was 
being completed by the P&Z, I, and members of the public, repeatedly made the 
Board of Commissioner members aware that more information and consideration 
was required before large tracts of land were rezoned from agricultural to 
residential uses. 
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k. During my tenure and thereafter repeatedly throughout this process, I 
informed member of P&Z and the Board that considering and adopting 
amendments during meetings, where the subject had not published and noticed as 
a public hearing was not fair to the public whose allowed property uses would 
change was not advisable. The response was to ignore the advise. 
1. During my tenure I often saw and heard the members of the P&Z act with 
prejudice against the Plaintiff and other members of the public who questioned 
the process or criticized what appeared to be a pre-determined outcome. At two 
different meetings during this period, the Sheriff or a deputy was present at the 
meetings to "control the public and limit the testimony". 
Dated this 1 st day of April, 2009 
AFFIANT/ROBERT "BOB" RODMAN 
~~ 
ROBERT RODMAN 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 1 st day of April, 2009. 
My Commission Expires: If) ht~/ l-
T I I 
Donna J Simms 
Notary Public 
State of Idaho 
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Paul Fitzer, ISB No. 5675 
MOORE SMITIl BUXTON & TuRCKE, ClITD. 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax: 208/331/1202 
I¥V. JV I 't I. L 
Attorneys for Defendants Camas County and the Individual Commissioners 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FlFfH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CuSTOM ) 
HOMES, LLC, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHo, by ) 
and through the duly elected Board of ) 
Commissioners in their official capacity, ) 
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DAVIS, and RON ) 
CHAPMAN, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Case No. CV -2008-40 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Defendant, Camas County, Idaho (the County), by and through its duly elected Board of 
County Commissioners (the Board), Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman (the 
Individual Commissioners), (collectively, County Defendants). by and through their attorneys of 
record, Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on 
or about February 11, 2009. Plaintiff filed its Response on or about April 1, 2009. Defendants 
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now submit its Reply Memorandwn in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment A hearing 
on the Motion for Summary Judgment has been set for April 13, 2009. 
ARGUMENT 
The declaratory judgment act is not a forum for those with general complamts about the 
legislative conduct of one's local governing board. "It is not enough that the party is a concerned 
citizen who seeks to ensure that a governmental entity abides by the law." Thomson v. City of 
Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002). Legislative actions are to be evaluated. with a 
restricted standard of review; as a form of judicial deference to legislative actions. Cooper v. 
Ada County Comm'rs, 101 Idaho 407, 410, 614 P.2d 947, 952 (1980). A strong preswnption 
exists in favor of the validity of local zoning ordinances. In determining whether a zoning 
ordinance should be upheld, "our review of decisions of zoning authorities is limited. Zoning is 
essentially a political, rather than a judicial matter, over which the legislative authorities have, 
generally speaking, complete discretion. ... It is' not the function of this Court or of the trial 
courts to sit as super zoning commissions." Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 
506,511,567 P.2d 1257, 1262 (1977). "Legislative action is shielded from direct judicial review 
by its high visibility and widely feIt impact, on the theory that the appropriate remedy can be had 
at the polls." Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65,68,665 P.2d 1075, 1078 (1983). 
Summary judgment is mandated if the non-moving party fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element which is essential to the non-moving party's 
case and upon which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Gelotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322.106 S.Ct 2548, 91 L.Ed2d 265 (1986); Olsen v. J.A. 
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Freeman, Co., 117 Idaho 706,791 P.2d 1285 (1990). The party opposing summary judgment 
must present more than speculation that material issues exist. East Lizard Butte Water 
Corporation v. Howell, 122 Idaho 679, 837 P.2d 805 (1992). While all controverted facts 
should be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party, Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 
Idaho 37, 740, P.2d 1022 (1987), a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine 
issue. R.G. NelsonA.lA. v. M.L. Steer, 118 Idaho 409,797, P.2d 117 (1990). 
For zoning agency actions, a court must defer to the agency's findings of fact unless they 
are clearly erroneous. Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 452 180 PJd 487, 491 
(2008). The agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even when there 
is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by 
evidence in the record. Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 
126, 176 P.3d 126, 131 (2007). Planning and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong 
presumption of validity. including the agency's application and interpretation of its own zoning 
ordinances. Spencer, 145 Idaho at 452, 180 P.3d at 491. 
The burden of proving that an ordinance is invalid rests upon the party challenging its 
validity and the presumption in favor of validity can be overcome only by a clear showing that: 
1. Hann: Plaintiff suffered a "distinct palpable injury"; 
2. Error: The County committed a procedural error or that the legislative activity "as 
applied is confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, and capricious"; 
3. Nexus: That the injury was sustained "by virtue of' or with a "fairly traceable causal 
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct." 
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See Spencer Y. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 457, 180 P.3d 487, 496 (2008)("The 
party attacking a zoning board's action must first illustrate that the board. erred in a manner 
specified herein. and then must show that a substantial right of the party has been prejudiced." 
Further, the Plaintiff must show that his substantial rights were prejudiced "by virtue of" the 
alleged error.) Spencer, 145 Idaho at 452, 180 P.3d at 491; Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 
Idaho 65, 68, 665 P.2d 1075, 1078 (1983); Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Board ofCom'rs, 133 
Idaho 833,841,993 P.2d 596,604 (1999): 
I. DISTINCT PALPABLE INJURY 
Plaintiff must have "suffered an injury in fact- an invasion of a legally protected interest 
which is ... 'concrete and particularized', and 'actual and imminent', not 'conjectural' or 
'hypothetical'," Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 
351 (1992). Plaintiff asserts that he bas suffered a distinct palpable injury having suffered 
financial damage... immediate negative fiscal impact because of the actual 
rezoning ofms property and adjacent lands"[; that his) "property ... is reduced in 
value ... [and] will suffer decrease in available services .. , increase in taxes and 
prevent him from developing land as he would have been able under the pre-
existing zoning schematic. 
See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 15, 
'2. Further, Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered harm due by virtue of the "government's 
I See also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 500: "First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" - an invasion of a 
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual and imminent", not 'conjectural' 
or 'hypothetical;' "Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of -
the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able) to the challenged action of the defendant, and not _ .. thee} result (of] the 
independent action of some third party not before the cou.xt» Third, it must be "likely", as opposed to merely 
"speculative", that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." 
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illegal action [which] will increase competition and therefore hurt him financially." [d. at. 16. 
While the County disputes nearly all of the factual allegations ofPlainti£f's affidavits, his claim 
that he has suffered a distinct palpable injury different than that suffered by any other member of 
the public is simply unsupported, and in fact is directly contradicted, by the record. 
A. Ordinance 159 Zoning Map: Actual Rezone of Plaintiff's Properties - No Injury 
Plaintiff owns or has an alleged interest in the following parcels of property in Camas County: 
a. Forty acre parcel at 770 E. 240 N. 
i, Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was zoned Agricultural (A); 
ii. After the 2008 amendments, the property remained Agricultural (A); 
iii. Prior to the 2006 Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map amendments, the property 
was designated (A-T) and (A) after the amendments. 
v. To the north, south, east and west the adjoining properties to this property were 
all zoned Agricultural (A) prior to 2007 and thereafter. 
vi. Effect of Legislation on Plaintiff: No Change 
b. Twenty-nine acre parcel west of Soldier road. 
i. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was zoned Agricultural (A) allowing 
one unit per eighty acres; 
ii. After the 2007 amendments, the property was upzoned Residential (R-I), 
allowing one unit per acre and remains so today; . 
iii. Prior to the 2006 Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map amendments, the property 
was designated (R-7) allowing seven units per acre, but (R-I) after the amendments 
and remains so today. 
iv. To the north. south, east and west the adjoining properties to this property were 
all zoned Agricultural (A) prior to 2007, (R-t) after the 2007 amendments, and 
remain (R-l) after the 2008 amendments, 
v. Effect of Legislation on Plaintiff: Upzoned 
C. One-acre lot within Homestead Subdivision with vested and approved one-acre sized lots. 
i. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was zoned (AT); 
Ii. After the 2008 amendments, the property was zoned Residential (R-l). 
iv. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the adjoining properties to the north, south, east, 
and west in the subdivision were also zoned (A-T), and rezoned to (R-l) in 2008. 
v. Effect of Legislation on Plaintiff: No change 
d. Contractual Interest in Two eight acre parcels. 
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i. Northern parcel: Both before and after the amendments, the property was zoned 
(AT); 
ii. Southern parcel: Before the amendments, the property was (A) AgricuItrual and 
rezoned to Residential (R-1) after the amendments. 
iii. Effect of Legislation on Plaintiff: No change or upzoned 
e. Alleged Right of First Refusal in a 67 acre parcel. 
i. Prior to the amendments, the property was zoned (A) Agricultural; 
ii. After the amendments, the property was rezoned (R-l) Residential; 
iii. Effect of Legislation on Plaintiff: Up zoned 
(See Butlin Afr., '22-23). Plaintiffs properties have not been downzoned. Rather they either 
remain the same or were even upzoned. Thus Plaintiff has not suffered a distinct palpable injury 
to his own property. He does not have a personal stake in the outcome and the judicial relief 
requested will not prevent or redress the claimed injury as the property would go largely 
unchanged. 
Further, Plaintiff has not yet sought to process a land use application pursuant to 
Ordinance 157.2 Plaintiff asserts that McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 
953 (1993) somehow bolsters his position. In McCuskey, the appellant sought and was issued a 
building permit to erect a gas station and store. Thereafter Canyon County issued a stop work 
order due to the adoption of a new zoning ordinance which downzoned his property from heavy 
industrial to rural residential effectively prohibiting the appellant's proposed use. The appellant 
challenged the Canyon County Zoning Ordinance itself for failure to provide him satisfactory 
notice which would have allowed him the opportunity to testify. While canyon Comty's rezone 
from industrial to rural residential might have been reasonably related to a legitimate 
2 On the day before Zoning Ordinance 153 was enacted. Plaintiff filed an application seeking a rezone of the eight 
acre parcel to (R-7). (See Budin Aff .• 1119-21). Thus, the applicable ordinance to his application is Ordinance 12. 
The adoption of Zoning Ordinance 157 does not preclude him from going forward on his application pursuant to 
Zoning Ora; .... nce 12; the ordinance in effect at the time ofhis application. See Chisolm v. 1\..,in Falk CO'.L'1.ty, 139 
Idaho 131, 134,75 P.3d 185, 188 (2003). 
REPLY MEMORANDUM -- 6 
f " "_ v _ L V V J i • J V I III IlIVVIIL 01f111n DUI\IVIV NU. jlj/4 r. ti 
governmental objective, the appellant's failure to receive actual or constructive notice served as 
the ba.sis to void the ordinance rezoning his property. The appellant had a vested land use 
application rescinded by a zoning ordinance to which he had Dot received constructive or actual 
notice, which additionally downzoned his property. The injury was suffered by virtue of the 
absence of notice. Note, the Court did not substitute its judgment for that of the county board as 
to whether the property ought to be zoned industrial or residential. This is a legislative 
determination that was not addressed. Rather, the appellant simply had the right to notice and an 
opportunity to testify. In the present action, there is DO such land use application. There was no 
such down zone or rescission of a vested right. The Plaintiff cannot assert procedural defects 
because the Plaintiffhad actual notice having attended and testified at each public hearing. 
B. Ordinance 159 Zoning Map: Adjacent Properties - No Injury 
Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered a distinct palpable injury by virtue of an upzone to 
"adjacent lands". Analogous to this rationale is Plaintiff's assertion that "increased competition" 
causes him a distinct palpable injury different than that suffered by the general public 
presumably because he is employed as a realtor and developer. Plaintiff has not suffered harm 
by virtue of neighboring properties being upzoned. The evidence clearly shows that each and 
every property to the north, south, east, and west of Plaintiff s properties were rezoned in exactly 
the same fashion as the Plaintiff's properties. Where Plaintiff's property remained the same, so 
did the "adjacent" property. Where Plaintiff's property was rezoned to (R~1), so too was the 
adjoining property. 
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The law does not recognize a personalized, distinct palpable injury by virtue of increased 
competition; i.e. the permitting of other (R-l) development does not reduce the value to his 
property by creating added inventory. As a realtor and developer. Plaintiff's affidavits capably 
identify his motive: Rezone his property to a high density designation while preventing any other 
property from doing so. It is of no surprise that there is no ease law in Idaho that supports the 
Plaintiff's position. Even a brief perusal of the persuasive authority demonstrates that standing 
does not exist when alleged damages flow from increased or perceived unfair competition. 
("Generally, persons whose only complaint is that the rezoning ... would create 
competition with. them in the conduct of their business have been held not to have 
standing to litigate the validity of the zoning action.") 
4 Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning §63.34 (41h cd. 2005). 
"a person whose sole interest for objecting to a zoning board's action is to prevent 
competition with his or her business is not a person aggrieved, and therefore does 
not have standing to challenge a zoning decision in court." 
83 AmJur.2d Zoning and Planning §926 (2003). This approach, which denies standing to a 
mere competitor, is the prevailing law throughout the country. While Plaintiff offers an 
alternative legislative solution to rezoning the county, such testimony is irrelevant. In acting in 
its legislative capacity, if the county's county-wide planning and zoning legislative actions are 
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, neither the Plaintiff nor the Court can 
substitute its judgment for that of the elected legislative body; Plaintiff's remedy is at the polls. 
C. Resolution 114 and I1S: Comprehensive Plan - No Distinct Palpable IDjury 
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Plaintiff alleges that he has been injured because he can no longer develop his property 
pursuant to the prior planning and zoning scheme.3 Without a pending application.. an R-7 
designation on a comprehensive plan land use map does not confer a vested property right and 
Plaintiff has not suffered harm by virtue of a subsequent change to the land use map. Giltner 
Dairy, UC \I. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 181 P.3d 1238 (2008)4. As Giltner and 
Highlands Development Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 188 P 3d 900 (2008), illustrate, a 
comprehensive plan, toning ordinance, and zoning map do not by their very legislative nature 
confer a right to develop, but are merely legislation applicable to property county-wide. The 
state legislature granted local governing boards the authority to exercise legislative judgment in 
detemllning the appropriate zoning designation throughout its jurisdiction - an individual has 
no right to a particular zone. Without any evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff has 
suffered a distinct palpable injury, Plaintiff does not have the standing to enjoin the County's 
legislative activity, and the County is entitled to summary judgment 
II. NEXUS - Fairly Traceable Cau.sal COWleetion 
Even were the Plaintiff to demonstrate a distinct palpable injury, he would still bear the 
burden to demonstrate that he suffered a distinct palpabJe injury by virtue of a procedural or 
substantive error of the County as in McCuskey (See also Spencer v. Kootenai County supra, 145 
Idaho at 457, 180 P Jd at 496 ) (or with a fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed 
3 This author assumes that Plaintiff is referring to future land use applications should he submit them. As Plaintiff 
does have an application pursuant to Ord:inanee 12, Plaintiff's statement is untrue as it pertains to existing 
applications as he does have the right to have his application processed under the former ordinance schematic. 
4 This argument is besides the point as Resolution 96 which removed the R-7 classification was adopted before 
Plaintiff submitted his rezone application. Resolution 96 designated the properties pursuant to Plaintifr s application 
as conducive to R-l. 
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injury and confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious conduct on the part oftbe county.) 
See Burt \I. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 66, 665 P.2d 1075, 1076, n.2 (l983). Plaintiff 
asserts that the County committed numerous procedural and substantive errors. While the 
County maintains its position that the applicable procedural requirements were either adhered to 
or were simply inapplicable to the County's legislative actions, such a legal analysis is irrelevant 
as the Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that he suffered a distinct palpable injury !Jy virtue of a 
procedural error. We will examine each in tum. 
A. LLUP A: Plaintiff is Dot entitled to el11umced due process for legislative actions. 
As a preliminary consideration, many of the alleged procedural and substantive defects 
are simply inapplicable in the legislative context. Citing case after case pertaining to petitions 
for judicial review in the quasi-judicial setting, Plaintiff contends that minimum due process 
requires the County to provide Plaintiff: 1) legal notice of the proceedings; 2) a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard; 3) adequate findings of fact, conclusions of law; and 4) a transcribable 
record. See Cowan v. Bd O/Comm'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 508, 148 P.3d 1247, 
1254 (2006). This is the inconect analysis. A$ the Supreme Court said in Cooper: 
It is beyond dispute that the promulgation or enactment of general zoning plans 
and ordinances is legislatiV'c action. Dawson, 98 Idaho at 506, 567 P.2d at 1257; 
Harrell v, City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 506 P.2<l 470 (1973); Cole-Collister 
Fire Protection District v. City of BOise, 93 Idaho 558, 468 P 2d 290 (1970); 
Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 117 P.2d 461 (1941). However, appellants 
urge that a crucial distinction be drawn between a zoning entitYs action in 
enacting general zoning legislation and its action in applying existing legislation 
and policy to specific, individual interests as in a proceeding on an application for 
rezone ofparticu1ar property . 
. " Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific piece of 
property are usually an exercise of legislative authority, are subject to limited 
review, and may only attacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse 
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of authority. On the other hand, a determination whether the permissible use of a 
specific piece of property should be changed is usually an exercise of judicial 
authority and its propriety is subject to an altogether different test. 
Basically, this test involves the determination of whether action produces a 
general rule or policy that is applicable to an open class of individuals, interests, 
or situations, or whether it entails the application of a general rule or policy to 
specific individuals. interests, or situations. If the former determination is 
satisfied, there is legislative action; if the latter determination is satisfied, the 
action is judicial. 
Cooper v. Ada County Comm'rs, 101 Idaho 407,409-410, 614 P.2d 947, 949-950 (1980). 
Action is legislative when it affects a large area consisting of many parcels of 
property in disparate ownership .... Conversely, action is considered quasi-judicial 
when it applies a general rule to a specific interest, such as a zoning change 
affecting a single piece of property, a variance, or a conditional use permit. ... It 
is analogous to a general rezone which affects a large number of people-in this 
case, multiple owners of multiple tracts of land approximating over eight hundred 
individuals, each with varying affected interests and impacts, and which is highly 
visible to the public. . .. The amendment of the plan and zoning of the annexed 
property affects the interests of all persons in the city in some manner. Such 
widely felt impact and high visibility is consistent with action deemed legislative. 
Burt, 105 Idaho at 66,665 P.2d at 1077; see also Dawson, 98 Idaho at 511, 567 P.2d at 1262. 
As a matter of law, the comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance, and zoning map are 
county-wide legislation. As general legislation pertaining to "many parcels of property in 
disparate ownership", they are wholly legislative in character. Burt, 105 Idaho at 67, 665 P.2d at 
1075. Thus, the enhanced due process protections that affected parties are entitled to inquasi-
judicial actions are not afforded to general members of the public in the legislative context. The 
plain meaning of the applicable statutory provisions also demonsttate that they do not apply in 
legislative actions. 
L Idaho Code §67-6521: Plaintiff is not an "affected person"? 
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For Plaintiff to invoke the judicial review protections of LLUP A, he must qualify as an 
"affected person". See Idaho Code § 67-6521(1); Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 74, 73 
P.3d 84,87 (2003). An "affected person" is ((one having an interest in real property which 
may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the development." 
§67-6521(1)(a) (Emphasis Added). Plaintiff does not have an interest in real property that has 
been adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a pennit authorizing development. Further, 
a comprehensive plan, land use map, zoning ordinance, and county-wide zoning map, per 
Highlands, do not, in of themselves, "authorize development". As the Court in Highlands 
indicated, such Plaintiffs are limited to the McCuskey analysis. Yet, unlike Mr. McCuskey, 
Plaintiff has not had a land use application rescinded, has not been downzoned, and had actual 
notice of the legislative proceeding. 
2. Idaho Code §67-6536 Transcribahle records are not required for legislative activity. 
I.e. §67-6536 provides: 
In every case in this chapter where an appeal is provided for, a transcribable 
verbatim record of the proceeding shall be made... . The proceeding envisioned 
by this statute for which a transcribable verbatim record must be maintained shall 
include all public hearings, at which testimony or evidence is received or at which 
an applicant or affected person addresses the commission or governing board 
regarding a pending application or during which the commission or governing 
board deliberates toward a decision after compilation of the record. 
(emphasis added). No appeal. as provided for in I.C. §§ 67-6519 or 6521, is provided for 
declaratory judgment actions challenging legislative activity. Further, a transcribable record is 
required only for a public hearing pertaining to a pending application at which an applicant or 
affected person addresses the Board. evide!'..ce is received, or the Board deliberates after 
REPLY MEMORANDUM - 12 
Illl\..V.a...vV' "J,IIII IIIV ..... ll\o, ""114' II \,IV" 1 V" 
ltv • .IV I .,. I· I "T 
compilation of the record. Per Giltner and Highlands, there is no pending application despite 
Plaintiff s arguments to contrary; no applicant; and no affected person. Thus, no transcribable 
record is required. Regardless, as a matter of COurSOl the County maintains transcribable records 
in all public hearings and did so in this case as well. 
3. Idaho Code §67-6535: Written findings of fact, conclusions of law. 
Idaho Code §67-6535 provides that the approval or denial of any application prOvided 
for in UUPA shall be based upon standards as set forth in the comprehensive plan and zoning 
ordinance. and to be in writing. As the Supreme Court has made patently clear in Giltner and 
Highlands, there has been. no approval or denial of an application that would subject 
comprehensive planning and zoning legislation to the quasi-judicial review provisions of 
LLUP A. Of course, the zoning ordinance, map, comprehensive plan, and land use map are all 
written documents which in and of the.mselves are public documents or records promulgated in a 
public hearing, which identify standards as being the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance, 
and are in writing contained in the record. See Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 
(2003). Res Ipsa Loquitur: the thing speaks for itself. 
4. Idaho Code §67-6509: Record of the heappgs shall be maintained. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code §67-6S09, a "record of the hearings, findings made, and actions 
taken" shall be maintained by the County. Transcribable audio recordings were maintained and 
submitted into evidence representing each and every public hearing for the challenged 
legislation. Against the plain text of the statute, Plaintiff wishes to add the word ''written'' to this 
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requirement; that a written record, a transcribed not tr.anscibable record, i.e. findings of fact, 
conclusions of law must be created. There is no such obligation in a plain reading of the text. 
B. Was Plaintiff denied due pr~ess pursuant to Idaho Code §61-6509 and §67-6511? 
1. Actual Notice 
Since the Plaintiff is not entitled to the due process protections afforded to "affected 
persons" pursuant to LLUPA's judicial review provisions, what due process, if any, is Plaintiff' 
entitled to and did the County fail to provide him this due process? Pursuant to Idaho Code §67-
6509 and §67 -6511, Plaintiff, as a member of the public, is entitled to notice and an opportunity 
to be heard. That's it. Plaintiff alleges numerous procedural violations mostly pertaining to 
defective notice or other publication requirements. While the County certainly disputes these 
allegations,' they are also immaterial. Regardless of the alleged defective notice, Plaintiff 
5 Plaintiff alleges a number of allegations including: 
a. Summary of the ptOposed amendments - The legal notices do provide a summru:y of each ordinance and 
resolution including chapter or section headings. Plaintiff fails to allege that he did not have a full and expansive 
understanding of the proposed legislation by virtue of an alleged f.tilure to public an expansive summary. 
b. NQti.ce to aU Political Subdivisions The County alleges that notice of the public hearing, whether actUal or 
constructive, was provided to all political subdivisions providmg services to the County. At trial, the Fire District 
will provide testimony that they were fully aware of the hearings. Of COUISe, this is irrelevant as Plaitniff cannot 
demonstrate a nexus between an alleged iIijury and the Fire District's fuilure to receive notice. The City ofFairfieJd 
does not provide services to the County and therefore was not entitled to notice. 
c. Failure to provide alternative notice pursuant to 67-6511 and Ordinance 142 by failing to post at Camas County 
Courthouse or Fairfield City Hall The County was not required to post at these locations. On:tinance 142, which 
identifies these locations, was codified in the 2007 zoning ordinance. Judge Elgee, in CV 07-24, ruled that a 
preliminary inju.nction enjoins not only the current ordinance but aU prior ordiI1ances as well. Thus, at the time the 
2008 Ordinances were enacted, Ordinance 142 was enjoined requiring the County to revert to I.C. 67-6511. This 
required posting at all extema1 boundaries of the subject property. The County complied with this statute. 
d. Findings of Fact Conclusign QfLaw was defective· Immaterial. not required. 
t. Txanscribable Record not maintained - Immaterial, nor required, bur maintained anyway. 
f. Planning and Zoning recommey.dation defective - The Planning and Zoning recommendation was issued both via 
a written recommendation and by the proposed legislation itself Further, staff reports, legal notice, etc. all 
identified P&Z's recommendation to the Board. 
g. The draft dates of the proposed legislation predate the public hearing dates - Of course they do. This is 
legislative activity. P&Z conducted three workshops and staffprepared drafts of the proposed ordinances prior to 
the public hearing. Otherwise, there is nothing for the public to COIlllIJe.Ilt on.. 
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waives any such challenge in that he attended and testified extensively at each and every public 
hearing and most, if not all, public workshops, infonnational sessions, etc. (See Butlin Aff. 
'-19,21, Exhibit M and N.) Actual notice operates as a waiver to alleged defective notice. 
Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho at 453, 180, P.3d 487,492 (2008). In Cowan, the court 
noted: 
[TJhe Board concedes that both notices were defective. Nonetheless, Cowan has 
failed to demonstrate that his substantial rights were prejudiced by either 
defective notice. First, Cowan's counsel attended the _ .. hearing and submitted a 
brief objecting to notice. Moreover, Cowan spoke against the application at that 
hearing. Therefore, even if the notice were defective, Cowan bas failed to 
demonstrate how this defect prejudiced his substantial rights since he clearly had 
notice of the meeting. 
Cowan, 143 Idaho at 513, 148 P.3d at 1259. In Contrast, in McCuskey, 123 Idaho 657,851 P.2d 
953 (1993), the county failed to properly post the property pursuant to Idaho Code §67-6511(b) 
and Plaintiff had not received actual, constructive, or legal notice of the hearing, which rezoned 
his property from Industrial to Residential thereby rescinding his building permit 
In the present action, like Cowan, even if the County committed a procedural error, 
Plaintiffhad no pending application, no injury and has failed to demonstrate the required nexus 
between an alleged procedural or substantive error and an injury suffered by the Plaintiff. As 
stated at the preliminary irtiUDction hearing before this Court, Plaintiff is more familiar with the 
2008 legislation and has attended more workshops, mee~ and nearings than any other citizen 
of the County including each and every board member. He has testified at every turn. Unlike 
Mr. McCuskey, even if we were to assume defective notice, Plaintiff does not have standing to 
allege he was denied due process as Plaintiff's actual notice operates as a waiver. 
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2. Conflict oflnterest - Was Plaintiff Denied Due Process? 
Idaho Code §67-6S06 provides that government officials shall not participate in any 
proceeding or action when he has an economic interest in the procedure or action. In Manookian 
v. Blaine County, 112 Idaho 697 (1987), the applicant sought a conditional use permit (i.e. 
specific application authorizing development) to construct electrical transmission lines. Several 
potential routes were identified to locate the lines, and the commissioners declined to approve 
the route which would have run straight through property owned by two of the planning and 
zoning commissioners in favor of the route, which crossed the property owned by the plaintiffs. 
The court reasoned that the rejected route's impact upon the conunissioners' land constituted an 
economic interest. The chosen route caused a distinct palpable uyury to the plaintiff with a fairly 
traceable connection to the commissioner's conflict of interest. Thus, the Court was able to 
reverse this quasi-judicial governmental action. 
The present action is distinguishable from Manoonkian. In Manoonkian, the properties 
owned by the plaintiffs and the commissioners were the subject of a specific application. The 
members specifically diverted attention from their own properties in favor of the plamtiff's 
property. Thus~ there was a causal and spatial connection. a nexus, between the respective 
properties. In contrast, the present action is legislative in nature applying county-wide. Plaintiff 
rests on its mere allegation that government officials, who are required to reside in the County, 
have a per se conflict by virtue of their ownership of property in the county. To claim that 
Plaintiff is denied a due process of law by virtue of a conflict of interest, Plaintiff bears the 
burden to present evidence demonstrating a nexus between his property and the governmental 
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agent's property. Further, if the County's rezone of the entire county is rationally related to a 
legitimate government objective, Plaintiff's action fails. 
While this issue is hotly contested in CV 07-24, now before the Idaho SUpreme Court, for 
purposes of this action, the County officials who owned property in the county recused 
themselves from participating in the enactment of Ordinance 158, the county zoning map.6 
Because they did participate in the enactment of the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance. 
Plaintiff feels that a ''taint'' continues because the planning and zoning legislation did not change 
in a material substantive manner. What is the alternative? You cannot materially alter 
legislation that makes sense, i.e. maintain agricultural land in rural areas and locate higher 
density zoning near Fairfield and other historically commercial areas. 
Because all governmental members who owned property in the County recused 
themselves, and because there is no showing demonstrating a nexus between an alleged conflict 
of interest (if the Supreme Court concludes that a conflict exists by virtue of ownership in the 
County) and a distinct palpable injury suffered by Plaintiff, as a matter of law, the County is 
entitled to summax}' judgment. 
4. "Substantive Dictates": Idaho Code 67-6508: 
Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map, and Zoning Ordinance 
based upon his mere allegations that the County failed to conduct a comprehensive planning and 
zoning process. Aside from contesting these assertions, the County is entitled to summary 
6 The C-Ounty still m,ai ... tains that no eon.tUct of inter~ existed and the county officials did not have to recuse 
thenoselvesatall 
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judgment because Plaintiff wholly fails to demonstrate how this perceived defect callses him a 
distinct palpable injury or otherwise substantially impairs his fundamental rights. 
Idaho Code §67-6508 provides that the commission shall conduct a comprehensive 
planning process to prepare, implement, and update its comprehensive plan. It simply provides 
that the comprehensive plan itself must include all planning components including property 
rights, population, school facilities and transportation, economic development, land usc, natural 
resources, hazardous areas, public services and facilities, recreation, special areas, housing. 
community design, and implementation. 
Similarly, Idaho Code §67-6507 identifies the powers of the planning and zoning 
commission in relation to the planning process. It provides that the commission shall provide for 
citizen meetings, hearings, surveys, or other methods to obtain advice on the planning process 
and implementation of the plan. Thereafter, the section provides that the commission may, or in 
other words, has the discretion to, consult with public officials or other professional 
organizations, conduct informational m.eetings, etc. Idaho Code §67-6502 identifies the pUIpose 
oftLUP A: to protect the healtl4 safety, and welfare of its citizens by protecting property rights, 
ensure adequate public facilities, protect the environment, etc. Plaintiff also cites several other 
LLUPA provisions that essentially identify further comprehensive planning and zoning 
considerations. 
The Plaintiff continually cites to the abbreviated legislative process and the absence of a 
detailed record in enacting Resolution 114 and 115 as a basis to overturn their enactment. It is as 
if three year's worth of comprehensive planning, work shops, meetings, hearings, assistance 
from legal, engineering, and environmental experts, as well as countless hoUl'S of testimony did 
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not ever occur. Further, Plaintiff argues that it is an affirmative requirement to deliberate each 
and every facet of each and every statutory provision on the record, This is not what lLUP A 
contemplates or requires. For example, Idaho Code §61-6508 requires that the plan contain the 
required components ... not that each component is deliberated after public testimony is closed. 
Res Ipsa Loquitur~ the thing speaks for itself. The comprehensive plan contains all of the 
required planning components. The comprehensive plan and the zoning ordinance itself 
provides for the protection of property rights, public infrastructure, the environment, agricultural 
uses, commercial and residential densities etc. etc. 
Plaintiff continually cites towards illegal deliberations that must have occurred prior to 
the close of the public testimony evidenced by the absence of the Board's discussion of each and 
every LLUP A provision in deliberation. These are legislative documents not a quasi-judicial 
hearing on a specific application. In the legislative context, staff (legal. planning, engineering. 
public works) work on such documents for months ... even years before presenting it at a public 
hearing. The governmental board members conduct workshops, infoxmational sessions, discuss 
with constituents, run election campaigns, discuss with the media, etc. regarding legislative 
enactments. This does not demonstrate bias or a conflict of interest. These are not illegal 
deliberations. This is the legislative process. If a plaintiff can establish that he suffered a 
distinct palpable injury with a fairly traceable connection to arbitrary, capricious governmental 
conduct, then the Court can examine whether the government's legislation is rationally related to 
a legitimate governmental objective, 
C. Confiscatory. Arbitra..ry, Unreasonable or Capricious 
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Even in quasi-judicial proceedings, the Court is not empowered to substitute its judgment 
for the governmental entity and shall defer to the factual determinations of the governing body 
unless they are clearly erroneous even when there is conflicting evidence before the agency. 
Spencer, 145 Idaho at 452, 180 P.3d at 491. In legislative actions, the court has even less or 
"limited" review. Affording the legislative branch nearly complete discretion, the gove.ming 
board's decision shall not be "disturbed absent a clear showing that it is confiscatory, arbitrary, 
unreasonable or capricious." Burt'V. City o/Idaho Falls. 105 Idaho 65, 66, 665 P.2d 1075,1076. 
FN.2 (1983); Dawson, 98 Idaho at 506,567 P.2d at 1257. Legislative activity is "capricious ifit 
is done without a rational basis" and "arbitrary if it was done in disregard of the facts and 
circumstances presented or without adequate determining principles." American Lung Ass'n, etc. 
v, State, Dep't of Agriculture, 142 Idaho 544, 547, 130 P.3d 1082, 1085 (2006). 
The County's legislation is not confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious. Quite 
the contrary, the County clearly had a rational basis pursuant to a legitimate governmental 
objective to undertake revisions to the zoning ordinance, zoning map, comprehensive plan, and 
land use map with the goals of main.ta.ining agricultural uses in rural areas and residential and 
commercial uses in areas already developed or historically utilized in that fashion.. (See 
Backstrom Aff. 15-8). Over the course of three years, the commission conducted an extensiVe 
comprehensive planning process in updating the comprehensive plan conducting, on ahnost a 
weekly basis, multiple informational workshops, public meetings, and numerous public hearings 
in considering an amendment to the comprehensive plan including testimony from countless 
citizens and experts. (See Backstrom Aff. '4.9). The County did not feel that new studies were 
necessary as the preexisting plan adequately addressed this need. (See Backstrom Afr. ;6). 
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There is no requirement that a county is required to expend the considerable resources to hire 
new consultants or perform new studies each time the plan is amended. 
The Plaintiff in his attached affidavit provides an alternate rationale as to why his 
property should have a higher density pursuant to the comprehensive plan. In essence, he wishes 
to substitute his own judgment for that of the County Board. Plaintiff simply disagrees with the 
direction that the elected officials have undertaken in the comprehensive planning and zoning 
process and offers an alternative suggestion. This is irrelevant. The County'S factual findings 
are binding upon the Court even in the presence of conflicting evidence provided the County's 
findings are rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. Spencer, 145 Idaho at 452~ 
180 P.3d at 491. The Board members are elected officials engaged in their legislative function. 
As Burt and subsequent cases have staunchly held, "legislative action is shielded from direct 
judicial review by its high visibility and 'Widely felt impact, on the theory that appropriate 
remedy can be had at the polls." Burt 105 Idaho at 66, 665 P .2d at 1076. 
In order to overturn the Board's action, this Court would have to find that the Board's 
conduct was arbitrary and capricious in enacting its legislation aruJ that Plaintiff suffered a 
distinct palpable injwy by virtue of this arbi1:raIy, capricious conduct. As a matter of law, 
Plaintiff simply does not have the standing to challenge the County's legislation. Because the 
County had a rational basis in light of the facts and circumstances in amending its 
comprehensive planning and zoning legislation, and the Plaintiff's absence of any distinct, 
palpable injury with a fairly traceable connection to County error or arbitrary conduct. the 
County is entitled to summary judgment as a matter oHaw. 
RESPONSE TO OBJECI10NS TO AFFIJ)A VITS 
REPLY MEMORANDUM - 21 
.. ,vv"'" VIfIIIII UVI\IVIV NU. :H1 I q r. L j 
Plaintiff objects to the Budin affidavit as his employment began after the 2006 
comprehensive plan was enacted. In contrast to Mr. Rodman's affidavit, this case pertains to the 
2008 legislation, not the 2006 comprehensive plan. Regardless, as custodian of the records 
pertaining to this cause of action, Mr. Budin is familiar with the dates, agendas, and subject of 
any and all public workshops, meetings, informational sessions etc. and the dates of adoption of 
all ordinances and resolutions. Further, Mr. Butiin's affidavit concerns factual assertions that 
occurred within his personal knowledge pertaining to the 2008 legislation. 
Plaintiff objects to the Backstrom affidavit with regard to the substantive deliberations or 
lack theroof that took place following the public hearings on the 2008 legislation. Again, the 
Plaintiff misunderstands legislative process. The adoption of comprehensive planning and 
zoning legislation is the compilation of many years of workshops, informational sessions, public 
meetings, public hearings, election campaigning, etc., etc., etc. The considerations that a board 
member makes in eventually approving proposed legislation and the motivations behind 
comprehensive planning and zoning legislaton cannot be feasibly discussed in their entirely in 
the deliberations following a public hearing nor need they be. This is legislative as opposed to 
quasj..judicial action. Mr. Backstrom recused himself from voting in the adoption only of the 
zoning map despite his continued assertion that one does not have a conflict of interest by virtue 
of owning property within the county. Recusing himself from the vote, however, does not 
somehow reduce his personal knowledge of the county. its planning processes, the importance of 
preserving agricultural uses, diverting higher density development near the city centers and 
townships, and the myriad of other concerns, While it is evident that the Plaintiff would prefer 
higher density zoning on his property. and offers the rationale for doing so, Mr. Backstrom's 
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affidavit certainly provides a rational basis as to why the county, as a whole, needed planning 
and zoning amendments and long range planning. 
Lastly, Plaintiff objects to the statement of facts as being argumentative. Given the tenor 
of Plaintiff s caustic myriad of filings, this is a bit ironic and disingenuous. Nonetheless, the 
statement of facts are just that: a detailed arrangement of the factual infonnation considered and 
the dates of hearings, etc. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S LAW OF THE CASE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff asserts that the doctrine of the "law of the case" mandates that this Court must 
take judicial notice of the findings of fact and the conclusions of law as determined by the Fifth 
Judicial District, via the Honorable Judge Elgee in CV 07-24. Aside from the fact that this cause 
of action pertains to different public hearings and different ordinances, Plaintiff also misstates 
the doctrine as applying between two state district courts. The "Law of the Case'J doctrine 
designates the principle that if an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded 
the cause to the court below for further proceedings, the legal question thus determined by the 
appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where 
the facts remain the same. Union Pacific v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 139 Idaho 572, 575, 
83 P 3d 116, 119 (2004); Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 110 Idaho 15, 21, 713 P.2d 1374, 
1380 (1985); Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n of Seattle, Wash., 58 Idaho 349, 3S2, 74 
P.2d 702, 703 (1937). An appellate court's detennination on a legal issue is binding on both the 
trial court on remand and an appellate court on a subsequent appeal given the same case and the 
same set of facts. Id. The doctrine is applied to legal "principles" and "rules of law", and not 
findings of fact made by the appellate court 
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The findings of fact, conclusions of law as determined in CV 07-24 which held among 
other things that, pursuant to LLUP A, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and transcribable 
records, are required in legislative actions is under appear before the Idaho Supreme Court. The 
Plaintiff contends that this decision is "binding and controlling precedent on the issues" with a 
"binding and preclusive affect [ sic] on the determinations before this Court" pertaining to the 
2008 legislation before this Court. This argument is not an misstatement of the law, or a 
misapprehension orit, but an outright re-invention of it and should not be taken seriously. 
CONCLUSION 
While the Plaintiff and the County disagree as to a myriad of factual allegations. as a 
matter of law, the Plaintiff is unable to carry its burden that it has standing to challenge the 
County's legislative activity. The Plaintiff simply has not suffered a distinct palpable injury with 
a fairly traceable connection to a procedural error or arbitrary conduct on the part of the CoWlty. 
Plaintiff's properties have remained the same or were even upzoned. The County complied with 
all notice and hearing requirements which, even if defective, could not be asserted by the 
Plaintiff who had actual notice and did testify at each public hearing. Lastly. while the Plaintiff 
has a different legislative agenda than the County. even viewed most favorably to the Plaintiff, 
the County has expressed its rationale for amending its legislation which does not rise to level of 
arbitrary or capricious conduct. Defendant respectfully requests that this Court grant its Motion 
for Sum.maxy Judgment awarding reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this 
action as Plaintiff never possessed a reasonable basis in law or fact to argue it had standing to 
challenge the COWlty'S legislative activity. 
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Dated this ~ of April, 2009. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHID. 
Paul J. Fitzer 
Attorney for the County Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was this ~ay of April, 2009 served upon the following individuals 
and in the corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O, Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Via United States mail 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN 
CUSTOM HOMES, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by and 
through the duly elected Board of 
Commissioners in their official 
capacities, KEN BACKSTROM, BILL 
DAVIS, and RON CHAPMAN, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV-2008-40 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
--------------------------
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on 
Monday, April 13, 2009. Counsel Christopher Simms appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, 
Martin. Counsel Paul Fitzer appeared on behalf of the Board. After the court heard the arguments 
of counsel, the court took the matter under advisement to issue a \vTitten decision. 
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I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Stipulated Facts 
The parties to this proceeding in a prior hearing have stipulated to a set of facts as set 
forth below and the court adopts the stipulated facts for purposes of the summary judgment 
motion. The parties in separate stipulations of fact have stipulated as follows: 
Stipulation of Facts submitted by Defendants: 
1. Plaintiff owns the following parcels of property in Camas County: 
1) Property: forty acre parcel at 770 e. 240 N. 
a. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was zoned Agricultural (A) allowing one unit 
per twenty acres; 
b. After the amendments, including 2008, the property was zoned Agricultural (A). 
c. Prior to the 2006 Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map amendments, the property was 
designated A-T, but A after the amendments. 
2) Property: twenty-nine acre parcel west of Soldier road. 
a. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was Agricultural (A); 
b. After the 2007 amendments, the property was zones Residential (Rl), allowing one unit 
per acre. 
c. Prior to the 2006 Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map amendments, the property was 
designated R-7, but R-l after the amendments. 
3) Property: one, one acre lot within the existing, approved, and platted Homestead 
Subdivision. 
a. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the properties were zones Agricultural Transitional (AT) 
allowing one unit per acre; 
b. Prior to the 2008 amendments, the property was A-S, allowing one unit per five acres. 
c. After the 2008 amendments, the property was zoned Residential (Rl), allowing one unit 
per acre. 
2. The Commission held several public meetings to discuss the new ordinances and 
resolutions; 9. Notice of Public Hearing before the Planning and Zoning Commission on the 
draft 2008 Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map were 
published in the April 2, April 9, and April 16,2008 editions to the Camas Courier. 
3. Pursuant to Idaho 67-6S11(b), notices were posted at: 
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a. Camas/Gooding County Line on US 46; 
b. East and West Camas County Lines on US 20; 
c. Camas County Annex; 
d. Entry Road to West Magic Highway 75; 
e. Soldier Road from the North 
Notice was not posted at Fairfield City Hall. 
4. Notice of the intent to amend the proposed legislation along with copies of the proposed 
legislation was mailed, on March 14,2008, to the political subdivisions providing services within 
the planning jurisdiction, including: 
a. Camas County Weed Management 
b. Camas Soil Conservation District 
c. Camas County Road and Bridge 
d. Idaho Department ofFish and Game 
e. Camas County Sheriff 
f. Camas County School District 
g. Frontier Telephone 
h. Camas County Fire Marshall 
1. Idaho Power 
J. Forsgren Associates, Inc. 
k. South Central Health Department 
1. Camas County Engineer at Galena Engineers. 
5. The Commission held public hearings on the 2008 Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map, 
Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map on April 21, 2008. 
6. All members, expect one (Celia), of the Planning and Zoning Commission recused 
themselves on the record and did not vote to recommend approval of said zoning Map. 
7. The Commission allowed all interested persons to provide testimony. 
8. Plaintiff testified at all public hearings. 
9. The public hearing was closed at the conclusion of the April 21 public hearing. The 
Commission then took up the matter and rendered its recommendation to forward the 2008 
Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map to the Board for 
consideration and approval. 
10. The Commission forwarded its written recommendation to the Board which was received 
in a Board meeting on April 22, 2008. 
11. The members of the Board that owned property in the County recused themselves on the 
record and did not vote to adopt the proposed zoning map. 
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12. Notice of Public Hearing before the Camas County Board of County Commissioners on 
the draft 2008 Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map were 
published in the April 23, April 30, and May 7, 2008 editions to the Camas County Courier. 
13. On May 12, 2008, the Board conducted public hearings on the proposed legislation 
taking public and written testimony. Plaintiff testified at all public hearings. The public hearing 
was closed on May 12, 2008 at the conclusion of testimony. The Board then took up the matter 
and rendered its decision. 
14. By Resolution 114 and 115 the County adopted the Comprehensive Plan and Land Use 
Map. By Ordinance 157 and 159, the County adopted the Zoning Ordinance and Map. 
15. The Planning and Zoning Commission nor the Board of Commissioners generated or 
conducted new studies in the adoption of the 2008 Comprehensive Plan. 
Stipulation of Facts submitted by Plaintiff: 
B. The Planning and Zoning Commission nor the Board of Commissioners generated or 
considered new studies in adoption of the Comprehensive Plans of 2008. 
C. Legal Notice of Public Hearing was posted at: 
a. Camas/Gooding County Line on US 46; 
b. East and West Camas County Lines on US 20; 
c. Camas County Annex; 
d. Entry Road to West Magic Highway 75; 
e. Soldier Road from the North 
Notice was not posted at Fairfield City Hall. 
D. At the Board of County Commissioner level Legal Notice of Public Hearing, pursuant to 
I.C. 67-6509, was purportedly mailed to all political subdivisions providing services 
within the planning area. Legal Notice of Public Hearing was not mailed to the City of 
Fairfield. No written verification of notice exists fro service to the West Magic Fire 
Protection District. 
E. Individual Legal descriptions of the various zoning designations on the 2008 
Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Designation Map 
were not considered in adoption of the same nor published with the Ordinances. 
F. Publication of Zoning Ordinance 157 adopted May 12, 2008 did not include any legal 
descriptions. The publication provided: [t]he full text of Ordinance 157 is available for 
public inspection during normal office hours at the office of the Camas County Planning 
and Zoning Administrator. 
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G. Publication of the Zoning Designation Map Ordinance No 158 adopted May 12,2008 did 
not include any legal descriptions. 
H. Plaintiff owns in fee simple the following parcels of real property in Camas County as of 
May 12,2008: (a) 40+ acre parcel 770 E 240 N; (b) 29 acre parcel west of Soldier Road 
and south of Baseline Road; (c) lots 2 & 4 Blk 5 Homestead Subdivision, within an 
exiting approved and platted subdivision of one acre lots. 
1. The above parcels of real property, in order, were located within the named zoning 
district prior to and after the rezone process of 2006, 2007, & 2008: (a) 
agricultural/agricultural; (b) agricultural/Rl; (c) AT/AS. 
J. Plaintiff had a fee simple ownership interest in two (2) 80 acre parcels, in section 4, that 
were sold to third parties while retaining a contractual fiscal interest in the development, 
marketing, and building potential thereon. The north parcel was zoned AT before and 
after the 2006, 2007, & 2008 rezone process. The southern parcel was rezoned from AG 
to Rl as a result of the 2006, 2007, & 2008 zoning amendment process. 
K. Plaintiff holds a first right of refusal as to a 67 acre parcel in Section 4 that was rezoned 
from Ag to Rl as a result of the 2006, 2007, & 2008 zoning amendment process. 
L. The parcels generally described in the two preceding paragraphs, numbered I and J, were 
included in the R-7 land use designation in the in the Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map 
existing prior to the 2006 Comprehensive Plan Amendments and R-l land use 
designation in the post 2006 Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map amendments. 
M. The 29 acre parcel described in paragraph H subparagraph (b) was included in the R-7 
land use designation in the Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map existing prior to the 2006 
Comprehensive Plan Amendments and R-l land use designation in the post 2006 
Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map amendments. 
B. Summary of Facts 
On May 12, 2008 the Board of Commissioners of Camas County (Board) adopted 
Resolutions 114 and 115 which provided for a new Amended Comprehensive Plan and Land Use 
Map and subsequent thereto and on the same date the Board adopted Ordinance Nos. 157 and 
159 for a new Amended Zoning Ordinance and Zoning Designation Map. As a result of the 
Board's action approximately 20,000 acres in Camas County was rezoned. 
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The plaintiff is a resident and property owner in Camas County and owns or has a 
contractual interest in the following properties: 
1. 40+ acre parcel 770 E 240 N (fee simple ownership); 
2. 29 acre parcel west of Soldier Road and south of Baseline Road(fee simple 
ownership); 
3. lots 2 & 4 Blk 5 Homestead Subdivision, within an exiting approved and platted 
subdivision of one acre lots (fee simple ownership); 
4. two (2) 80 acre parcels, in Section 4, that plaintiff sold but retains contractual interest 
in the development and marketing for sale; 
5. first right of refusal to purchase a 67 acre parcel in Section 4 
The plaintiff filed the complaint for declaratory judgment on October 15, 2008. The 
complaint seeks to have this court declare as void the adoption of the 2008 amended 
comprehensive plan and amended zoning ordinance adopted by the Board. The complaint further 
alleges that the plaintiff is an owner of real property and/or has a contractual interest in real 
property in Camas County. The complaint summarizes proceedings relative to attempts by the 
Board to amend and rezone property countywide prior to the adoption of the 2008 
comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance and the complaint alleges that certain property of 
board members or relatives of the board was up-zoned while unspecified property of plaintiff's 
was do\\'n-zoned. In addition, the complaint sets forth allegations of improper and illegal 
procedures in the adoption of the 2008 land use package. The plaintiff in his affidavit, although 
not specifically alleged in his complaint, primarily challenges the loss of the R-7 land use 
designation on the 29-acre parcel of property. Specifically, the 29-acre parcel had a land use 
map designation of R -7, and after the changes in the 2008 ordinance and comprehensive plan the 
parcel had a designation of R-1. The 29-acre parcel was located in the named zoning district of 
agricultural prior to the rezone process initiated in 2006; after the changes in 2006, 2007, and 
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2008 the parcel was located in a named zoning district ofR-I. The defendants filed their motion 
for summary judgment on February 13,2009. 
II. 
STANDARD 
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." IRCP Rule 56(c); Scona, Inc. 
v. Green Willow Trust, 133 Idaho 283, 985 P.2d 1145 (1999). If conflicting inferences are 
possible, summary judgment should be denied. Only if there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the affidavits, pleadings, and depositions have been construed in the light most favorable to 
the non moving party should summary judgment be awarded. Loomis v. City of Hailey, I 19 
Idaho 434,807 P.2d 1272 (1991). 
If reasonable minds might come to different conclusions, summary judgment is 
inappropriate. Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 870, 993 P.2d 
1197 (1999). The moving party is entitled to a judgment when the non-moving party "fails to 
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case 
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 
16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). The court must liberally construe all disputed facts in favor of the non-
moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences and conclusion supported by the record in 
favor of the party opposing the motion. Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 
878 (1999). Further, our courts have repeatedly held that "issues considered on summary 
judgment are those raised by the pleadings." VanVooren v. Astin, 141 Idaho 440, 111 P.3d 125 
(2005). 
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In the context of planning and zoning, ""[P]romulgation or enactment of general zoning 
plans and ordinances is legislative action." Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada 
County, 101 Idaho 407, 409, 614 P.2d 947, 949 (1980); Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine 
County, 98 Idaho 506, 567 P.2d 1257 (1977); Harrell v. City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 506 
P.2d 470 (1973); Cole-Collister Fire Protection District v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 468 P.2d 
290 (1970); City of Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 117 P.2d 461 (1941)." Burt v. City of 
Idaho Falls, 125 Idaho 65, 67, 665 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1983). ("Legislative activity by a zoning 
entity is differentiated from quasi-judicial activity by the result--Iegislative activity produces a 
rule or policy which has application to an open class whereas quasi-judicial activity impacts 
specific individuals, interests or situations."). A legislative act is not subject to judicial review 
but may be subject to collateral attack in a declaratory judgment action. Burns Holdings, IIC v. 
Madison County Board of Commissioners, 2009 Opinion No. 65 (May 1, 2009); Scott v. 
Gooding County, 137 Idaho 206, 46 P.3d 24 (2002); lvfcCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 
657, 851 P.2d 953 (1993); Jerome County v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681, 799 P.2d 969 (1990); 
Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 665 P.2d 1075 (1983); Cooper v. Board of County 
Com'rs. Of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
The plaintiff, George Martin is a resident and lando\vner in Camas County. He also 
operates a real estate and land development business in the County. Camas County over the last 
few years has attempted to amend its comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance on a county 
wide basis for approximately 20,000 acres. Camas County has a population of less than 1000 
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residents and overall consists of approximately 678,400 acres. A little over 30 % of the land in 
the county is under private ownership and the remainder of the land is government owned. 
In 2007 the County adopted an amended comprehensive plan and amended zoning 
ordinance that became the subject of a declaratory and injunctive relief action filed by Mr. 
Martin. (Martin v. Camas County-C V-200 7-24). The court in that action enjoined enforcement 
of the 2007 comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance and subsequently after a court trial 
determined that the zoning ordinance was void. This action is presently on appeal. This court has 
been asked to take judicial notice of decisions and orders entered in CV -2007-24. This court 
declines to take judicial notice of those proceedings, but it would appear to this court that the 
issue of "standing" was not directly addressed in those prior proceedings. 
On May 12,2008 the County adopted a further amended comprehensive plan and zoning 
ordinance, which is now the subject of this pending action. In general the plaintiff, Mr. Martin 
asserts that the 2008 adoption of the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance is void for 
essentially the same reasons that the 2007 comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance was void, 
i.e., conflicts of interest (I.C. § 67-6506); lack of proper notice (I.C. § 67-6509 & 67-6511); lack 
of a deliberative process and proper findings of fact (I.e. §67-6508; 67-6509; 67-6535). 
It is undisputed that the adoption of a valid comprehensive plan is a condition precedent 
to the validity of any zoning ordinance. Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 
506, 567 P.2d 1257 (1977); Sprenger, Grubb & Assoc. v. City of Hailey, 133 Idaho 320, 986 
P.2d 343 (1999). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has of recent times made it clear that planning and zoning 
decisions are only subject to judicial review under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act 
(IAPA) , if there is a statute authorizing or granting a right to judicial review. Highlands 
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Development Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 188 P.3d 900 (2008). The adoption or 
amendment of a comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance is governed by the provisions ofLC. § 
67-6507 - 67-6509 & 67-6511. These statutes do not expressly authorize judicial review of the 
adoption or amendment of either the comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance. In fact, the court 
in Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 181 P.3d 1238 (2008) held that an 
amendment to the comprehensive plan was not subject to judicial review since there was no 
statute authorizing judicial review. It stands to reason that the adoption or amendment of a 
zoning ordinance likewise would not be subject to judicial review since LC.§ 67-6511 does not 
expressly authorize judicial review. Burns Holding, LLC v. Madison County Board of 
Commissioners, 2009 Opinion No. 65 (May 1, 2009). However, an aggrieved landowner may 
seek relief through an independent action, i.e. declaratory judgment action, under certain 
circumstances. Highlands Development Corp., supra., 145 Idaho at 962, 188 P.3d at 904. 
A. Does Martin have standing? 
The first issue to be addressed on summary judgment is whether Martin has standing to 
challenge the adoption of the 2008 amended comprehensive plan and amended zoning ordinance. 
The issue of standing must be decided before reaching the merits of the substantive claims. 
Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102,44 P.3d 1157 (2002). This court will summarize the 
appellate court decisions that have addressed the issue of declaratory judgment actions relative to 
planning and zoning matters as well as the issue of standing in such declaratory judgment 
actions. 
1. Case law re: planning & zoning and standing. 
In Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989) the court set 
forth the three relevant considerations concerning the issue of standing: 
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(1) "The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the 
party wishes to have adjudicated." 
(2) "To satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must 
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief 
requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." 
(3) "A citizen and taxpayer may not challenge a governmental enactment where the 
injury is one suffered by all citizens and taxpayers of the jurisdiction." 
In Jerome County v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681, 799 P.2d 969 (1990) the issue presented 
was the validity of a zoning ordinance amendment which prohibited dairies within one thousand 
feet of a residence. A dairyman had applied for a special use permit for his proposed dairy. The 
planning and zoning commission approved the special use permit and an adjoining property 
owner appealed the granting of the permit to the County Commissioners claiming that the dairy 
could not comply with the thousand foot setback requirement from their residence. The County 
Commissioners referred the matter back to the planning and zoning commission which then 
reissued the permit with the condition that the dairy not be operated or constructed within one 
thousand feet of a residence. The dairyman then appealed to the County Commissioners, arguing 
that the ordinance requiring the thousand foot setback was void because it was enacted without 
the proper notice required by I.e. § 67-6509. The County Board of Commissioners, while the 
appeal was pending before them, filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the validity of 
the amended ordinance. The court found that the amended ordinance was void but did not 
address the issue of standing and it does not appear that the issue was ever raised by the parties 
or the court. 
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In McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953 (1993) a landowner sought 
to build a gas station and convenience store on land that he owned. The planning and zoning 
commission issued to the plaintiff a building permit for a Circle K store. A dispute then arose as 
to the zoning designation of his property and subsequently the planning and zoning commission 
issued a stop order on the work claiming that the building permit had been issued in error. It was 
discovered that the county had amended its comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance which 
result in the plaintiff's property being down zoned from "heavy industrial" to "rural residential." 
The plaintiff sought to challenge the adoption of the 1975 comprehensive plan and the 1979 
zoning ordinance by way of a declaratory judgment action. 
The contested issue in McCuskey was whether he could maintain a declaratory judgment 
action since he had "failed to appeal certain adverse zoning decisions made prior to the 
enactment of the 1979 zoning ordinance." Id. 123 Idaho at 661, 851 P.2d at 957. The court only 
detem1ined that he could maintain his action as filed since he was only "seeking a determination 
of how his land was zoned" and was not seeking to challenge any "administrative decisions." 
The court subsequently determined that the amended ordinance was void since the county had 
not complied with the notice procedures and the plaintiff did not have any actual or constructive 
notice of the public hearings. Again it does not appear that the court or any of the parties raised 
the issue of standing of the plaintiff to maintain his action. However, it is clear from the facts 
presented that the plaintiff had in fact suffered a "peculiarized harm" when the county issued its 
stop order which prevented the plaintiff from proceeding with the construction of his gas station 
and store and the fact that his property was down zoned as a result of the enactment of the 
amended ordinance. 
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The Court of Appeals in Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. Payette County, 125 Idaho 
824, 875 P.2d 236 (Ct. App. 1994) addressed the issue of "standing" in a declaratory judgment 
action wherein the plaintiff sought to challenge the validity of an "area of impact" agreement and 
implementing ordinances between the City of Fruitland and the County of Payette. In regards to 
the adopted agreement the court noted as follows: 
The agreement specifies the zoning for land within the impact area 
and provides that the county will amend its zoning ordinances to 
conform to the agreed zoning for the impact area. The agreement 
calls for the county to adopt a new zoning designation known as 
"agriculture preservation." Within portions of the impact area to 
be zoned "agriculture preservation," the agreement provides that 
"no further development or division of property shall be allowed 
unless agreed to by both the City and County. 
125 Idaho at 825, 875 P.2d at 237. 
The court further noted that the county had not passed any ordinances in compliance with 
the agreement that would have specified the "zoning for the affected land." The record was silent 
as to how the plaintiffs land was zoned prior to the adoption of the impact area, but did note that 
a "small portion" of the plaintiff s land according to the agreement was to be zoned commercial 
and the remaining land would be designated "agricultural preservation zone." The plaintiff 
argued that it had standing to challenge the County's action because it was an "affected person" 
since its land fell within the agricultural preservation zone. The court stated as follows: 
We note that this is a contemplated future change, not an 
accomplished rezoning of the property. Although the agreement 
calls for the county to adopt particular zoning for the area of city 
impact, as of the date of oral argument in this case, the county had 
not complied with the agreement by amending its zoning 
ordinances. Hence, zoning of the Fund's land is as yet unchanged 
and, absent further action by the county, will remain so. We 
recognize that standing may be predicated not only upon a past 
injury but also upon a threatened harm. Harris, supra; Idaho 
Branch, Inc. of the Associated Gen. Contractors of America, Inc. v. 
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Nampa Highway Dist. No.1, 123 Idaho 237, 240, 846 P.2d 239, 
242 (Ct.App.1993). Therefore, the peril of an imminent rezoning 
of the Funds' property could be a sufficient predicate for standing 
if the rezone would inflict some injury. 
125 Idaho at 826, 875 P.2d at 238. The court concluded as to this argument that the fund 
did not have standing because there was no evidence that the contemplated zoning would have 
altered the permitted uses of the land or the "land's marketability or value." 
The Court of Appeals distinguished the holdings in McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 
Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953 (1993) and Jerome County v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681, 799 P.2d 969 
(1990) on the basis that "neither case presented any question as to the plaintiffs standing to 
bring the suit" which sought to challenge the validity of zoning ordinance amendments. 1d., 125 
Idaho at 826,875 P.2d 238. 
The plaintiff, Student Loan Fund, further argued standing on the basis that it had a 
"particularized interest at stake" but as to this contention the court concluded as follows: 
Status as an owner of land within a designated area does not 
relieve a complainant of the necessity of demonstrating a "distinct 
palpable injury" traceable to the challenged governmental conduct. 
It is the quality or magnitude of the injury suffered which must 
differentiate a plaintiff from the citizenry at large in order to confer 
standing. The situs of O\vned property in relationship to an area 
touched by an ordinance is relevant to a standing inquiry only 
insofar as the property's location exposes the landowner to 
peculiarized harm. The deficiency in the Fund's status is not that 
its injury is undifferentiated from that suffered by the general 
populous of Payette County, but rather, that it has shown no injury 
at all. 
125 Idaho at 828, 875 P.2d at 240. 
Therefore it is clear that based on the holding in Student Loan Fund that to have standing 
the land owner must allege or demonstrate an actual or potential harm or injury by reason of the 
challenged zoning ordinance amendment. By comparison, in Jerome County v. Holloway and 
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McCuskey v. Canyon County, the adopted zoning ordinances had a direct impact on the permit 
process at issue. 
In Butters v. Hauser, 131 Idaho 498, 960 P.2d 181 (1998) a property owner brought a 
declaratory judgment action seeking to declare an amended zoning ordinance void. This action 
concerned a conditional use permit that was issued by Latah County to Hauser for a radio 
transmission tower. The permit was issued based on an amended zoning ordinance related to the 
issuance of conditional use permits. The district court had held that Butters did not have standing 
based on the Court of Appeals holding in Student Loan Fund The Idaho Supreme Court 
disagreed with the district court and found that Butters did have a personal stake in both the 
amended ordinance and the issuance of the conditional use permit and that she had shown had 
demonstrated a "peculiarized harm": 
[S]he owns land in close proximity to the tower; the tower looms 
over her land; and its physical invasiveness affects her enjoyment 
of her property. Although the location of her property alone does 
not confer standing, the location does expose her to peculiarized 
harm. In particular, Butters contends that she had to spend $1,500 
for a new telephone system to eliminate the tower's radio signal 
from her telephone and that the tower's radio signal still broadcasts 
through her daughter's compact disc system. 
Id. 131 Idaho at 501,960 P.2d at 184. 
The court concluded that Butters had demonstrated the requisite peculiarized harm "as a 
result of the conditional use permit which was issued pursuant to a new appeal procedure 
prescribed by the ordinance amendment in question," and therefore had standing. Butters v. 
Hauser, supra. 
2. Martin's standing 
The court will now address the issue of Mr. Martin's standing to challenge the adoption 
of the 2008 amended comprehensive plan and amended zoning ordinance. In conducting such an 
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analysis this court must detennine if the plaintiff has sufficiently pled or demonstrated a 
peculiarized harm resulting from the adoption of the 2008 amended comprehensive plan and 
amended zoning ordinance as discussed in the authorities cited above. In conducting this analysis 
the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Martin as the non-moving party. 
It is undisputed that at all relevant times Martin is a landowner as to some but not all of 
the property described below in Camas County. The property owned or in which Martin claims a 
financial interest was initially zoned as follows: 
(l) forty acre parcel at 770 E. 240 N.- the property was zoned Agricultural (A) allowing 
one unit per twenty acres; 
(2) twenty-nine acre parcel west of Soldier road.- the property was zoned Agricultural 
(A) allowing one unit per twenty acres; it had an R-7 designation on the comprehensive land use 
map which would be 7 units per acre; 
(3) one acre lot within the existing, approved, and platted Homestead Subdivision - the 
property was zoned Agricultural Transitional (AT) allowing one unit per acre; 
(4) Plaintiff had a fee simple ownership interest in two (2) 80 acre parcels, in section 4, 
that were sold to third parties while retaining a contractual fiscal interest in the development, 
marketing, and building potential thereon. The north parcel was zoned Agricultural Transitional 
(A T) allowing one unit per acre. The southern parcel was zoned Agricultural (A) allowing one 
unit per 20 acres. Each of these parcels is said to have had an R -7 land use designation on the 
comprehensive land use map; 
(5) Plaintiff holds a first right of refusal as to a 67 acre parcel in Section 4 that was zoned 
Agricultural (A) allowing one unit per 20 acres. This parcel is said to have had an R-7 land use 
designation on the comprehensive land use map. 
After the adoption of the 2008 amended comprehensive plan and amended zoning 
ordinance the property referred to above was rezoned as follows: 
(l) forty acre parcel at 770 E. 240 N.- the property was rezoned Agricultural (A) allowing 
one unit per twenty acres; 
(2) twenty-nine acre parcel west of Soldier road- the property was rezoned Residential 
(R-l) allowing one unit per acre and it lost its R-7 designation on the comprehensive land use 
map; 
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(3) one acre lot within the existing, approved, and platted Homestead Subdivision - the 
property was rezoned Residential (R-l) allowing one unit per acre; 
(4) Plaintiff had a fee simple ownership interest in two (2) 80 acre parcels, in section 4, 
that were sold to third parties while retaining a contractual fiscal interest in the development, 
marketing, and building potential thereon. The north parcel was rezoned Agricultural 
Transitional (AT) allowing one unit per acre. The southern parcel was rezoned Residential (R -1) 
allowing one unit per acre. Each of these parcels is said to have lost its R -7 land use designation 
on the comprehensive land use map; 
(5) Plaintiff holds a first right of refusal as to a 67 acre parcel in Section 4 that was 
rezoned Residential (R-l) allowing one unit per acre. This parcel is said to have lost its R-7 land 
use designation on the comprehensive land use map. 
As a result of the rezone the property described above either did not change in its prior 
zoning designation or the property was up-zoned so as to allow a greater density in development, 
although some ofthe plaintiffs property lost the R-7 designation on the amended comprehensive 
land use map. It is undisputed that at no time was there ever any property in Camas County that 
was actually zoned R-7; that R-7 was only a designation on the original comprehensive land use 
map; and that after the amendments the R-7 designation ceased to exist. 
The plaintiff in his affidavit (~ 15) admits that on April 17, 2007, on behalf of a third 
party he filed an application to rezone approximately 181 acres from (A) or (AT) to R-7. This 
application for rezone was filed prior to the 2007 zoning amendments (declared void in CV-
2007-24) and the 2008 zoning amendments. The parties admit that the application is pending and 
has not been fully processed by the County. The law is relatively clear that this application 
would be processed under the zoning ordinance and comprehensive plan in existence at the time 
of the filing of the application and would not be processed under the 2008 amended 
comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance. Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131, 134-
135,75 P.3d 185, 188-189 (2003); Payette River Property Owners Ass'n. v. Board ofComm'rs 
of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 976 P.2d 477 (1999). The mere fact that the comprehensive 
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land use map may have designated some of the plaintiff's property as R-7 for development does 
not mean that the County would be compelled to rezone the property as such since the 
comprehensive land use map is but one component to the comprehensive plan and does not act as 
"legally controlling zoning law." Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844,693 P.2d 1046 (1984). 
a. 160 acre "downzone" from R-7 designation on comprehensive land use map. 
The plaintiff alleges in his affidavit (~ 16) that the 2008 amendments to the 
comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance "had the effect of up zoning approximately twenty 
thousand (20,000) acres of real property in Camas County and down zoning the approximate 
one hundred sixty (160) acres; the later in which I hold an economic interest." The court in 
Highlands Development Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 962, 188 P.3d 900, 904 (2008), 
citing McCuskey, indicated that a "landowner" could seek relief by way of an independent 
action, i.e., declaratory judgment action, in those circumstances where a planning and zoning 
decision resulted in the down-zoning of the landowner's property. This court would note that the 
plaintiff no longer claims to be a landowner of the property that was designated R-7 on the 
original comprehensive land use map. Plaintiff admits that the property in question was sold to 
Soldier Star Development, LLC, which is not a party to this action. The plaintiff cites to no 
authority that grants to a party who, is not a landowner, standing to challenge a zoning 
ordinance. 
It is clear that the plaintiff contends that the elimination of the R -7 designation as part of 
the comprehensive land use map is a "down zone." However, this contention is not supported by 
the law for the reasons set forth above. The undisputed evidence is that the amended zoning 
ordinance left the plaintiff's actual zoning designation and density the same or allowed the 
plaintiff a greater density in development, i.e. an up-zone. Further, the plaintiff admits that he has 
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a pending application to rezone the subject property to R-7 based on the comprehensive plan and 
zoning ordinance in effect at the time the application was filed. Because there has been no 
determination on the plaintiff's application to rezone to R-7, any harm to plaintiff's property is 
purely speculative-he cannot show that he has been harmed due to a downzone because no such 
downzone has actually occurred and also the fact that he is not a landowner as to this property. 
The plaintiff in his affidavit (rs 23-25) that the county zoned certain property R-4 that is 
located north and south of the property in which he claims to have sold but retained some 
contractual interest in the development and sale of such property that was rezoned to R-l. This is 
the same property for which he has a pending rezone application for R-7 rezone under the pre-
existing ordinance and is the same property for which he has no ownership interest and is 
therefore not a landowner. As to these arguments the plaintiff, he has failed to demonstrate the 
requisite "peculiarized harm" for the purpose of standing. 
b. Increased inventory. 
As another basis for standing the plaintiff in his affidavit (r s 26-27) asserts that the 
rezone of approximately 20,000 acres to "allow various densities of residential housing," which 
was previously designated for agricultural use, creates an "over supply of residential property" 
and a "diminished demand on all residential property in general." The plaintiff relies upon the 
holding in Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium District, 141 Idaho 849, 119 P.3d 624 
(2005) for his proposition that increase in the residential inventory and the resulting diminished 
demand gives him the requisite standing. 
In Amerite/, the plaintiffs consisted of individual voters residing within the boundaries of 
the Auditorium District and Ameritel Inns, which operated three hotels within the boundaries of 
the Auditorium District. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the use of public funds by the 
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Auditorium District to influence a bond election to expand its facilities for the construction of a 
second convention center. The court addressed the issue of standing for both the individual 
voters and Ameritel. As to the individual voters, the court concluded that they lacked standing 
because there was no allegation that the Auditorium District did anything to "invade the privacy 
or sanctity of the voting booth." Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens a/Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 15 
P.3d 1129 (2000). The court further held that the allegation that expenditure of public funds 
"increased the chances of its passage" was not sufficient to confer standing to the individual 
voters. Id 141 Idaho at 852, 119 P.3d at 627. 
As for the plaintiff Arneritel, it claimed to have standing as a "taxpayer," that the 
expansion of the convention center "would negatively impact Ameritel's business," and that the 
use of tax monies would "finance speech with which Ameritel disagreed, in violation of its First 
Amendment Rights." Id 141 Idaho at 852, 119 P.3d at 627. The court held that Ameritel had 
standing for two reasons: (1) that it was a taxpayer; and (2) the claim that the proposed 
expansion of the convention center would negatively impact its business in that the District's 
increase in meeting space would be in competition with the meeting space of Ameritel was a 
sufficient a1legat~on of a "particularized injury that is not one suffered alike by all citizens within 
the boundaries of the Auditorium District." Id 141 Idaho at 852-853, 119 P.3d 627-628. The 
court's finding of standing was directly related to the fact that Ameritel was a "taxpayer" since 
the Auditorium District was funded in part by a tax on the receipts of hotels and motels within 
the District boundaries and as such Ameritel was among a limited number of taxpayers. 
Ameritel's taxpayer status was "relevant to standing because its claim in this case is directly 
related to the tax it is required to pay." Id 141 Idaho at 853, 119 P.3d at 628. 
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Ameritel is distinguishable from the instant case. Plaintiff Martin admits that the rezone 
"increased values of property originally with a land use of agricultural only." (Martin Affidavit ~ 
26). Mr. Martin by his own admission has not been harmed by the rezone as to the value of his 
property. Prior to the rezone all of his property was zoned either Agricultural (A) [one unit per 
20 acres] or Agricultural Transitional (AT) [one unit per acre] and after the rezone his property 
was zoned either Agricultural (A) [one unit per 20 acres]; Agricultural Transitional (AT) [one 
unit per acre]; or Residential (R-l) [one unit per acre]. Further, as to the discussion in Ameritel 
as to increased competition, in the area of zoning decisions, the vast majority of jurisdictions 
have concluded that reduced income or value based on competition is not the type of injury that 
gives rise to standing to sue. Westbourgh Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, Mo., 693 F2d. 
733, 747 (8th Cir. 1982); Earth Movers of Fairbanks, Inc. v. Fairbanks N Star Borough, 865 
P.2d 741, 745 (Alaska, 1993); Swain v. Winnebago County, 250 N.E.2d 439, 444 (Ill. 1969); E. 
Servo Ctrs., inc. V. Cloverland Farms Dairy, Inc., 744 A.2d 63, 67 (Md. Ct. App. 2000); 
Cummings V. City Council of Gloucester, 551 N.E.2d 46, 50 (Mass. Ct. App. 1990); City of 
Eureka v. Litz, 658 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Copple V. City of Lincoln, 315 
N.W.2d 628, 630 (Neb. 1982); Nautilus of Exeter, Inc. V. Town of Exeter, 656 A.2d 407, 408 
(N.H. 1995); Rockland Hospitality Assocs., LLC v. Paris, 756 N.Y.S.2d 585, 586-587 (2003); 
City of Pittsburgh, 620 A.2d 692, 696 (Pa. 1993); ATC South, Inc. v. Charleston County, 669 
S.E.2d 337, 343 (S.c. 2008). 
This court would note from the evidence provided that the plaintiff has not identified any 
land use applications that are pending or that have been granted by the County which have 
caused or will cause any particular harm to the plaintiff or any of his alleged financial interests. 
The potential for a development of the land at one density is not the same as the immediate 
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ability to develop the land at that density. Ameritel was actually engaged in a business which 
included the rental of meeting space, and the action supported by the District would have directly 
resulted in increased competition through the availability of additional meeting space, however, 
it was not the mere competition that gave rise to standing but the fact that the Auditorium 
District was using the tax dollars of Ameritel, a taxpayer, to fund such competition. If the 
Auditorium District had not sought to use taxpayer funds to compete with Ameritel, then 
Ameritel would not have had the requisite standing to sue. The plaintiff has not established that 
he was actually engaged in development or even that he had the immediate ability, through a 
lawful permit, to develop. As such, the plaintiff has failed to support his argument that the rezone 
by the County caused him particularized harm due to the potential for added inventory of 
residential property. 
c. Procedural allegations regarding notice. 
Martin further alleges that through the course of the proceedings that the County failed to 
comply with certain statutory notice requirements. However, Martin himself does not allege and 
in fact admits that he had notice of and attended all proceedings relative to the adoption of the 
amended comprehensive plan and amended zoning ordinance. Martin has failed to show that he 
has suffered any particularized harm as a result of any defect in the notice procedures. Martins' 
case is distinguishable from McCuskey since it was undisputed that Mr. McCuskey did not have 
notice of the proceedings relative to the adoption of the amended comprehensive plan and zoning 
ordinance. Assuming arguendo that the notices of the various public hearings may have been 
defective in some respect does not confer standing absent a showing of a peculiarized harm or 
the denial of due process as to him. Cowan v. Board of Com 'rs. Of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 
501,513,148 P.3d 1247, 1259 (2006); Rural Kootenai Organization, Inc. v. Board ofCom'rs., 
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133 Idaho 833, 841, 993 P.2d 596, 604 (1999); Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. Payette 
County, 125 Idaho 824, 828, 875 P.2d 236, 240 (et. App. 1994). 
3. Conclusion. 
To have standing to challenge legislative action in a declaratory judgment action the 
plaintiff would have to make an adequate showing of a "distinct palpable injury" to himself and a 
" 'fairly traceable' causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct." 
Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Board ofCom'rs, l33 Idaho 833,841,993 P.2d 596, 604 (1999). 
Martin in his brief in opposition argues that the rezone will reduce the value of the lands that he 
has an economic interest in; that he will suffer decrease in available services and an increase in 
taxes; and that the rezone will prevent him from developing the land as he would have been able 
under the pre-existing zoning scheme. (Plaintiffs Memorandum Response, pg. 15). However, 
there are no such factual allegations actually alleged in the plaintiffs complaint. Further, the 
affidavit of Mr. Martin does not allege that his taxes have increased as a result of rezone; the 
affidavit does not allege that there has been a decrease in available services to his property or 
what services are not available to his property; he admits that the rezone increased the value of 
agricultural land, which his land was previously zoned. As to the allegation that he cannot 
develop his land as he had intended, such an allegation is contrary to the facts and law Martin 
had filed an application on behalf of the current landowner for rezone under the prior existing 
zoning ordinance which is still pending. It simply is yet undetermined whether the land can be 
developed as intended. Finally, it is clear that the alleged injury as claimed is not particular to 
Martin but would be common to all landowners subject to the rezone. "It is the quality or 
magnitude of the injury suffered which must differentiate a plaintiff from the citizenry at large in 
order to confer standing." Student Loan Fund, supra. The plaintiff alleges numerous defects in 
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the adoption of the 2008 zoning ordinance and comprehensive plan. However, he does not have 
standing merely because he "is a concerned citizen who seeks to ensure that a governmental 
entity abides by the law." Ameritel, supra, citing Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 
50 P.3d 488 (2002). The plaintiff lacks standing and has failed to show any dispute as to any 
material fact relevant to the issue of standing. In as much as the court has found that the plaintiff 
lacks standing to seek declaratory judgment as to the validity of the 2008 amended 
comprehensive plan and amended zoning ordinance, this court need not address the merits of the 
plaintiff s substantive claims. 
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff Martin lacks standing to bring this 
declaratory judgment action and the defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted 
based on a lack of standing. The complaint for declaratory judgment is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this (P day of Y\;\1q1 
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Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Paul Fitzer 
Attorney at Law 
950 W. Bannock St. 
Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
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Paul Fitzer, ISB No. 5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax: 208/33111202 
Attorneys for Defendants Camas County, the Individual Commissioners, and Ed Smith in his 
capacity as a member of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM ) 
HOMES, LLC, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by ) 
and through the duly elected Board of ) 
Commissioners in their official capacity, ) 
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DA VIS, and RON ) 
CHAPMA0i, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV -2008-40 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
COME NOW, Camas County, Idaho (the County), by and through its duly elected Board 
of County Commissioners (the Board), Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman (the 
Individual Commissioners), (collectively, County Defendants), by and through their attorneys of 
record, Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, hereby move this Court for an order awarding 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 1 
ORIGINAL 
37i{ 
Defendants their costs and attorney fees, as against Plaintiff, George Martin and Martin Custom 
Homes, LLC, as set forth in the City's Memorandum of Costs and Fees filed contemporaneously 
herewith. 
The Defendants bring this Motion pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1), (d)(5), and 
54(e)(5); and I.e. § 12-117. This motion is supported by (1) the Defendants' Memorandum of 
Attorney Fees and Costs, and (2) the Affidavit of Paul 1. Fitzer in Support of the Defendants' 
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs; each filed contemporaneously herewith. 
In the body of their memorandum supporting their motion for summary judgment, the 
defendants requested fees and costs under Idaho R. Civ. P. 54 and I.e. § 12-117 and presented an 
argument in support of that request. Defendants rely upon that argument in support of this 
Motion. 
Should the Plaintiff file a response to this Motion, the Defendants request oral argument. 
If the PlaintitT files a response within the time permitted by the rules of civil procedure, 
Defendants will notice the matter for a hearing. If Plaintiff files no response within the time 
permitted, Defendants request the court rule without oral argument. 
Dated this (1 day of May, 2009. 
MOORE SM7JXTON & TURCKE, CHrD, 
IJ 11J1~ 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 2 
* * * 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was this ~~_ 
day of May, 2009, served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Via United States mail 
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Paul Fitzer, ISB No. 5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock S1., Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax: 208/33111202 
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Attorneys for Defendants Camas County, the Individual Commissioners, and Ed Smith in his 
capacity as a member o/the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CLSTOM ) 
HOMES, LLC, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by ) 
and through the duly elected Board of ) 
Commissioners in their official capacity, ) 
KEN BACKSTROM, BrLL DAVIS, and RON ) 
CHAPMAN, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV -2008-40 
DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY'S 
MEMORA.NDUM OF ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS 
Defendant Camas County, by and through its attorneys of record, Moore Smith Buxton & 
Turcke, Chartered, hereby submits this Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs pursuant to 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1), (d)(5), (e)(1), and (e)(5). 
DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY'S MEMORANDUM 
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS-- 1 
OR~AL 
A. Discretionary Costs: Idaho R. Civ. P. S4(d)(1)(D) 
Item No. Description 
1. Photocopies 
Total discretionary costs: 
B. Attorney Fees: Idaho Code § 12-117 
Item No. 
1. 
Description 
Fees for legal services for this matter incurred and billed 
between October 14,2008, and May 7, 2009. For a 
detailed itemization of fees, please see Exhibit A to the 
Affidavit of Paul J. Fitzer in Support of Motion for 
Attorney Fees and Costs. 
Total attorney fees: 
Amount 
$419.56 
$419.56 
Amount 
$14,300.00 
$16,085.05 
C. Sum of Costs as a Matter of Right, Discretionary Costs, and Attorney Fees 
Section No. Item Description Amount 
A. Discretionary costs $ 419.56 
Total costs and fees requested: $16,504.61 
Dated this -P-day of May, 2009. 
MOORE S~vlITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
DEFENDANTS CAMAS C01JNTY'S MEMORANDUM 
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS-- 2 
e County Defendants 
* * * 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was this A 
day of May, 2009, served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Via United States mail 
Pau . 
DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY'S MEMORANDUM 
OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS-- 3 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd. 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208)331-1800 
Camas County 
P.O. Box 430 
Fairfield ID 83327 
In Reference To: 3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas County Invoice # 35760 
10/14/08 
10115/08 
10116/08 
10/20/08 
10/20/08 
Thru 
10/23/08 
10/24/08 
Statement for Oct 31, 2008 
Legal Services (Billed at Reduced Rate at $125 Per Hour) 
Hours 
PJF Executive session with Board; Telephone conference 4.50 
with Simms; Telephone call to court; Review complaint, TRO, begin 
objection to Temporary Restraining Order, Research 
case law. 
P JF Continue TRO, Begin answer to complaint; Research case law. 5.00 
PJF Continued Review 2008 Complaint and 7.00 
Temporary Restraining Order; Prepare motion to 
disqualify Judge Elgee; Continue Answer to Complaint: 
Continue Response to Preliminary Injunction. 
P JF Review Disqualification order; Telephone conference 1.00 
with Court and telephone conference with Simms. 
PJF Prepare for Court; Prepare affidavit in support of 22.00 
Objection to Preliminary Injunction, Prepare brief support of 
Objection to Preliminary Injunction, Telephone conference with 
Ken, Camas Board in exec., Ed, Dwight, Megan, e-mails with all, 
e-mail with Marshall; Telephone conference with Simms 
on stipulation; Status conference with Judge, etc. Research caselaw 
PJF Preparation of stipulation of facts cont.; converse with 13.00 
Simms, prepare argument, direct, cross, etc. 
Travel to Jerome, Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
before Judge Butler. 
360 
Camas County 
In Reference To: 3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas 
County 
For professional services rendered 
Additional charges: 
Facsimile 
Meals/Meetings 
Photocopies 
Postage 
Travel Expense 
Westlaw 
Total costs 
Total amount of this bill 
Balance due 
Page 2 
Hours Amount 
52.50 $6,562.50 
$82.50 
$45.49 
$61.20 
$4.87 
$140.40 
$65.13 
$399.59 
$6,962.09 
$6,962.09 
3Bl 
Camas County 
P.O. Box 430 
Fairfield ID 83327 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd. 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208)331-1800 
Statement for November 30, 2008 
Legal Services (Billed at Reduced Rate at $125 Per Hour) 
In Reference To: 3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas County Invoice # 35992 
Legal Services 
11112/08 
11120108 
11114/08 
P JF Review Order regarding Preliminary Injunction; 
Strategy session with Carl and what to do next. 
CJW Review Judge Butler's decision denying Application 
for Injunction; Conference P. Fitzer regarding same. 
PJF E-mail and request for mediation from Chris Simms, 
e-mail to Dwight and Board for executive session to 
discuss; Telephone conference with Dwight. 
For professional services rendered 3.30 
Additional charges: 
Photocopies 
Postage 
Total costs 
Total amount of this bill 
Previous Balance 
Payment thank you, Ck# 19092 
Balance due 
1.80 
0.80 
No Charge 
0.70 
Amount 
312.50 
2.04 
0.84 
$2.88 
$315.38 
$6,962.09 
($4,187.49) 
$3,089.98 
Camas County 
P.O. Box 430 
Fairfield ID 83327 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd. 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208)331-1800 
Statement for December 31, 2009 
Legal Services (Billed at Reduced Rate at $125 Per Hour) 
In Reference To: 3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas County 
Previous balance 
03/11109 Payment - thank you, Ck#19338 
Balance due 
Invoice # 36200 
Amount 
$3,089.98 
($3,089.98) 
$0.00 
353 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd. 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208)33 I -1800 
Statement for January 31,2009 
Legal Services (Billed at Reduced Rate at $125 Per Hour) 
Camas County 
P.O. Box 430 
Fairfield ID 83327 
In Reference To: 3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas Countv 
36372 
116/09 
1/9/09 
Legal Services 
CJW Locate and analyze judicial authorities for inclusion in 
memorandum in support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
CJW Review, analyze and edit Motion for Summary Judgment. 
1112/09 
THRU 1/16 
P JF Research case law cited in Order; Prepare Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Affidavits, executive session 
with Board, telephone conference with Dwight, Ken, 
etc. regarding Butler case. 
]/26/09 P JF Continue work on summary judgment motion. 
For professional services rendered 26.60 
Additional charges: 
Copies 
Westlaw 
Total costs 
Total amount of this bill 
Invoice # 
Hours 
1.30 
0.80 
20.00 
4.50 
Amount 
$3,325.00 
11.05 
1,591.91 
$1,602.96 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd. 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208)331-1800 
Statement for February 28,2009 
Legal Services (Billed at Reduced Rate at $125 Per Hour) 
Camas County 
P.O. Box 430 
Fairfield 1D 83327 
In Reference To: 3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas County 
Legal Services 
Invoice # 36472 
Hours 
2/2/09 PJF Summary Judgment. 2.50 
2/3/09 PJF Affidavit for Ken Backstrom. 1.20 
PJF Summary Judgment in Butler case; Meet with Ken for 
his affidavit. 5.50 
2/4/09 PJF Continue Summary Judgment, put exhibits together, 
insert exhibit numbers, etc. 2.50 
211 0/09 PJF Complete affidavits, exhibits, motion, memorandum 
for Summary Judgment. 5.50 
2111/09 PJF E-mail to Simms regarding hearing dates; Notice of hearing. 0.30 
2117/09 PJF E-mail.tc.s regarding resetting hearing dates. 0.30 
2118/09 PJF StipUlation to continue. 0.20 
PJF Telephone conference with Dwight, Ken. 0.60 
:585 
Statement for February 28, 2009 
Camas County Page 
In Reference To: 3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas 
County 
For professional services rendered 
Additional charges: 
Copies 
Postage 
Total costs 
Total amount of this bill 
Previous balance 
Balance due 
36472 
Page 2 
Hours Amount 
18.60 $2,325.00 
298.69 
25.45 
$324.14 
$2,649.14 
$4,927.96 
$7,577.10 
Camas County 
P.O. Box 430 
Fairfield ID 83327 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd. 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208)331-1800 
Statement for March 31,2009 
Legal Services (Billed at Reduced Rate at $125 Per Hour) 
In Reference To: 3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas County 
Previous balance 
03111109 Payment - thank you, Ck#19555 
Balance due 
Invoice # 36688 
Amount 
$7,577.1 
($319.63) 
$7,257.47 
Camas County 
P.O. Box 430 
Fairfield ID 83327 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd. 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208)331-1800 
Statement for April 30, 2009 
Legal Services (Billed at Reduced Rate at $125 Per Hour) 
In Reference To: 3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas Countv Invoice # 36848 
Legal Services 
4/1/09 
4/2/09 
417109 
4/8/09 
4113109 
PJF Review & respond to Summary Judgment Simms, 
affidavits, etc. 
PJF Review & respond to Summary Judgment Simms, 
affidavits, etc. (continued) 
LWA Proofread memorandum for Paul. 
CJW Review & edit P. Fitzer draft of brief. 
CJW Review & edit P. Fitzer reply memorandum. 
PJF Prepare for, travel to, and attend Summary Judgment 
motion before Judge Butler; Read Simms materials: 
Research case law cited; Review current case law just released. 
4114/09 P JF E-mails/tc regarding court appearance to client. 
0.30 
Hours 
1.00 
1.00 
0.90 
0.90 
1.20 
8.00 
4/22/09 PJF Research standing issue raised by Simms (Ameritel and others). 0.90 
Amount 
For professional services rendered 14.20 $1,775.00 
388 
Statement for April 30, 2009 
36848 
Camas County Page Page 2 
In Reference To: 3037-11 CV 2008-40 Martin v. Camas 
County 
Additional charges: 
Copies 
Facsimile 
Westlaw 
Total costs 
Total amount of this bill 
Previous balance 
4/]6/09 Payment - thank you, Ck#19670 
Balance due 
Amount 
46.58 
40.50 
128.01 
$215.09 
$1,990.09 
$7,257.47 
($7,257.47) 
$1,990.09 
Paul Fitzer, ISB No. 5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax: 208/33111202 
Attorneys for Defendants Camas County, the Individual Commissioners, and Ed Smith in his 
capacity as a member of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND F'OR CAMAS COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM ) 
HOMES, LLC, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by ) 
and through the duly elected Board of ) 
Commissioners in their official capacity, ) 
KEN BACKSTRO'v1, BILL DA VIS, and RON ) 
CHAPMAN, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
State of Idaho ) 
)ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV -2008-40 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. 
FITZER IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS 
Paul J. Fitzer, first being duly sworn, states as follows: 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 1 
1. This affiant is an attorney with the law firm Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, 
Chartered, Boise, Idaho, attorneys of record for Camas County, Idaho, which was retained for 
the purpose of defending this lawsuit. 
2. I am familiar with the files generated in this case and I have knowledge of the 
contents thereof, and I make this Affidavit based on my own personal knowledge. 
3. The Defendants request a total of$16,504.61 in attorney fees and costs. 
4. I have reviewed the sum identified in Section A of the Memorandum of Attorney 
Fees and Costs. Defendants seek only the costs of photocopies as discretionary costs. These 
discretionary costs were necessary and extraordinary costs associated with this action. The costs 
of photocopying were necessary as the documents served as the factual basis for the Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment. These costs are reasonable, necessary, and extraordinary. 
5. I have reviewed Section B of the Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs. The 
amount of attorney fees are reasonable under the factors identified in Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(3). 
Attached as Exhibit A to this Affidavit is the itemized list of fees billed by this firm for this 
matter from the time the Cause of Action was filed until this Court ruled on the matter on May 7, 
2009. I believe it accurately reflects the work done, hours consumed, and rate charged for the 
attorneys in this firm who participated in the defense of this action. I explain how the fees 
requested are reasonable under Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(3) below: 
A. Time and labor required: Please see Exhibit A, attached hereto. This case 
necessitated significant factual investigation and research to defend. Plaintiff alleged a plethora 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL 1. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 2 
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of legal and factual assertions which necessitated significant time to review, research, and 
respond. Significant time was necessary to accurately identify and assess the facts in the 
legislative action and its relationship to this matter including revIewmg audio recordings, 
minutes, findings, etc. This case also required significant time researching the legal basis for 
the defense of the case including numerous statutory references and legal bases. The hours and 
rate reflect the time and labor required. 
B. Novelty and difficulty of the question: The central defense of the action centered 
on the plaintiff's standing to prosecute the action. However, as noted above, the question 
required significant factual investigation to accurately identify the plaintiff's interests in the case 
and the numerous alleged procedural and substantive infirmities in the enactment of the 
challenged legislation. 
C. Skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability 
of the attorney in the particular field of the law: I have been practicing law in Idaho since 1997 
and act as the county/city attorney or special counsel to numerous cities in this state. I have 
significant experience in local government and land use matters, having worked for this firm and 
for the City of Boise for a dozen or so years. Additionally, I have consistently taught 
courses/CLE's in municipal and land use law for the National Business Institute. the Idaho 
Municipal Association, various state bar sections, and other similar seminars. Land Use I 
Municipal law is never an easy subject and generally requires a significant amount of skill and 
experience. That being said, as a courtesy to some of the smaller governmental entities such as 
AFFIDA VIT OF PAUL 1. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 3 
Camas County, I charge a significantly reduced rate of $125 per hour as opposed to my general 
hourly fee of $200 per hour. 
D. Carl J. Withroe, an associate in this firm, participated in the defense of this case. 
Mr. Withroe clerked for a state district judge for two years and an Idaho Supreme Court justice 
for approximately a year and a half. Since joining this firm in 2006, he has gained significant 
experience representing political subdivisions of the state. He also has significant experience 
researching and writing. Mr. Withroe's experience was necessary to the successful defense of 
this case. 
E. Prevailing charges for like work: Since my admission to the bar of this state, I 
have perforn1ed similar services to those required by this case. I am aware of the prevailing 
charges for like work. I believe that an appropriate attorney fee for this work to be between 
$150.00 per hour and $250.00 per hour. My services for work on this matter were $125.00 per 
hour. The services for Mr. Withroe's work on this matter were also $125.00 per hour. I believe 
these fees were reasonable and a courtesy to the many smaller governmental entities that do not 
have the resources to defend itself from frivolous causes of actions. 
F. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent: The fee agreement in this matter is based 
on an hourly rate. 
G. The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case: 
This case presented no more time limitations than the usual case, although this 
case IS different in that it was broadly drafted with challenges to the County's entire 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF 
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comprehensive planning and zoning scheme. This is atypical. The hours spent and rate reflect 
this. 
H. The amount involved and the results obtained: There was no amount of money 
involved; however, plaintiff sought to invalidate significant portions of Camas County's 
planning and zoning legislation. The result obtained-summary judgment in the county's favor 
and dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's complaint-was the best and most cost effective result 
the county could have obtained. In direct contrast is CV 07-24 where the parties were not 
permitted to file summary judgment motions, affidavits, or other such time-saving measures and 
were forced to proceed to trial costing both the plaintiff and defendants well over one hundred 
thousand dollars each. 
I. The undesirability of the case: This case was no more undesirable than any other 
defense of a political subdivision although quite extensive and far reaching. The hours and rate 
retlect this. 
1. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client: I have been 
representing Camas County since 2006. I serve as special counsel on all civil matters concerning 
the county. 
K. Awards in similar cases: Based on my experience, the amount sought in this 
matter is consistent with awards of fees in similar cases, perhaps less, given the reduction in the 
typical hourly rate. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 5 
L. The reasonable cost of automated legal research: Given the importance of this 
action and the necessity of extensive legal research, the amount of charges for automated legal 
research (Westlaw) is reasonable. Automated research is the most efficient tool for legal 
research, and the research was necessary to accurately represent the law applicable to the facts of 
this casco Results from use of Westlaw was used to form the legal argument advanced by the 
county in this matter. 
M . Plaintiff did not have a reasonable basis in law or fact: The myriad of legal and 
factual assel1ions made by the Plaintiff, for the most part, was a rcd herring. The inescapable 
conclusion throughout these entire proceedings is that the Plaintiff simply had not suffered harm 
and therefore did not havc the requisite legal standing to bring this cause of action. Plaintiff had 
actual notice and participated at every level of the legislative process. Hc simply disagrees with 
the result. His properties either remained the same or were even upzoned. Neighboring 
properties were treated identically. Instead, Plaintiffs legal counsel asserted that Plaintiff had 
the right, cven duty, as a sort of private attorney general to challenge perceived injustices 
wherever found or something of the sort. The law is firmly established in this arena. One must 
have a personal stake in the outcome, a peculiarized harm, not suffered by everyone in the 
county in order to challenge the legislative activity of a governmental entity. This action was not 
pursuant to the approval or denial of Plaintiffs land use application, but rather county-wide 
legislative activity. The tax payers of the county were forced to pay for and defend a frivolous 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF 
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law suit without a reasonable basis in law or fact. This is an improper use of the judicial system 
designed to protect individuals from peculiarized harm. 
* * * 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
Dated this _~{C+! day of May, 2009. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 7 
TON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
County of Ada ) 
On this --:....171--- day of May, 2009, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in 
and for the State, personally appeared Paul 1. Fitzer, known to be the person whose name is 
subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal on the date last above 
written . 
Residing at ~t;;.u.~~~~~r:::~~ 
My Commission Expires: --13 
* * * 
AFFIDA VIT OF PAUL 1. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was this fI 
day of May, 2009, served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, TD 83340 
Via United States mail 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL J. FITZER IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 9 
Paul Fitzer, ISB No. 5675 
MOORE SM1TH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax: 208/33111202 
Attorneys for Defendants Camas County, the Individual Commissioners, and Ed Smith in his 
capacity as a member of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CCSTOM ) 
HOMES, LLC, ) 
) 
PlaintifTs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by ) 
and through the duly elected Board of ) 
Commissioners in their official capacity, ) 
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DA VIS, and RON ) 
CHAPMAN, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV -2008-40 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS 
COME NOW, Camas County, Idaho (the County), by and through its duly elected Board 
of County Commissioners (the Board), Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman (the 
Individual Commissioners), (collectively, County Defendants), by and through their attorneys of 
DEFENDANTS' ~10TION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 1 
399 ORIGINAL 
record, Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, hereby respond to Plaintiffs' Objections to 
Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. 
In response to the County' s assertion that Plaintiff had no reasonable basis in law or fact 
to challenge the County's legislative activity in the absence of standing, Plaintiff asserts that it 
had a reasonable basis in law or fact to rely upon Fifth Judicial District Judge Elgee's finding 
that Plaintiff had standing to challenge the Defendant's "identical ordinances" in case no. 07-24. 
Plaintiffs assertions arc incorrect for the following reasons: 
1. Judge Elgee has not, as of this date, issued a final order in case no. 07-24. Thus, 
there is no order for Plaintiff to reasonably rely upon meeting its burden to proceed 
with a reasonable basis in law or fact. On May 26, 2009, the Court heard Plaintiffs 
Motion to re-issue his final order in case no. 07-24. Pursuant to the United States 
District Court and Judge Elgee's own statements on the record, Judge Elgee's 
December 3, 2008 Final Order was invalid as the state court was divested of 
jurisdiction over the case, which had been properly removed to the United States 
District Court per the Honorable Candy Dale. Moreover, at the time Plaintiff 
brought this cause of action, Judge Eigee had not issued even its invalid order. 
2. The ordinances are not in fact "identical", nor is the actual text of the ordinances 
even relevant. The issue presented to thi s Court is whether Plaintiff had sufficient 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 2 
standing, 1.e. peculiarized harm, entitling him to due process. The dates of the 
hearings, the conduct of hearings, Plaintiff's presence at the hearings, and most 
importantly, Plaintiff's alleged injury sustained entitling him to due process was 
distinct from earlier legislative activity. This court's final order pertained to 
Plaintiff's lack of standing; that Plaintiff had not suffered peculiarized harm by virtue 
of the 2008 legislation. Notably, this Court noted that none of Plaintiff's properties 
had been downzoned. 
Most pertinent to this discussion is the Court's finding per the parties stipulated 
facts that the one acre lot in the Homestead Subdivision resulted in no change. Per 
the Court ' s order and stipulation of the parties: 
Property: One, one acre lot within the existing, approved, and platted Homestead 
Subdivision. 
a. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the properties were zoned Agricultural 
Transitional (AT) allowing one unit per acre: 
b. Prior to the 2008 amendments, the prope11y was (A5), allowing one unit per five 
acres. 
c. After the 2008 amendments, the prope11y was zoned Residential (R 1) allowing 
one unit per acre. 
Thus, from 2006 to 2007 the property was rezoned from AT to A5 , and from 2007 
to 2008 from A5 to Rl. Judge Elgee, who never conducted an extensive analysis of 
Plaintiffs peculiarized harm nonetheless referenced this property in his invalid order, 
but did not include the 2008 amendments; despite their enaction eight months prior to 
his December 3, 2008 invalid order. Thus, to Judge Elgee, the property was rezoned 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 3 
'-I()/ 
from AT to A5; one unit per acre to one unit per five acres. Now, Judge Elgee is 
mistaken, and on appeal , this author will argue lack of harm, mootness, judicial 
estoppel, and other legal defenses to Judge Elgee's finding. For the purposes of this 
motion however, Plaintiff is judicially estopped from relying upon Judge Elgee's 
finding of a downzone as Plaintiff stipulated that for purposes of the 2008 legislation 
the property was rezoned to an R-l designation. Thus technically, this property was 
rezoned from an AT to an A-5 in 2007 per Judge Elgee; a downzone, and an A-5 to 
an R-l in 2008 per the stipulation of the parties and this Court; an upzone. This is a 
materially distinct fact. Thus, Plaintiff has no reasonable basis in law or fact to rely 
upon the earlier invalid and incorrect finding per Plaintiff's own stipulation of facts, 
different procedural status, materially different substantive status, and lack of a valid 
decision. 
Dated this ___ 1 ___  day /t:w09 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD_ 
efendants 
* * * 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was this -1--
day of June, 2009, served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Via United States mail 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS -- 5 
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CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
Attorney at Law 
US Bank Bldg., Ste 209 
191 Sun Valley Road 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Tel : 208622 7878 
Fax: 208 622 7921 
ISB# 7473 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
HR l \ 'dS£j l~ j 
~~ c:
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 
GEORGE MARTIN, 
Plaintiff, 
and 
MARTIN CUSTOM 
HOMES, L.L.c., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ED SMITH, 
Defendant, 
and 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, ) 
By and through the duly elected ) 
Board of Commissioners in ) 
their official and capacity ) 
) 
) 
KEN BACKTROM, ) 
BILL DAVIS, and ) 
RON CHAPMAN, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Case No. CV -07 -24 
ORDER REISSUING FINDINGS 
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER FOLLOWING TRIAL 
ORDER REISSUING FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER FOLLOWING TRIAL 
THE COURT, being fully apprised of the circumstances, having reviewed 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Re-issuing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
Following Trial, Defendants' Response thereto, and argument of counsel finds and orders 
as follows, 
1. This Court was divested of jurisdiction over this matter on November 5, 
2008, by the Defendants' filing of Notice of Removal to Idaho Federal 
District Court. 
2. This Court was re-vested of jurisdiction over this matter on March 17, 
2009 when the Idaho Federal District Court issued its Order granting 
Plaintiff s Motion to Remand. 
3. This Court's December 3, 2008 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order Following Trial, issued during a period of interruption of this 
Court's jurisdiction, is hereby, this day reissued, is attached hereto and 
made a part hereof. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
ROBERT~' ~T JUDGE 
DATED this ) 7 dayof ~~'2009. 
ORDER REISSUING FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 2 
ORDER FOLLO\VING TRIAL 
L/DS 
M. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this a 9 day of '-tV) CUZf 2009, I served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER REISSUING FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LA W, AND ORDER FOLLOWING TRIAL by delivering same, to 
Phillip J. Collaer, Attorney for Defendant Ed Smith, 250 South Fifth Street, Ste. 700, 
P.O. Box 7426, Boise Idaho 83707-7426, Paul Fitzer, Attorney for Camas County 
Defendants 950 W. Bannock St., Stc 520, Boise, Idaho 83702, and Christopher Simms, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, P.O. Box 1861, Hailey, Idaho 83333. 
-----b~D,hJolk 
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER REISSUING FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER FOLLOWING TRIAL 
3 
LIOLD 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
Attorney at Law 
US Bank Bldg., Ste 209 
191 Sun Valley Road 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Tel: 208 622 7878 
Fax: 208 622 7129 
ISB# 7473 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ORIGINAL 
FILED ~ - 15.---Q)9 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 
GEORGE MARTIN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
MARTIN CUSTOM ) 
HOMES, L.L.c., ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
v. ) 
) 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, ) 
By and through the duly elected ) 
Board of Commissioners in ) 
their official capacities, ) 
) 
) 
KEN BAXTROM, ) 
BILL DAVIS, and ) 
RON CHAPMAN, ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents, ) 
______________________J 
Case No. CV -2008-40 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS, CAMAS COlJNTY, IDAHO, BY 
AND THROUGH THE DULY ELECTED BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, IN THEIR 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
400 
OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, KEN BAXTROM, BILL DAVIS AND RON CHAPMAN 
AND THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD, PAUL 1. FITZER, 950 W. BANNOCK 
STREET, STE. 520, BOISE, IDAHO, 83702, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HERBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants, George Martin and Martin Custom Homes, LLC, 
appeal against the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final 
judgment entitled Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment entered in the above-entitled action on the 7tll day of May, 2009, 
Honorable Judge John K. Butler presiding. 
2. The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment and order described in paragraph one (1) above is an appealable judgment and 
order under and pursuant to Rule II (a)( 1), I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which appellants intends to assert 
in the appeal is as follows: 
(a) Whether the District Court erred in holding that Plaintiffs lacked 
standing to challenge, through a declaratory judgment action, 
defendants adoption of an amended zoning ordinance that rezoned 
property owned by Plaintiffs, rezoned property in which Plaintiffs held 
a financial interest, and rezoned property adjacent to property ovmed 
by Plaintiffs and in which Plaintiffs held a financial interest. 
(b) Whether the District Court erred in refusing to take judicial notice of 
the Court ' s file in CV-07-24 and ruling that the Court ' s finding 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 2 
40«\ 
therein, that Plaintiffs had standing to challenge a substantially 
identical amended zoning ordinance, did not have a collateral estoppel 
effect on the issue of standing. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
S. A reporter's transcript is requested. The appellants requests the preparation of the 
following portions of the reporter's transcript: the reporter's compressed transcript 
pursuant to Rule 26, I.A.R., supplemented by the following: 
(a) October 24,2008 Preliminary Injunction hearing 
(b) April 13,2009 Motion for Summary Judgment hearing 
6. Appellants request those doeuments which are automatically included under Rule 
28, LA.R., be included in the clerk's record. Appellants also requests the following 
documents be ineluded in the clerk's record: 
(a) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed 2.13.09 
(b) Memorandum in support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed 2.13.09 
(c) Plaintitfs' Statement of Material Fact & Submittal of Affidavits and 
Document in in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed 4.1.09 
(d) Affidavit of Bob Rodman in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed 4.1.09 
(e) Affidavit of George Martin In Opposition to 1,\/10tion for Summary 
Judgment filed 4.1.09 
(0 Plaintiffs' Memorandum Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed 4.1.09 
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(g) Defendants' Reply Memorandum 10 Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed on 4.8.09. 
(h) Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment issued May 7,2009. 
Pursuant to 1.A.R. 31 , Appellants request that all tapes, exhibits, including charts, 
graphs, maps or other documents, offered and admitted as evidence during the 
proceedings, whether at hearing or trial , be included as exhibits to the record . 
7. I certify that: 
(a) A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Court Reporter, Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County 
Candice Childres 
233 W. Main 
Jerome, Idaho 
(b) The Clerk of the District Court has been paid , contemporaneously with the 
filing hereof, the estimated fees for preparation of the designated reporters 
transcript as required by rule 24. 
(c) The Clerk of the District Court has been paid, contemporaneously with the 
filing hereof, the estimated fees for preparation of the clerk's record and all 
appellate fees. 
(d) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20, I.A.R. 
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CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
A TTORc'JEY FOR PLA TTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
~ 
. t"6:Qy 
Cliristopher P. Simms Dated 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/ j v,i///$ The undersigned hereby certifies that on the ___ ""-__ day of./ ~ 2009, 
a copy of PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF APPEAL was served upon counsel via facsimile 
and addressed to Paul Fitzer, Attorney for Camas County Defendants 950 W. Bannock 
St., Stc 520, Boise, Idaho 83702, facsimile number 20833 I 1202. 
~ //Y =-V-~I-- ...... ~....• -
Christopher P. Simms 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Paul Fitzer, ISB No. 5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax : 208/33111202 
Attorneys for Defendants Camas County, the Individual Commissioners, and Ed Smith in his 
capacity as a member of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
G EORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM ) 
HOM ES, LLC, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by ) 
and through the duly elected Board of ) 
Commissioners in their official capacity, ) 
K EN BACKSTROM, BILL DAVIS, and RON ) 
CHAPMAN, ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
---------------------------) 
Case No. CV -08-40 
DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY, 
THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF 
THE CAMAS COUNTY BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, AND ED 
SMITH' S REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
I.A.R. 19 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Respondent (Cross-Respondent) in the above 
enti tled proceeding hereby requests pursuant to Rule J 9, I.A.R., the inclusion of the following 
material in the reporter's transcript or the clerk's record in addition to that required to be included 
by the I.A.R. and the notice of appeal: 
DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY AND THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE CAMAS 
COlJNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL -- 1 ORIGINAL 
1. Plaintiffs-Appelllants, George Martin and Martin Custom Homes, LLC, by 
counsel filed a Notice of Appeal herein on or about June 15,2009. 
2. Idaho Appellate Rule 19 provides for a Respondent to request additional materials 
to supplement Clerk 's Record identified by Appellant, and does therefore request the 
following documents: 
a. Plaintiffs Verified Application for Temporary Restraining Order, filed 
10115/2008; 
b. Statement In Support of Proposed Temporary Restraining Order, filed 
1011512008 ; 
c. County Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, filed 10/20/2008 ; 
d. Affidavit of Dwight Butlin in Support of County Defendants' Objection to 
Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Restraining Order; filed 10/20/2008; 
e. Stipulation as to Facts and Admission of Documentary Evidence, filed on 
October 28, 2008 ; 
f. Affidavit of Dwight Butlin In Support of Defendants ' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, fi led 0211 3/09; 
g. Affidavit of Ken Backstrom In Support of Defendants ' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, fi led 02113/09 ; 
h. Defendants ' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, filed 05 /20109; 
DEfENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY AND THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE CAMAS 
COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL -- 2 
Y,3 
1. Defendants' Memorandum of in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and 
Costs, filed 05/20109; 
J. Affidavit of Paul J. Fitzer in Support of Defendants' Motion for Attorney 
Fees and Costs, filed 05/20109; 
k. Hearing to be held on July 13, 2009 on Defendants' Motion for Attorney 
Fees and Costs; 
I. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Motion for 
Attorney Fees and Costs. 
3. I certify that a copy of this request was served upon the clerk of the district court 
and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20 Idaho Code. 
ZiJ Dated this __ 1 _ _ day of June, 2009. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & T URCKE, CHTD . 
..__+h"-t------/ 
DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY AND THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE CAMAS 
COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL -- 3 
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* * * 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Request to Supplement 
Clerk's Record on Appeal was this # day of June, 2009 served upon the following 
individuals and in the corresponding manner: 
Clerk of the Court 
Fifth Judicial District 
County of Camas 
P.O. Box 430 
Fairfield, Idaho 83327 
Via United States mail 
Court Reporter 
Fifth Judicial District 
County of Jerome 
233 West Main 
Jerome, Idaho 83338 
Via United States mail 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 186] 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Via United Slates mail 
DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY AND THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE CAMAS 
COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT 
CLERK' S RECORD ON APPEAL -- 4 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM 
HOMES,LLC, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPREME COURT NO. ~101tJ (IS -za:Pt 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
V. CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by 
And through the duly elected Board of 
Commissioners in their official capacity, 
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DA VIS, and RON 
CHAPMAN, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
I, KORRI BLODGETT, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the 
State ofIdaho in and for the county of Camas, do hereby certifY: 
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy ofthe exhibits being forwarded to the 
Supreme Court on Appea\. However the following exhibits will be retained at the district Court Clerk's 
Office and will be made available upon request: 
1. Plaintiff's exhibit #A-Published Notice of P & Z Commission Hearing on Zoning Ordinance & 
CompPlan 
2. Plaintiff's exhibit #B-Published Notice of Board of County Commissioners Hearing on Zoning 
Ordinance & Comprehensive Plan. 
3. Plaintiff's exhibit #C-Finding of Facts & Conclusions of Law by Camas County Planning & 
Zoning Commission regarding Camas County Zoning Map. 
4. Plaintiff's exhibit #D-Findings of Camas County Planning & Zoning Commission Re: Zoning 
Ordinance. 
5. Plaintiff's exhibit #E-Findings of Camas County P&Z Commission Re: Comphrehensive Plan. 
6. Plaintiff's exhibit # F-Findings of Camas County P&Z Commission Re: Comprehensive Plan. 
7. Plaintiff's exhibit #G-Publication on May 14th, of adoption on May 12,2008 Zoning 
Ordinance # 157 &Zoning Map Ordinance # 158 
8. Plaintiff's exhibit #H-Decision on Requirements of a "Transcribable Verbatim Record" 
9. Plaintiffs exhibit I-Order Following Contempt Hearing & Order Expanding Preliminary 
Injunction. 
1 O. Plaintiff's exhibit #J-Decision on Conflict of Interests Issue for Purposes of a Preliminary 
Injunction. 
11. Plaintiff's exhibit #K- Minutes ofP&Z Additional Meeting dated April 21, 2008. 
12. Plaintiff's exhibit #L-Minutes of May 12,2008 Camas County Commissioners Meeting. 
13. Plaintiff's exhibit #M-Motion to dismiss. 
14. Defendant's exhibit #I-April w, 2008 legal Notice of Public Hearings for Camas County 
Zoning Ordinance & Comprehensive Plan &Comprehensive Plan Map & Zoning Map. 
IS. Defendant's exhibit #2 April 9, 2008 legal notice of Public Hearings. 
16. Defendant's exhibit #3-ApriI16, 2008 Legal notice of Public Hearing. 
17. Defendant's exhibit #4-Finding of Facts & Conclusions of Law of Camas County P&Z 
Commission Re camas County Zoning Map. 
18. Defendant's exhibit #6- Findings of Camas County P&Z Commission Re: Comphrehensive 
Plan 
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19. Defendant's exhibit #7- -Findings of Camas County P&Z Commission Re: Comprehensive 
Plan Map. 
20. Defendant's exhibit #8-Camas County P &Z recommendation Form dated 4/22/08. 
21. Defendant's exhibit #9- April 23, 2008 legal Notice of Public Hearings for Camas County 
Zoning Ordinance & Comprehensive Plan &Comprehensive Plan Map & Zoning Map. 
22. Defendant's exhibit #10-April 30, 2008 legal Notice of Public Hearings for Camas County 
Zoning Ordinance & Comprehensive Plan &Comprehensive Plan Map & Zoning Map. 
23. Defendant's exhibit #1 I-May 7, 2008 legal Notice of Public Hearings for Camas County 
Zoning Ordinance & Comprehensive Plan &Comprehensive Plan Map & Zoning Map. 
24. Defendant's exhibit #12-Agenda for May 12, 2008 Board of County Commissioners 
meeting. 
25. Defendant's exhibit #13- Agenda for May 19, 2008 Board of County Commissioners 
meeting. 
26. Defendant's exhibit #14-Minutes of the May 12,2008 Camas County Commissioners 
Meeting. 
27. Defendant's exhibit #15-Minutes of the May 19,2008 Camas County Commissioners 
meeting. 
28. Defendant's exhibit #16--Publication on May 14th, of adoption on May 12,2008 Zoning 
Ordinance # 157 &Zoning Map Ordinance # 158. 
29. Defendant's exhibit #17-Camas County Board of Commissioners Findings of Fact and 
Conclusion of Law Re: 2008 Zoning Map. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following document will be submitted as an exhibit to the Record: 
I. Affidavit of Dwight Butlin in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
2. Affidavit of Ken Backstom in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court the day 
of August, 2009. 
F.R. Bennett 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COUT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM 
HOMES, LLC, 
) 
) 
) Supreme Court No.36605-2009 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
V. 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by 
And through the duly elected Board of 
Commissioners in their official capacity, 
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DAVIS, and RON 
CHAPMAN, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
) 
) 
) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
II Korri Blodgett, Deputy Clerk of the Dist ct Court of 
the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho l in and 
for the County of Camas, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States mail, postage 
prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record and any Reporterls 
Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of 
Record as lows: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 1861 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Paul Fitzer 
950 W.Bannock St, Suite 520 
Boise l ID 83702 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of the said Court this day of August, 2009. 
F.R.Bennett 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM 
HOMES,LLC, 
Plaintiff-A ppe Ilants, 
V. 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by 
And through the duly elected Board of 
Commissioners in their official capacity, 
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DAVIS, and RON 
CHAPMAN, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPREME COURT NO. ,3<Olo05-200 <t 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Korri Blodgett, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Camas, do hereby certify that the 
above and foregoing Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and 
bound under my direction and is a true, full and correct Record of, the pleadings 
and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that all documents and exhibits offered or admitted in the 
above-entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the supreme court 
along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record as required by Rule 
31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Fairfield Idaho, this ~ day of August, 2009. 
F.R. Bennett 
Clerk of the District Court 
By ~oAA>. 22\ ~\)hf1) 
Korri Blodgett 
Deputy Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
